Boundary maintenance in Qatar: Interpretation of domination, segregation and subordination

This study explores the interaction of expatriates in Qatar and their perception of their subordination. The study design included participant observation in an all female University and University housing as well as interviews with Qatari government agencies and ministries, expatriate embassies and expatriates. Semi-structured interviews were conducted across seven expatriate groups: domestic workers, unskilled laborers, semiskilled, professionals, housewives, second-generation expatriates with host country other than Qatar, second-generation expatriates with host country Qatar, and Gulf Cooperation Council citizens. Forty-two subjects completed the interview schedule while 87 interviews were incomplete. ^ Physical control of expatriates occurs through the Gulf practice of sponsorship (The Kafeel System), and local cultural and Islamic related controls intertwined with the Arab Code of honor. Interviews and observations revealed rankings of Arabs and foreigners which emphasize Qatari superiority such as tribal identity, moral ranking of female groups by dress, legal protection and power, sexual consideration and desexualization and salaries and job opportunities based on nationality and ethnicity. Individuals who desire to transcend boundaries into the Qatari realm through citizenship or marriage view Qataris as possessing the “image of the unlimited good” and have acquired Qatari social and cultural capital. Members from all expatriate groups engaged in various forms of resistance to labor and gender domination which ranged from forms of “exit,” expressing a hidden transcript in the privacy of their own group, disguised resistance in public, and occasionally, direct confrontation with the Qatari. Although the legal arena created the appearance that worker's needs were being addressed, laborers engaged in forms of “exit” to escape their oppression. Omani students in the hostel disguised their resistance by spreading gossip, nick-naming homosexual Qatari students at the University, acting out a skit depicting their exclusion from Qatari privilege, spreading rumors of impending freedom, and singing songs of despair in the courtyard. Other sites of resistance were expatriate embassies, the road, the newspaper and technology. This study emphasizes that blaming oppression of the expatriate worker on globalization is a simplistic view of oppression in the Gulf, and ignores complex issues within Qatari society and other Gulf States. Sponsorship, servitude, and gender segregation intersect in Qatar to create a system of segregation and domination of expatriates. ^

The political economy of poverty alleviation strategies. The initiative for heavily indebted poor countries in Bolivia: More of the same

In the year 2000, approximately 1.1 billion people lived in extreme poverty while developed countries spent US$600 billion a year on defense. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a recent component of a larger poverty reduction strategy supported by the International Financial Institutions, as well as many developed and developing countries. By implementing lessons of the past fifty years, this program attempts to diminish misery around the globe. As such, it provides debt relief while seeking to enable the poorest countries to simultaneously attain sustainable debt and promote human development. Interest in poverty reduction around the globe reemerged in the 1990s. This study contributes directly to this recent effort by presenting a nuanced approach that builds on the stepping-stones generated by other poverty scholars. To fulfill its goal, this investigation applies a political economy framework. Within this framework, the author conducts an actor-specific analysis. This dissertation addresses the following question: How do domestic and international actors respond to the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies? The author assumes actors desire to maximize their utility calculation and suggests these calculations are based on the player's motivations and external influences. Based on their motivations, the external influences, and the initiative's guidelines, each actor develops a set of expectations. To fulfill those expectations, stake holders utilize one or several strategies. Finally, the actors' ability to achieve their expectations determines each player's assessment of the initiative. The framework described is applied in an in-depth, actor-specific analysis of the HIPC in Bolivia. Bolivia's National Revolution represents the country's first attempt at reducing poverty. Since then, all governments have taken specific steps to combat poverty at the local and national levels. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is one of the most recent macro strategies of this kind. The case study demonstrated that three factors (national ownership, effective sponsorship and the local context) determine the success levels of poverty reduction strategies from abroad. In addition, the investigation clearly shows that poverty reduction is not the sole motivation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. All actors, however, share the dream of poverty reduction.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Effect of child care subsidies on price and quality of care for low -income families

