The moderate voice of John Sherman and the Republican agenda 1855-1898

Republican John Sherman, United States Congressman, Senator, Treasury Secretary, and Secretary of State had a political career of major importance from 1855 to 1898, yet there have been only casual references by historians and only two biographies of him, with the most recent published in 1902. From a strong Whig Party background, he was first elected to the United States House of Representatives in 1854; switching to the Republicans that same year. Then elevated to the Senate in 1861, he served in that body throughout the Civil War and Reconstruction when he was the most important voice of party unity and moderation. In 1877, the new President Rutherford Hayes appointed Sherman Secretary of the Treasury. He returned to the Senate after the Hayes administration where he sat for the following 15 years. In this particularly notable period, he not only led the upper house, but he engineered more bills in Congress which bore his name than any other member of either house. These included the critically important Sherman Silver Purchase Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and Sherman Inter-State Commerce Act. In 1897 he left the Senate finally when William McKinley appointed him Secretary of State. ^ Through this long, distinguished career, Sherman was involved in all the important legislation that brought the country through the Civil War and Reconstruction and into the post-war world of the Gilded Age of rapid industrialization, and urban growth, Politically, he never strayed far from the nationalistic and economic principles of the Whig Party, and brought both these values to bear in the Republican Party that dominated American political life from 1860 to 1900. Similarly, party loyalty and loyalty to the President always characterized his service. He was indeed, an exemplar of political and statesmanship. ^ While research for this dissertation included review of both journal and monographic literature, its basis lies more critically in primary research in unpublished archival material in repositories from Maine to Ohio, in particular the Library of Congress. ^

Determinants and effects of electoral party coalitions: The case of Brazil

Since the 1985 return to democracy, Brazilian politicians have resorted to vote-pooling arrangements to elect representatives. A puzzle thus presents itself: What drives parties to join these electoral cartels? The dissertation unraveled the incentives party elites have to participate in coalitions under a presidencialist system of government. I also investigated the effect of electoral coalitions on congressional representation. I applied a model of binary outcomes and relied on standard deviations to assess the ideological homogeneity/heterogeneity of electoral coalitions. I also calculated the Index of Disproportionality to measure the gaps between the proportion of votes and seats received by all parties in Brazil with and without electoral coalitions. Finally, I assessed the effects of the electoral formula on proportionality. An unexpected exogenous factor resulted crucial in explaining proportional electoral coalition building: The district's majoritarian election for governor. In each district, political actors often synchronize coalition partners to maximize winning results while minimizing electoral efforts.

Voting with their feet: Migration, partisanship, and party-safe elections in Florida

Political scientists have long noted that Congressional elections are often uncompetitive, often extremely so. Many scholars argue that the cause lies in the partisan redistricting of Congressional districts, or “gerrymandering”. Other scholars emphasize polarization created by a fragmented news media, or the candidate choices made by a more ideological primary electorate. All these explanations identify the cause of party-safe elections in institutions of various kinds. This dissertation, by contrast, presents a structural explanation of uncompetitive elections. My theory is that population composition and patterns of migration are significant causes and predictors of election results in Florida. I test this theory empirically by comparing the predictions from four hypotheses against aggregate data, using the county as the unit of analysis. The first hypothesis is that Florida can be divided into clearly distinguishable, persistent partisan sections. This hypothesis is confirmed. The second hypothesis is that Florida voters have become increasingly partisan over time. This hypothesis is confirmed. The third hypothesis is that the degree of migration into a county predicts how that county will vote. This hypothesis is partially confirmed, for the migration effect appears to have waned over time. The last hypothesis is that the degree of religiosity of a county population is a predictor of how that county will vote. This hypothesis is also supported by the results of statistical analysis. By identifying the structural causes of party-safe elections, this dissertation not only broadens our understanding of elections in Florida, but also sheds light on the current polarization in American politics.

Casino Drink Policies: Limiting Third-Party Liability

In their efforts to provide an atmosphere or hospitality to their casino customers, many operators will provide complimentary alcoholic beverage service. This practice is fraught with liability, particularly in venues outside of Nevada. Conscientious operators must take every precaution to mitigate the possibility of lawsuit.