Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin: A comparative analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and development, undermines government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of recent anti-corruption efforts of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGO/NGOs), Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be worsening in the post-Cold War period. This dissertation discovers why IGO/NGO efforts to arrest corruption are failing by investigating the domestic and international causes of political corruption in the Caribbean. The dissertation's theoretical framework centers on an interdisciplinary model of the causes of political corruption built within the rule-oriented constructivist approach to social science. The model first employs a rational choice analysis that broadly explains the varying levels of political corruption found across the region. The constructivist theory of social rules is then used to develop the structural mechanisms that further explain the region's levels of political corruption. The dissertation advances its theory of the causes of political corruption through qualitative disciplined-configurative case studies of political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica. The dissertation finds that IGO/NGO sponsored anti-corruption programs are failing because they employ only technical measures (issuing anti-corruption laws and regulations, providing transparency in accounting procedures, improving freedom of the press, establishing electoral reforms, etc.). While these IGO/NGO technical measures are necessary, they are not sufficient to arrest the Caribbean's political corruption problems. This dissertation concludes that to be successful, IGO/NGO anti-corruption programs must also include social measures, e.g., building civil societies and modernizing political cultures, for there to be any hope of lowering political corruption levels and improving Caribbean social conditions. The dissertation also highlights the key role of Caribbean governing elite in constructing the political and economic structures that cause their states' political corruption problems. ^

Gender, identity, and the security state: The politics of international drug trafficking

This dissertation examined how United States illicit drug control policy, often commonly referred to as the "war on drugs," contributes to the reproduction of gendered and racialized social relations. Specifically, it analyzed the identity producing practices of United States illicit drug control policy as it relates to the construction of U.S. identities. ^ Drawing on the theoretical contributions of feminist postpositivists, three cases of illicit drug policy practice were discussed. In the first case, discourse analysis was employed to examine recent debates (1986-2005) in U.S. Congressional Hearings about the proper understanding of the illicit drug "threat." The analysis showed how competing policy positions are tied to differing understandings of proper masculinity and the role of policymakers as protectors of the national interest. Utilizing critical visual methodologies, the second case examined a public service media campaign circulated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy that tied the "war on drugs" with another security concern in the U.S., the "war on terror." This case demonstrated how the media campaign uses messages about race, masculinity, and femininity to produce privileged notions of state identity and proper citizenship. The third case examined the gendered politics of drug interdiction at the U.S. border. Using qualitative research methodologies including semi-structured interviews and participant observation, it examined how gender is produced through drug interdiction at border sites like Miami International Airport. By paying attention to the discourse that circulates about women drug couriers, it showed how gender is normalized in a national security setting. ^ What this dissertation found is that illicit drug control policy takes the form it does because of the politics of gender and racial identity and that, as a result, illicit drug policy is implicated in the reproduction of gender and racial inequities. It concluded that a more socially conscious and successful illicit drug policy requires an awareness of the gendered and racialized assumptions that inform and shape policy practices.^

Development of local homeland security networks in the state of Florida: A social network analysis approach

How do local homeland security organizations respond to catastrophic events such as hurricanes and acts of terrorism? Among the most important aspects of this response are these organizations ability to adapt to the uncertain nature of these "focusing events" (Birkland 1997). They are often behind the curve, seeing response as a linear process, when in fact it is a complex, multifaceted process that requires understanding the interactions between the fiscal pressures facing local governments, the institutional pressures of working within a new regulatory framework and the political pressures of bringing together different levels of government with different perspectives and agendas. ^ This dissertation has focused on tracing the factors affecting the individuals and institutions planning, preparing, responding and recovering from natural and man-made disasters. Using social network analysis, my study analyzes the interactions between the individuals and institutions that respond to these "focusing events." In practice, it is the combination of budgetary, institutional, and political pressures or constraints interacting with each other which resembles a Complex Adaptive System (CAS). ^ To investigate this system, my study evaluates the evolution of two separate sets of organizations composed of first responders (Fire Chiefs, Emergency Management Coordinators) and community volunteers organized in the state of Florida over the last fifteen years. Using a social network analysis approach, my dissertation analyzes the interactions between Citizen Corps Councils (CCCs) and Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) in the state of Florida from 1996–2011. It is the pattern of interconnections that occur over time that are the focus of this study. ^ The social network analysis revealed an increase in the amount and density of connections between these organizations over the last fifteen years. The analysis also exposed the underlying patterns in these connections; that as the networks became more complex they also became more decentralized though not in any uniform manner. The present study brings to light a story of how communities have adapted to the ever changing circumstances that are sine qua non of natural and man-made disasters.^