This dissertation examines the effect of regulations, resource and referral agencies, and subsidies on price and quality of care in child care centers. This research is based on a carefully developed conceptual framework that incorporates the factors affecting the demand and supply of child care. The first step in developing this framework is sketching out the structural equations. The structural equations help us understand the underlying behavior of individuals and firms making a decision. The exogenous variables are vector of attributes relating to family characteristics, child characteristics, regulations, subsidy, community characteristics and prices of inputs. Based on the structural equations, reduced form equations are estimated to find the effect of each of the exogenous variables on each of the endogenous variables. Reduced form equations help us answer public policy questions. The sample for this study is from the 1990 Profile of Child Care Settings (PCCS) data in which 2,089 center based programs were interviewed.^ Child/Staff Ratio (Group Level). Results indicate that among subsidies, only the state subsidy per child in poverty has a significant effect on the child/staff ratio at the group level. Presence of resource and referral agencies also increase the child/staff ratio at the group level. Also when the maximum center group size regulation for 25-36 months becomes more stringent, the child/staff ratio at the group level decreases.^ Child/Staff Ratio (Center Level). When the regulations for the maximum child/staff ratio for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months become lax, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. As the regulation for maximum group size for infants becomes stringent, the child/staff ratio decreases. An interesting finding is that as the regulations for maximum group size for age groups 13-24 months and 25-36 months become stringent, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. Another significant finding is that when a center is located in a rural area the child/staff ratio is significantly lower.^ Center Weighted Average Hourly Fees. Maximum group size regulations for age groups 25-36 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 0-12 months and 25-36 months have a positive effect on center hourly fee. Findings also indicate that the center average hourly price is lower when there is a resource and referral agency present. Cost adjusted prekindergarten funds and JOBS child care subsidies have a negative effect on average hourly fee. Cost adjusted social services block grant and state subsidy per child in poverty have a positive effect on the average hourly price. A major finding of this dissertation is the interaction of subsidy and regulatory variables.^ Another major finding is that child/staff ratio at the group level is lower when there is an interaction between geographic location and nature of center sponsorship. ^

Effect of child care subsidies on price and quality of care for low -income families

This dissertation examines the effect of regulations, resource and referral agencies, and subsidies on price and quality of care in child care centers. This research is based on a carefully developed conceptual framework that incorporates the factors affecting the demand and supply of child care. The first step in developing this framework is sketching out the structural equations. The structural equations help us understand the underlying behavior of individuals and firms making a decision. The exogenous variables are vector of attributes relating to family characteristics, child characteristics, regulations, subsidy, community characteristics and prices of inputs. Based on the structural equations, reduced form equations are estimated to find the effect of each of the exogenous variables on each of the endogenous variables. Reduced form equations help us answer public policy questions. The sample for this study is from the 1990 Profile of Child Care Settings (PCCS) data in which 2,089 center based programs were interviewed. Child/Staff Ratio (Group Level): Results indicate that among subsidies, only the state subsidy per child in poverty has a significant effect on the child/staff ratio at the group level. Presence of resource and referral agencies also increase the child/staff ratio at the group level. Also when the maximum center group size regulation for 25-36 months becomes more stringent, the child/staff ratio at the group level decreases. Child/Staff Ratio (Center Level): When the regulations for the maximum child/staff ratio for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months become lax, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. As the regulation for maximum group size for infants becomes stringent, the child/staff ratio decreases. An interesting finding is that as the regulations for maximum group size for age groups 13-24 months and 25-36 months become stringent, the child/staff ratio for the center increases. Another significant finding is that when a center is located in a rural area the child/staff ratio is significantly lower. Center Weighted Average Hourly Fees: Maximum group size regulations for age groups 25-36 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 13-24 months and 37-60 months have a negative effect on center hourly fee. Maximum child staff regulations for age groups 0-12 months and 25-36 months have a positive effect on center hourly fee. Findings also indicate that the center average hourly price is lower when there is a resource and referral agency present. Cost adjusted prekindergarten funds and JOBS child care subsidies have a negative effect on average hourly fee. Cost adjusted social services block grant and state subsidy per child in poverty have a positive effect on the average hourly price. A major finding of this dissertation is the interaction of subsidy and regulatory variables. Another major finding is that child/staff ratio at the group level is lower when there is an interaction between geographic location and nature of center sponsorship.