Gender, identity, and the security state: The politics of international drug trafficking

This dissertation examined how United States illicit drug control policy, often commonly referred to as the "war on drugs," contributes to the reproduction of gendered and racialized social relations. Specifically, it analyzed the identity producing practices of United States illicit drug control policy as it relates to the construction of U.S. identities. ^ Drawing on the theoretical contributions of feminist postpositivists, three cases of illicit drug policy practice were discussed. In the first case, discourse analysis was employed to examine recent debates (1986-2005) in U.S. Congressional Hearings about the proper understanding of the illicit drug "threat." The analysis showed how competing policy positions are tied to differing understandings of proper masculinity and the role of policymakers as protectors of the national interest. Utilizing critical visual methodologies, the second case examined a public service media campaign circulated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy that tied the "war on drugs" with another security concern in the U.S., the "war on terror." This case demonstrated how the media campaign uses messages about race, masculinity, and femininity to produce privileged notions of state identity and proper citizenship. The third case examined the gendered politics of drug interdiction at the U.S. border. Using qualitative research methodologies including semi-structured interviews and participant observation, it examined how gender is produced through drug interdiction at border sites like Miami International Airport. By paying attention to the discourse that circulates about women drug couriers, it showed how gender is normalized in a national security setting. ^ What this dissertation found is that illicit drug control policy takes the form it does because of the politics of gender and racial identity and that, as a result, illicit drug policy is implicated in the reproduction of gender and racial inequities. It concluded that a more socially conscious and successful illicit drug policy requires an awareness of the gendered and racialized assumptions that inform and shape policy practices.^

Trojan horses: On the origins of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008

In this thesis I sought to explain the origins of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008. I identified and examined 29 cases of national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States during that period, and argued that in order to understand the circumstances under which foreign investments in the United States are perceived to be threats to the U.S. security we must rely on a combination of democratic peace theory and the version of political realism known as power transition theory. Thus, I tested the argument that national security concerns over foreign investments in the United States from 1919 to 2008 resulted from: (1) perceptions of international power transition, (2) perceptions of ideological and institutional differences between the United States and the home country of the investor, (3) perceptions of the strategic importance of the sector where the investment is made, and (4) perceptions of participation or control of the foreign investor by the government of the country of origin. I found that all these hypotheses have some explanatory power.

Trading democracy for security? The effects of the international drug war on the quality of democracy in the Dominican Republic, 1996–2008

The purpose of the research is to study the relationship between international drug interdiction policies and domestic politics in fragile democracies, and to demonstrate how international drug control policies and the use of force fit the rhetoric of war, are legitimized by the principles of a just war, but may also cause collateral damage and negative unintended consequences. The method used is a case study of the Dominican Republic. The research has found that international drug control regimes, primarily led by the U.S. and narrowly focused on interdiction, have influenced an increasingly militarized approach to domestic law enforcement in the Dominican Republic. The collateral damage caused by militarized enforcement comes in the form of negative perceptions of citizen security, loss of respect for the rule of law and due process, and low levels of civil society development. The drug war has exposed the need for significant reform of the institutions charged with carrying out enforcement, the police force and the judicial system in particular. The dissertation concludes that the extent of drug trafficking in the Dominican Republic is beyond the scope of domestic reform efforts alone, but that the programs implemented do show some potential for future success. The dissertation also concludes that the framework of warfare is not the most appropriate for the international problems of drug traffic and abuse. A broader, multipronged approach should be considered by world policy makers in order to address all conditions that allow drugs to flourish without infringing upon democratic and civil rights in the process.

The Use of the Military for Law Enforcement Activities in Central America

Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Disciplining democracy: United Nations peacekeeping, international security and democratization in the post -Cold War era

