Jane Smiley's "A Thousand Acres": A Feminist Revision of "King Lear"

Jane Smiley retells the tale of “King Lear” through the perspective of one of the evil sisters, in her novel “A Thousand Acres”. While the literary canon places William Shakespeare and his plays at the top of the list, I disagree that the canon should denote what is considered “classic” and what would be disregarded. Jane Smiley's novel is not canonized, but why? Her feminist revision of “King Lear” answers why Goneril and Regan were so evil. I argue that “King Lear” (both the text and the play) does not provide the evidence of dysfunction that Smiley's novel exhibits. “A Thousand Acres” opens up questions about gender formation, issues that are misrepresented and occluded in Shakespeare's “King Lear”. By bringing the trauma of incest to the forefront of the novel, its reverse emotional structures allow the reader to obtain a new perspective to a complex four-century-old play.

Measuring effectiveness in international financial crime prevention: Can we agree on a performance metric?

The attempts at carrying out terrorist attacks have become more prevalent. As a result, an increasing number of countries have become particularly vigilant against the means by which terrorists raise funds to finance their draconian acts against human life and property. Among the many counter-terrorism agencies in operation, governments have set up financial intelligence units (FIUs) within their borders for the purpose of tracking down terrorists’ funds. By investigating reported suspicious transactions, FIUs attempt to weed out financial criminals who use these illegal funds to finance terrorist activity. The prominent role played by FIUs means that their performance is always under the spotlight. By interviewing experts and conducting surveys of those associated with the fight against financial crime, this study investigated perceptions of FIU performance on a comparative basis between American and non-American FIUs. The target group of experts included financial institution personnel, civilian agents, law enforcement personnel, academicians, and consultants. Questions for the interview and surveys were based on the Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard (BSC) methodology. One of the objectives of this study was to help determine the suitability of the BSC to this arena. While FIUs in this study have concentrated on performance by measuring outputs such as the number of suspicious transaction reports investigated, this study calls for a focus on outcomes involving all the parties responsible for financial criminal investigations. It is only through such an integrated approach that these various entities will be able to improve performance in solving financial crime. Experts in financial intelligence strongly believed that the quality and timeliness of intelligence was more important than keeping track of the number of suspicious transaction reports. Finally, this study concluded that the BSC could be appropriately applied to the arena of financial crime prevention even though the emphasis is markedly different from that in the private sector. While priority in the private sector is given to financial outcomes, in this arena employee growth and internal processes were perceived as most important in achieving a satisfactory outcome.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.