Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied-- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton--are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy--executive orders--redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress. ^

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton-are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy-executive orders redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress.

Politics and prayer in West Perrine, Florida: Civic social capital and the black church

This thesis traces the mechanisms and sources responsible for the generation of civic social capital (a set of shared norms and values that promote cooperation between groups, enabling them to participate in the political process) by black churches in West Perrine, Florida. Data for this thesis includes over fifty interviews and participant observations, archival records, newspaper articles, and scholarly journals. ^ Despite the institutional racism of the first half of the twentieth century, many blacks and whites in Perrine developed levels of trust significant enough to form an integrated local governing body, evidence of high levels of csc. At mid-century, when black and white interactions ceased, Perrine's csc decreased, leading to the deterioration of Perrine's social and physical conditions. Perrine's csc increased in the 1980s by way of broad-based coalitions as Perrine's churches invested their csc in an effort to eradicate crime, clean up its neighborhood, and win back its youth. ^

Tocqueville in Miami: Political culture and political organizing in Miami's Cuban community

This study examines the effectiveness of civic organizations focusing on leadership and the role of culture in politics. The study is based on a quasi-experimental research design and relies primarily on qualitative data. The study focuses on Miami's Cuban community in order to examine the role of public initiative in grassroots civic and community organizations. ^ The Miami Cuban community is a large, institutionally complex and cohesive ethnic community with dense networks of community organizations. The political and economic success of the community makes it an opportune setting for a study of civic organizing. The sheer number of civic organizations to be found in Miami's Cuban community suggests that the community's civic organizations have something to do with the considerable vibrancy and civic capacity of the community. How have the organizations managed to be so successful over so many years and what can be learned about successful civic organizing from their experience?^ Civic organizations in Miami's Cuban community are overwhelmingly ethnic-based organizations. The organizations recreate collective symbols that come from community members' memories of and attachments to the place of origin they hold dear as ethnic Cubans. They recreate a collective Cuban past that community members remember and that is the very basis of the community to which they belong.^ Cuban Miami's ethnically based civic organizations have generally performed better than the literature on civic organizations says they should. They gained greater access to community ties and social capital, and they exhibited greater organizational longevity. The fit between the political culture of civic organizations and that of the broader political community helps to explain this success. Yet they do not perform in the same way or in support of the same social purposes. Some stress individual agency rather than community agency, and some pursue an externally-oriented social purpose, whereas others focus on building an internal community.^

Essays on political economy

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms.^ The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values.^ The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.^

Essays in economic growth, political economy and institutions

This dissertation analyzes the effects of political and economic institutions on economic development and growth.^ The first essay develops an overlapping-generations political economy model to analyze the incentives of various social groups to finance human capital accumulation through public education expenditures. The contribution of this study to the literature is that it helps explain the observed differences in the economic growth performance of natural resource-abundant countries. The results suggest that the preferred tax rates of the manufacturers on one hand and the political coalition of manufacturers and landowners, on the other hand, are equal to the socially optimal tax rate. However, we show that owners of natural resources prefer an excessively high tax rate, which suppresses aggregate output to a suboptimal level.^ The second essay examines the relationship between the political influence of different social classes and public education spending in panel data estimation. The novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that I proxy the political power and influence of the natural resource owners, manufacturers, and landowners with macroeconomic indicators. The motivation behind this modeling choice is to substantiate the definition of the political power of social classes with economic fundamentals. I use different governance indicators in the estimations to find out how different institutions mediate the overall impact of the political influence of various social classes on public education spending. The results suggest that political stability and absence of violence and rule of law are the important governance indicators.^ The third essay develops a counter argument to Acemoglu et al. (2010) where the thesis is that French institutions and economic reforms fostered economic progress in those German regions invaded by the Napoleonic armies. By providing historical data on urbanization rates used as proxies for economic growth, I demonstrate that similar different rates of economic growth were observed in the regions of France in the post-Napoleonic period as well. The existence of different economic growth rates makes it hard to argue that the differences in economic performance in the German regions that were invaded by the French and those that were spared a similar fate follow from regional differences in economic institutions.^

Transnational Capital and the Politics of Global Supply Chains

In the latest phase of globalization, transnational corporations based in the U.S. have worked closely with U.S. foreign policymakers to secure favorable foreign direct investment provisions within U.S. domestic legislation and within U.S. trade agreements. These interactions between transnational firms and the U.S. state have provided many of the preconditions for an expansion of foreign direct investment connected to capital liberalization and the growth of global supply chains from the 1980s to the present. This relationship is best conceptualized as representing a “transnational interest bloc,” whose policy objectives are incorporated within investment provisions in US-backed trade and investment agreements.

Mining in Peru: Indigenous and Peasant Communities vs. The State and Mining Capital

The Peruvian economy depends for its growth on the export of natural resources and investment in the mining and hydrocarbon sectors. Peruvian governments and mining corporations have confronted anti-mining protests in different ways. While the current government has introduced policies of social inclusion to soften the negative effects of the operations of mining capital and policies of dialogue to engage social actors with the essence of governmental policies, mining companies use corporate social responsibility programs as a cover for the devastating effects of their operations on the environment and the livelihoods and habitats of the indigenous and peasant communities. Curiously, in the current context of the declining commodity prices and export volumes the Peruvian government strengthens its extractivist model of development. This article argues that whatever government that follows the rules of capital cannot but favor the corporations. It points out the main adversaries of the indigenous and peasant communities and the problems to transform the locally and/or regionally struggle into a nationwide battle for another development model.

Essays On Political Economy

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms. The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values. The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.

Tocqueville in Miami : political culture and political organizing in Miami's Cuban community

This study examines the effectiveness of civic organizations focusing on leadership and the role of culture in politics. The study is based on a quasi-experimental research design and relies primarily on qualitative data. The study focuses on Miami's Cuban community in order to examine the role of public initiative in grassroots civic and community organizations. The Miami Cuban community is a large, institutionally complex and cohesive ethnic community with dense networks of community organizations. The political and economic success of the community makes it an opportune setting for a study of civic organizing. The sheer number of civic organizations to be found in Miami's Cuban community suggests that the community's civic organizations have something to do with the considerable vibrancy and civic capacity of the community. How have the organizations managed to be so successful over so many years and what can be learned about successful civic organizing from their experience? Civic organizations in Miami's Cuban community are overwhelmingly ethnic-based organizations. The organizations recreate collective symbols that come from community members' memories of and attachments to the place of origin they hold dear as ethnic Cubans. They recreate a collective Cuban past that community members remember and that is the very basis of the community to which they belong. Cuban Miami's ethnically based civic organizations have generally performed better than the literature on civic organizations says they should. They gained greater access to community ties and social capital, and they exhibited greater organizational longevity. The fit between the political culture of civic organizations and that of the broader political community helps to explain this success. Yet they do not perform in the same way or in support of the same social purposes. Some stress individual agency rather than community agency, and some pursue an externally-oriented social purpose, whereas others focus on building an internal community.