After the end of the Cold War, democratization and good governance became the organizing concepts for activities of the United Nations, regional organizations and states in the fields of peace, development and security. How can this increasing interest in democratization and its connection with international security be explained? This dissertation applies the theoretical tools developed by Michel Foucault in his discussions of disciplinarity and government to the analysis of the United Nations debate on democracy in the 1990s, and of two United Nations pro-democracy peacekeeping operations and their aftermath: the United Nations interventions in Haiti and Croatia. It probes “how” certain techniques of power came into being and describes their effects, using as data the texts that elaborate the United Nations understanding of democracy and the texts that constitute peacekeeping. ^ In the face of the proliferation of unpredictable threats in the last decades of the twentieth century a new form of international power emerged. Order in the international arena increasingly was maintained through activities aimed at reducing risk and increasing predictability through the normalization of “rogue” states. The dissertation shows that in the context of these activities, which included but were not limited to UN peacekeeping, normality was identified with democracy, non-democratic regimes with international threats, and democratization with international security. “Good governance” doctrines translated the political debate on democracy into the technical language of functioning state institutions. International organizations adopted good governance as the framework that made democratization a universal task within the reach of their expertise. In Haiti, the United Nations engaged in efforts to transform punishment institutions (the judiciary, police and the prison) into disciplined and disciplinary machines. In Croatia, agreements signed in the context of peacekeeping established in detail the rules of functioning of administrations and the monitoring mechanisms for their implementation. However, in Haiti, the institutions promoted were not sustainable. And in Croatia reforms are stalled by lack of consensus. ^ This dissertation puts efforts to bring about democracy through peacekeeping in the context of a specific modality of power and suggests caution in engaging in universal normalizing endeavors. ^

Conceptualizing American power and security in a post -9/11 security context: Conflict, resistance, and global security, 2001–present

In a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world, the advent of US global supremacy resulted in the installation, perpetuation, and dissemination of an Absolutist Security Agenda (hereinafter, ASA). The US ASA explicitly and aggressively articulates and equates US national security interests with the security of all states in the international system, and replaced the bipolar, Cold War framework that defined international affairs from 1945-1992. Since the collapse of the USSR and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the US has unilaterally defined, implemented, and managed systemic security policy. The US ASA is indicative of a systemic category of knowledge (security) anchored in variegated conceptual and material components, such as morality, philosophy, and political rubrics. The US ASA is based on a logic that involves the following security components: (1) hyper militarization, (2) intimidation,(3) coercion, (4) criminalization, (5) panoptic surveillance, (6) plenary security measures, and (7) unabashed US interference in the domestic affairs of select states. Such interference has produced destabilizing tensions and conflicts that have, in turn, produced resistance, revolutions, proliferation, cults of personality, and militarization. This is the case because the US ASA rests on the notion that the international system of states is an extension, instrument of US power, rather than a system and/or society of states comprised of functionally sovereign entities. To analyze the US ASA, this study utilizes: (1) official government statements, legal doctrines, treaties, and policies pertaining to US foreign policy; (2) militarization rationales, budgets, and expenditures; and (3) case studies of rogue states. The data used in this study are drawn from information that is publicly available (academic journals, think-tank publications, government publications, and information provided by international organizations). The data supports the contention that global security is effectuated via a discrete set of hegemonic/imperialistic US values and interests, finding empirical expression in legal acts (USA Patriot ACT 2001) and the concept of rogue states. Rogue states, therefore, provide test cases to clarify the breadth, depth, and consequentialness of the US ASA in world affairs vis-à-vis the relationship between US security and global security.

Trading Democracy for Security? The Effects of the International Drug War on the Quality of Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 1996 -2008

The purpose of the research is to study the relationship between international drug interdiction policies and domestic politics in fragile democracies, and to demonstrate how international drug control policies and the use of force fit the rhetoric of war, are legitimized by the principles of a just war, but may also cause collateral damage and negative unintended consequences. The method used is a case study of the Dominican Republic. The research has found that international drug control regimes, primarily led by the U.S. and narrowly focused on interdiction, have influenced an increasingly militarized approach to domestic law enforcement in the Dominican Republic. The collateral damage caused by militarized enforcement comes in the form of negative perceptions of citizen security, loss of respect for the rule of law and due process, and low levels of civil society development. The drug war has exposed the need for significant reform of the institutions charged with carrying out enforcement, the police force and the judicial system in particular. The dissertation concludes that the extent of drug trafficking in the Dominican Republic is beyond the scope of domestic reform efforts alone, but that the programs implemented do show some potential for future success. The dissertation also concludes that the framework of warfare is not the most appropriate for the international problems of drug traffic and abuse. A broader, multipronged approach should be considered by world policy makers in order to address all conditions that allow drugs to flourish without infringing upon democratic and civil rights in the process.