South American Defense Council: What it Means for Regional Security?

The South American Defense Council (CSD), created in March 2009 as a military coordinating body of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) demonstrates a growing trend among Latin American countries to approach matters of regional security independent of the United States. The CSD also indicates a maturation of democratic civil military relations in a region once dominated by authoritarian military regimes. The CSD aims to facilitate the exchange of information about regional defense policies, promote collaboration for disaster relief, and promote civil-military engagement. In less than a year it is hardly a tested entity, but the presence of 12 South American states coming together around security policy marks an important moment in the evolution of civil-military relations in the region. Brazil has taken on an important leadership role in the CSD, acting as a leader in recent regional peacekeeping efforts. As a geopolitical move, Brazil also sees a benefit in promoting good relationships with all countries of South america, given its common border with nine of them. Although the United States is not a member of the CSD, the organization's agenda of infromation exchange of defense policies, military cooperation, and capacity building, including disaster assistance and preparedness provide opportunities for greater collaboration. The CSD is not part of the Inter-American System created after the Second World War. It is unclear how its work will coincide with the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security or its Secretariat for Multidimensional Security. The U.S. should view the CSD as a mechanism to promote joint initiatives that encourage democratic governance in the region.

Patterns of Root Dynamics in Mangrove Forests Along Environmental Gradients in the Florida Coastal Everglades, USA

Patterns of mangrove vegetation in two distinct basins of Florida Coastal Everglades (FCE), Shark River estuary and Taylor River Slough, represent unique opportunities to test hypotheses that root dynamics respond to gradients of resources, regulators, and hydroperiod. We propose that soil total phosphorus (P) gradients in these two coastal basins of FCE cause specific patterns in belowground biomass allocation and net primary productivity that facilitate nutrient acquisition, but also minimize stress from regulators and hydroperiod in flooded soil conditions. Shark River basin has higher P and tidal hydrology with riverine mangroves, in contrast to scrub mangroves of Taylor basin with more permanent flooding and lower P across the coastal landscape. Belowground biomass (0–90 cm) of mangrove sites in Shark River and Taylor River basins ranged from 2317 to 4673 g m-2, with the highest contribution (62–85%) of roots in the shallow root zone (0–45 cm) compared to the deeper root zone (45–90 cm). Total root productivity did not vary significantly among sites and ranged from 407 to 643 g m-2 y-1. Root production in the shallow root zone accounted for 57–78% of total production. Root turnover rates ranged from 0.04 to 0.60 y-1 and consistently decreased as the root size class distribution increased from fine to coarse roots, indicating differences in root longevity. Fine root biomass was negatively correlated with soil P density and frequency of inundation, whereas fine root turnover decreased with increasing soil N:P ratios. Lower P availability in Taylor River basin relative to Shark River basin, along with higher regulator and hydroperiod stress, confirms our hypothesis that interactions of stress from resource limitation and long duration of hydroperiod account for higher fine root biomass along with lower fine root production and turnover. Because fine root production and organic matter accumulation are the primary processes controlling soil formation and accretion in scrub mangrove forests, root dynamics in the P-limited carbonate ecosystem of south Florida have a major controlling role as to how mangroves respond to future impacts of sealevel rise.

The Re-Emergence of Suriname’s Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety

This study examines some concerns that derive from Suriname‘s May-July 2010 elections, which resulted in the re-emergence of erstwhile military ruler and convicted drug trafficker, Désiré (Desi) Bouterse, as President of the Republic. The victory reflects Bouterse‘s political acumen in aggregating disparate political interests and in establishing a viable coalition government. But because of his history and profile, this triumph has generated anxiety in some places internationally. In this respect, the study examines anxieties related to three matters: (a) relations with Guyana, where there is an existing territorial dispute and a recently resolved maritime dispute, (b) illegal drug trafficking operations, and (c) foreign policy engagement with Venezuela. There has been a flurry of bilateral activities—including several presidential summits—with Guyana since President Bouterse‘s inauguration, albeit seemingly more about symbolism than substance. Although the maritime dispute was settled by a Tribunal of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 2007, the 15,000 km2 New River Triangle is still unresolved. Indeed, in June 2011 President Bouterse reasserted Suriname‘s claim to the Triangle. Suriname has upped the ante in that dispute by portraying internationally the map of Suriname as inclusive of the disputed area. In all likelihood that self-redefinition slowly will become the country‘s cartographic definition in the eyes of the world if Guyana does not successfully rebuff that move or pursue the definitive settlement of the dispute. A geonarcotics assessment shows Suriname to be still heavily implicated in trafficking, because of geography, law enforcement limitations, corruption, and other factors. But despite Bouterse‘s drug-related history and that of former senior military officers, several reasons suggest the inexpediency of a narco-state being created by Bouterse. As well, as part of Suriname‘s pursuit of increased Caribbean and South American engagement, it has boosted relations with Venezuela, which has included it in PetroCaribe and provided housing and agricultural aid. However, the engagement appears to be driven more by pragmatism and less by any ideological affinity with Hugo Chavez.

