Research and University Graduate School Report; Office of Sponsored Research Administration - Fiscal Year 2007-2008

The Office of Sponsored Research Administration became The Division of Research. The Division of Research became the Office of Research and Economic Development in January 2015.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Financial constraints on research and development

This dissertation examines whether-there exists financial constraints and, if so, their implications for investment in research and development expenditures. It develops a theoretical model of credit rationing and research and development in which both are determined simultaneously and endogenously. The model provides a useful tool to examine different policies that may help alleviate the negative the effect of financial constraints faced by firms.^ The empirical evidence presented deals with two different cases, namely, the motor vehicle industry in Germany (1970-1990) and the electrical machinery industry In Spain (1975-1990).^ The innovation in the empirical analysis is that it follows a novel approach to identify events that allow us to isolate the effect of financial constraints in the determination of research and development.^ Further, empirical evidence is presented to show that in the above two cases financial constraints affect investment in physical capital as well.^ The empirical evidence presented supports the results of the theoretical model developed in this dissertation, showing that financial constraints negatively affect the rate of growth of innovation by reducing the intensity of research and development activity. ^

On the fundamentals of research and development (R&D) spillovers in competitive markets

Rivals may voluntarily share Research and Development (R&D) results even in the absence of any binding agreements or collusion. In a model where rival firms engage in non-cooperative independent R&D process, we used optimization and game theory analysis to study the equilibrium strategy of the firms. Our work showed that, while minimal spillover is always equilibrium, there may be another equilibrium where firms may reciprocally choose high, sometimes perfect, spillover rates. The incentive for sharing R&D output is based on firms' expectations of learning from their rivals' R&D progress in the future. This leads to strategic complementarities between the firms' choices of spillover rates and thus policy implication follows. ^ Public research agencies can contribute more to social welfare by providing research as public goods. In a non-cooperative public-private research relationship where parallel R&D is conducted, by making its R&D results accessible, the public research agency can stimulate private spillovers, even if there exists rivalry among the private firms who can benefit from such spillovers. ^