Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Social Capital and International Migration from Latin America

We combine data from the Latin American Migration Project and the Mexican Migration Project to estimate models predicting the likelihood of taking of first and later trips to the United States from five nations: Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Peru. The models test specific hypotheses about the effects of social capital on international migration and how these effects vary with respect to contextual factors. Our findings confirm the ubiquity of migrant networks and the universality of social capital effects throughout Latin America. They also reveal how the sizes of these effects are not uniform across settings. Social capital operates more powerfully on first as opposed to later trips and interacts with the cost of migration. In addition, effects are somewhat different when considering individual social capital (measuring strong ties) and community social capital (measuring weak ties). On first trips, the effect of strong ties in promoting migration increases with distance whereas the effect of weak ties decreases with distance. On later trips, the direction of effects for both individual and community social capital is negative for long distances but positive for short distances.

The direct investments in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s of multinational enterprises headquartered in Spain

This thesis explains why multinational enterprises (MNEs) headquartered in Spain made significant investments in Latin America in the 1990s. Two independent variables are considered: structural reforms in Latin America, and liberalization in Spain. The first independent variable concerns the ways in which Latin American governments adopted a series of reforms that made their economies attractive to foreign investors. The second variable explains how the prospects of liberalization and foreign competition led Spanish firms to invest abroad in order to expand their businesses. The study will also show the competitive advantage of Spanish MNEs, vis-a-vis other foreign and local competitors in Latin America. This thesis takes an international political economy approach. The core of the thesis shows the development of Spanish direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. The theoretical perspectives on MNEs are provided by theory of the firm, industrial organizations theory and alliance theory. ^

The advantage of Spanish multinational enterprises in Latin America

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Spain made large foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Latin America between 1990 and 2002, making Spain the second largest direct investor in this region since 1998, behind the United States. This dissertation explains the reasons that led Spanish firms to make these FDIs, as well as their operations in Latin America. Seven Spanish MNEs were included in this study, BBVA and SCH (banking), Telefónica (telecommunications), Endesa, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa (public utilities), and Repsol-YPF (oil and natural gas). Quantitative and qualitative data were used. Data were collected from the firms' annual reports, from their archives and from personal interviews with senior executives, as well as from academic and specialized publications. ^ Results indicate that the large Spanish FDIs in Latin America were highly concentrated in a few firms from five sectors. The FDIs of these firms alone accounted for 70 percent of total Spanish FDI in Latin America in this period. The reasons for these investments were firm-specific and sector specific. A series of institutional conditions existed in Spain between the 1970s and the 1990s that allowed the employees of the firms to develop the knowledge and devise strategies to adjust to that set of conditions. First, the policies of the Spanish state favored the creation of large firms in these sectors, operating under conditions of monopoly sometimes. Secondly, the consumers put pressure on the firms to provide better and cheaper products as the Spanish economy grew and modernized. Thirdly, the employees of the firms had to adjust their services and products to the demands of the consumers and to the constraints of the state and the market. They adjusted the internal organization of the firm to be able to produce the goods and services that the market demanded. Externally, they also adopted patterns of interaction with outside agents and institutions. This patterned behavior was the “corporate culture” of each firm and the “normative framework” in which their employees operated. When the managers of the firms perceived that there were similar conditions in Latin America, they decided to operate there as well by making FDIs. ^

Why and how multinational corporations influence the trade negotiation process in Latin America

This thesis examines two research questions: (1) Why do Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) try to influence trade negotiations in the Latin American context? and (2) How do MNEs influence the trade negotiation process in Latin America? The results show that the MNE's main reasons for participation are: (1) to gain market access and, specifically, to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers; (2) to create a beneficial regulatory environment for the MNE; and (3) to set the rules of the game by influencing the business environment in which its industry or its specific company is required to operate. The main approaches reported by the interviewees as to how MNEs participate are: (1) the MNE directly lobbies domestic government officials, principally the United States Trade Representative office; (2) a business, trade or industry association lobbies domestic government officials on the MNE's behalf; and (3) the MNE lobbies Congress.

Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America

Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi’ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran -- a designated State-sponsor of terrorism – its nuclear program. Hezbollah, and the “Bolivarian revolution” led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi’ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chávez’ Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new convert, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. While conducting this research, no websites directly claiming to be linked to Hezbollah were found, although there numerous sites hosted by that group that were active until around 2006. Several of the inactive links are supportive of Hezbollah as a political party. No websites linked to al Qaeda were found. Yet a substantial Internet network remains operational. Much of the outreach for Shi’ite Muslims, closely tied to Iran, is sponsored on numerous websites across the region, including El Salvador, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Numerous Facebook forums for discussion are also hosted around Latin America. These links must be viewed in the context of the rapidly expanding diplomatic, intelligence, political and economic ties of Iran in recent years with the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states. Given the sparse literature available and the rich vein of un-mined information on the sites cited as well as others that one could find with additional research, the cyber network of Islamist groups remains one of the least understood or studied facets of their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It merits significantly more investigation.

Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions

Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactive nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.

The Rise of Native Voices Against Natural Resource Extraction in Latin America [Student's Paper Series]

Latin America, a region rich in both energy resources and native heritage, faces a rising politico-social confrontation that has been growing for over two decades. While resources like oil and gas are exploited to enhance the state’s economic growth, indigenous groups feel threatened because the operations related to this exploitation are infringing on their homelands. Furthermore, they believe that the potential resource wealth found in these environmentally-sensitive regions is provoking an “intrusion” in their ancestral territory of either government agencies or corporations allowed by governmental decree. Indigenous groups, which have achieved greater political voice over the past decade, are protesting against government violations. These protests have reached the media and received international attention, leading the discourse on topics such as civil and human rights violations. When this happens, the State finds itself “between a rock and a hard place”: In a debate between indigenous groups’ rights and economic sustainability.

Entrepreneur's Dilemma: Hotel Investments in Emerging Markets

Estimating the required rate of return for hotel properties is a daunting task because a lodging property is considered a hybrid between a real estate asset, and a revenue-generating enterprise affiliated with a hotel brand. Computing the expected rate of return for a hotel becomes even more complicated when a third party foreign investor/entrepreneur is the one performing the computation for an investment hotel in an emerging country. This clinical case illustrates the challenges surrounding the estimation of a project’s cost of equity in the multinational hotel industry. The results reveal that estimating cost of equity in emerging markets for hotel investments continues to be a conundrum. Future investors should make multiple adjustments and use several models when making their capital investment decisions.

Indigenous Movements, Democracy, and U.S. Interests in Latin America

Indigenous movements have become increasingly powerful in the last couple of decades and they are now important political actors in some South American countries, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and, to a lesser extent, Peru and Chile. The rise of indigenous movements has provoked concern among U.S. policymakers and other observers who have feared that these movements will exacerbate ethnic polarization, undermine democracy, and jeopardize U.S. interests in the region. This paper argues that concern over the rise of indigenous movements is greatly exaggerated. It maintains that the rise of indigenous movements has not brought about a market increase in ethnic polarization in the region because most indigenous organizations have been ethnically inclusive and have eschewed violence. Although the indigenous movements have at times demonstrated a lack of regard for democratic institutions and procedures, they have also helped deepen democracy in the Andean region by promoting greater political inclusion and participation and by aggressively combating ethnic discrimination and inequality. Finally, this study suggests that the indigenous population has opposed some U.S. –sponsored initiatives, such as coca eradication and market reform, for legitimate reasons. Such policies have had some negative environmental, cultural, and economic consequences for indigenous people, which U.S. policymakers should try to address. The conclusion provides some specific policy recommendations on how to go about this.

Catholic student movements in Latin America: Cuba and Brazil, 1920s to 1960s

This dissertation examines the ideological development of the Catholic University Student (JUC) movements in Cuba and Brazil during the Cold War and their organizational predecessors and intellectual influences in interwar Europe. Transnational Catholicism prioritized the attempt to influence youth and in particular, university students, within the context of Catholic nations within Atlantic civilization in the middle of the twentieth century. This dissertation argues that the Catholic university movements achieved a relatively high level of social and political influence in a number of countries in Latin America and that the experience of the Catholic student activists led them to experience ideological conflict and in some cases, rupture, with the conservative ideology of the Catholic hierarchy. Catholic student movements flourished after World War II in the context of an emerging youth culture. The proliferation of student organizations became part of the ideological battlefield of the Cold War. Catholic university students also played key roles in the Cuban Revolution (1957-1959) and in the attempted political and social reforms in Brazil under President João Goulart (1961-1964). ^ The JUC, under the guidance of the Church hierarchy, attempted to avoid aligning itself with either ideological camp in the Cold War, but rather to chart a Third Way between materialistic capitalism and atheistic socialism. Thousands of students in over 70 nations were intensively trained to think critically about pressing social issues. This paper will to place the Catholic Student movement in Cuba in the larger context of transnational Catholic university movements using archival evidence, newspaper accounts and secondary sources. Despite the hierarchy's attempt to utilize students as a tool of influence, the actual lived experience of students equipped them to think critically about social issues, and helped lay a foundation for the progressive student politics of the late 1960s and the rise of liberation theology in the 1970s. ^