The state of emergency management 2000: The process of emergency management professionalization in the United States and Florida

This dissertation analyzes the current status of emergency management professionalization in the United States and Florida using a qualitative case study. I investigate the efforts of various organizations at the national and state levels in the private and public sectors to organize emergency management as a profession. I conceptualize emergency management professionalization as occurring in two phases: the indirect institutionalization of the occupation of emergency management and the formal advancement toward an emergency management profession. The legislative, organizational, and procedural developments that occurred between approximately 1900 and the late 1970s became the indirect institutionalization of the occupation of emergency management. Over time, as our society developed and became increasingly complex, more disasters affect the security of the population. In order to adapt to increasing risks and vulnerabilities the emergency management system emerged and with it the necessary elements upon which a future profession could be established providing the basis for the formal advancement toward an emergency management profession. ^ During approximately the last twenty years, the formal advancement toward an emergency management profession has encompassed two primary strategies—certification and accreditation—motivated by the objective to organize a profession. Certification applies to individual emergency managers and includes all training and education. Accreditation of state and local emergency management agencies is reached by complying to a minimum level of proficiency with established standards of performance. Certification and accreditation are the mechanisms used to create an emergency management profession and thus act as axes around which the field of emergency management is organizing. ^ The purpose of this research is to provide a frame of reference for whether or not the field of emergency management is a profession. Based on sociology of professions literature, emergency management can be considered to be professionalizing. The current emergency management professionalization efforts may or may not be sufficient to achieve the ultimate goal of becoming a legitimate profession based on legal and public support for the exclusive right to perform emergency management tasks (monopoly) as well as self-regulation of those tasks (autonomy). ^

The Security Challenges for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games

Brazilians greeted the long-awaited decision of making Rio de Janeiro the host of the 2016 Olympic Games with tremendous exhilaration. Although Rio’s fantastic natural beauty certainly added to its attraction in hosting the games, its alarming rates of urban crime and violence largely associated with drug trafficking immediately triggered worldwide criticism, and put at issue its ability to guarantee the security for the games. Brazilians have been vying for a position as an emerging global economy and understand the importance of the Games for international prestige. This makes the stakes very high when hosting the Olympic Games in the wake of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, which will also be held in Brazil. This paper explores these criticisms and assesses Rio’s ability to prepare for this important event. The paper further explores the consensus that Brazilians will be more equipped to address actions taken by organized crime capable of affecting the Olympic Games than to face a terrorist attack. Brazil – and Rio – does not figure in the “terrorism map” as a region particularly linked to terrorism. Aside from uncorroborated suspicions of activities by terrorist organizations on the Tri-Border region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Brazil does not elicit many concerns regarding terrorism.1 Yet, there is no way to guarantee that terrorist organizations will not try to make use of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to advance their agenda. This being in mind, Rio and Brazil in general face a long road ahead to prepare, prevent, protect and respond to a possible terrorist attack during the 2016 Olympics. It is clear that prevention and preparation towards potential threats to the Games must necessarily include cooperation and exchange of best practices with other countries. 1 U.S. Department of State has confirmed that this area may have been used to transport weapons and conduct financial affairs in the past. This type of activity has been made more difficult with the fortification of border controls in more recent times.

Guatemala: A Failing State?