Altered Landscape or Arms Race? Making Sense of Military Spending in South America

In 2009, South American military spending reached a total of $51.8 billion, a fifty percent increased from 2000 expenditures. The five-year moving average of arms transfers to South America was 150 percent higher from 2005 to 2009 than figures for 2000 to 2004.[1] These figures and others have led some observers to conclude that Latin America is engaged in an arms race. Other reasons, however, account for Latin America’s large military expenditure. Among them: Several countries have undertaken long-prolonged modernization efforts, recently made possible by six years of consistent regional growth.[2] A generational shift is at hand. Armed Forces are beginning to shed the stigma and association with past dictatorial regimes.[3] Countries are pursuing specific individual strategies, rather than reacting to purchases made by neighbors. For example, Brazil wants to attain greater control of its Amazon rainforests and offshore territories, Colombia’s spending demonstrates a response to internal threats, and Chile is continuing a modernization process begun in the 1990s.[4] Concerns remain, however: Venezuela continues to demonstrate poor democratic governance and a lack of transparency; neighbor-state relations between Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay, must all continue to be monitored; and Brazil’s military purchases, although legitimate, will likely result in a large accumulation of equipment.[5] These concerns can be best addressed by strengthening and garnering greater participation in transparent procurement mechanism.[6] The United States can do its part by supporting Latin American efforts to embrace the transparency process. _________________ [1] Bromley, Mark, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 12,13, and 16 [2] Robledo, Marcos, “The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,” Power Point presentation, slide 18, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25th-26th, 2010 [3] Yopo, Boris, “¿Carrera Armamentista en la Regiόn?” La Tercera, November 2nd, 2009, http://www.latercera.com/contenido/895_197084_9.shtml, accessed October 8th, 2010 [4] Walser, Ray, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 49,50,53 and 54 [5] Ibid., Guevara, Iñigo, Pg. 22 [6] Ibid., Bromley, Mark, Pgs. 18 and 19

Land Use and Climate Change Impacts on the Hydrology of the Upper Mara River Basin, Kenya: Results of a Modeling Study to Support Better Resource Management

Some of the most valued natural and cultural landscapes on Earth lie in river basins that are poorly gauged and have incomplete historical climate and runoff records. The Mara River Basin of East Africa is such a basin. It hosts the internationally renowned Mara-Serengeti landscape as well as a rich mixture of indigenous cultures. The Mara River is the sole source of surface water to the landscape during the dry season and periods of drought. During recent years, the flow of the Mara River has become increasingly erratic, especially in the upper reaches, and resource managers are hampered by a lack of understanding of the relative influence of different sources of flow alteration. Uncertainties about the impacts of future climate change compound the challenges. We applied the Soil Water Assessment Tool (SWAT) to investigate the response of the headwater hydrology of the Mara River to scenarios of continued land use change and projected climate change. Under the data-scarce conditions of the basin, model performance was improved using satellite-based estimated rainfall data, which may also improve the usefulness of runoff models in other parts of East Africa. The results of the analysis indicate that any further conversion of forests to agriculture and grassland in the basin headwaters is likely to reduce dry season flows and increase peak flows, leading to greater water scarcity at critical times of the year and exacerbating erosion on hillslopes. Most climate change projections for the region call for modest and seasonally variable increases in precipitation (5–10 %) accompanied by increases in temperature (2.5–3.5 °C). Simulated runoff responses to climate change scenarios were non-linear and suggest the basin is highly vulnerable under low (−3 %) and high (+25 %) extremes of projected precipitation changes, but under median projections (+7 %) there is little impact on annual water yields or mean discharge. Modest increases in precipitation are partitioned largely to increased evapotranspiration. Overall, model results support the existing efforts of Mara water resource managers to protect headwater forests and indicate that additional emphasis should be placed on improving land management practices that enhance infiltration and aquifer recharge as part of a wider program of climate change adaptation.