 Guatemala is not a failed state and is unlikely to become one in the near future. Although the state currently fails to provide adequate security to its citizens or an appropriate range of effective social programs, it does supply a functioning electoral democracy, sound economic management, and a promising new antipoverty program, My Family Progresses (MIFAPRO).  Guatemala is a weak state. The principal security threats represented by expanding Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), criminal parallel powers, and urban gangs have overwhelmed the resources of the under-resourced and compromised criminal justice system. The UN-sponsored International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), however, has demonstrated that progress against organized crime is possible.  The principal obstacles to strengthening the Guatemalan state lie in the traditional economic elite’s resistance to taxation and the venal political class’ narrow focus on short-term interests. Guatemala lacks a strong, policyoriented, mass-based political party that could develop a coherent national reform program and mobilize public support around it.  The United States should strengthen the Guatemalan state by expanding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and by strongly supporting CICIG, MIFAPRO, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE).

The Current State of Argentina's Oil Industry

An oil wealthy country, Argentina has repeatedly tried and failed to capitalize on its potential. The unfortunate energy policies of subsequent Argentinean government and a lack of investment capital have been two of the main reasons that have significantly limited the production of export oil in the recent past. Yet, with recent discoveries and changes to the country’s hydrocarbon laws, there may be a new dawn for Argentina’s oil industry. Since 1999 when Argentina’s oil production peaked at approximately 800,000 barrels per day, there has been a 24 percent decrease in its oil output. The country’s oil reserves have also been in steady decline. Yet, the recently enacted reforms by Argentina’s government to incentivize foreign investment in the oil industry seem to be working, allowing investors to negotiate the terms of exploration directly with local governments. As a result, foreign investment is increasing, as well as new willingness to finance exploration of untapped reserves. Also, the discovery of shale oil in Argentina may provide the potential to become a key exporter in the region. Nonetheless, there are challenges that need to be overcome and it may be years before the various oil projects underway become profitable. The success of current oil projects, coupled with the potential of shale oil, new discoveries and the sustainability of the current energy policy reforms will likely determine if Argentina is finally able to fulfill its potential and exert itself as an oil exporter country in Latin America.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Disciplining democracy: United Nations peacekeeping, international security and democratization in the post -Cold War era

After the end of the Cold War, democratization and good governance became the organizing concepts for activities of the United Nations, regional organizations and states in the fields of peace, development and security. How can this increasing interest in democratization and its connection with international security be explained? This dissertation applies the theoretical tools developed by Michel Foucault in his discussions of disciplinarity and government to the analysis of the United Nations debate on democracy in the 1990s, and of two United Nations pro-democracy peacekeeping operations and their aftermath: the United Nations interventions in Haiti and Croatia. It probes “how” certain techniques of power came into being and describes their effects, using as data the texts that elaborate the United Nations understanding of democracy and the texts that constitute peacekeeping. ^ In the face of the proliferation of unpredictable threats in the last decades of the twentieth century a new form of international power emerged. Order in the international arena increasingly was maintained through activities aimed at reducing risk and increasing predictability through the normalization of “rogue” states. The dissertation shows that in the context of these activities, which included but were not limited to UN peacekeeping, normality was identified with democracy, non-democratic regimes with international threats, and democratization with international security. “Good governance” doctrines translated the political debate on democracy into the technical language of functioning state institutions. International organizations adopted good governance as the framework that made democratization a universal task within the reach of their expertise. In Haiti, the United Nations engaged in efforts to transform punishment institutions (the judiciary, police and the prison) into disciplined and disciplinary machines. In Croatia, agreements signed in the context of peacekeeping established in detail the rules of functioning of administrations and the monitoring mechanisms for their implementation. However, in Haiti, the institutions promoted were not sustainable. And in Croatia reforms are stalled by lack of consensus. ^ This dissertation puts efforts to bring about democracy through peacekeeping in the context of a specific modality of power and suggests caution in engaging in universal normalizing endeavors. ^

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

Russia's Islam: Discourse on Identity, Politics, and Security

Despite the long history of Muslims in Russia, most scholarly and political literatures on Russia’s Islam still narrowly interpret Muslim-Slavs relations in an ethnic-religious oppositional framework. In my work, I examine Russia’s discourse on Islam to argue that, in fact, the role of Islam in post-Soviet Russia is complex. Drawing from direct sources from academic, state, journalistic, and underground circles, often neglected by Western commentators, I identify ideational patterns in conceptualizations of Islam and reconstruct relational networks among authors. To explain complex intertextual relations within specific contexts, I utilize an analytically eclectic method that appropriately combines theories from different paradigms and/or disciplines. Thanks to my multi-dimensional approach, I show that, contrary to traditional views, Russia’s Muslims participate in processes of post-Soviet Russia’s identity formation. Starting from textual contents, avoiding pre-formed analytical frames, I argue that many Muslims in Russia perceive themselves as part of Russian civilization – even when they challenge the status-quo. Building on my initial findings, I state that a key element in Russia’s conceptualization of Islam is the definition, elaborated in the 1990s, of traditional Islam as part of Russian civilizational history, as opposed to extremist Islam as extraneous, hostile phenomenon. The differentiation creates an unprecedently safe, if confined, space for Islamic propositions, of which Muslims are taking advantage. Embedded in debates on Russian civilization, conceptualizations of Islam, then, influence Russia’s (geo)political self-perceptions and, consequently, its domestic and international policies. In particular, Russian so-far neglected Islamic doctrine supports views of Islamic terrorism as a political and not religious phenomenon. Hence, Russia interprets both terrorism and counterterrorism within its own historical tradition, causing its strategy to be at odds with Western views. Less apparently, these divergences affect Russian-U.S. broader relations. Finally, in revealing the civilizational value of Russia’s Islam, I expose intellectual relations among influential subjects who share the aim to devise a new civilizational model that should combine Slavic and non-Slavic, Orthodox and Islamic, Western, and Asian components. In this old Russian dilemma, the novelty is Muslims’ participation.

A State and Territorial Survey Regarding Utilization of Environmental Health Shelter Assessments during Disasters, and a Secondary Analysis of Available Shelter Assessment Data

Disasters are complex events characterized by damage to key infrastructure and population displacements into disaster shelters. Assessing the living environment in shelters during disasters is a crucial health security concern. Until now, jurisdictional knowledge and preparedness on those assessment methods, or deficiencies found in shelters is limited. A cross-sectional survey (STUSA survey) ascertained knowledge and preparedness for those assessments in all 50 states, DC, and 5 US territories. Descriptive analysis of overall knowledge and preparedness was performed. Fisher’s exact statistics analyzed differences between two groups: jurisdiction type and population size. Two logistic regression models analyzed earthquakes and hurricane risks as predictors of knowledge and preparedness. A convenience sample of state shelter assessments records (n=116) was analyzed to describe environmental health deficiencies found during selected events. Overall, 55 (98%) of jurisdictions responded (states and territories) and appeared to be knowledgeable of these assessments (states 92%, territories 100%, p = 1.000), and engaged in disaster planning with shelter partners (states 96%, territories 83%, p = 0.564). Few had shelter assessment procedures (states 53%, territories 50%, p = 1.000); or training in disaster shelter assessments (states 41%, 60% territories, p = 0.638). Knowledge or preparedness was not predicted by disaster risks, population size, and jurisdiction type in neither model. Knowledge: hurricane (Adjusted OR 0.69, 95% C.I. 0.06-7.88); earthquake (OR 0.82, 95% C.I. 0.17-4.06); and both risks (OR 1.44, 95% C.I. 0.24-8.63); preparedness model: hurricane (OR 1.91, 95% C.I. 0.06-20.69); earthquake (OR 0.47, 95% C.I. 0.7-3.17); and both risks (OR 0.50, 95% C.I. 0.06-3.94). Environmental health deficiencies documented in shelter assessments occurred mostly in: sanitation (30%); facility (17%); food (15%); and sleeping areas (12%); and during ice storms and tornadoes. More research is needed in the area of environmental health assessments of disaster shelters, particularly, in those areas that may provide better insight into the living environment of all shelter occupants and potential effects in disaster morbidity and mortality. Also, to evaluate the effectiveness and usefulness of these assessments methods and the data available on environmental health deficiencies in risk management to protect those at greater risk in shelter facilities during disasters.