Local officials' preferences of performance measurements: A study of local police services

The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of local officials' preferences of performance measures under the assumption that public officials' consensus on performance measures can enhance the accountability in public service delivery. This research consists of two steps: multiple case studies and a survey. The author conducted the case studies in five general-purpose municipalities in Florida, interviewing 25 local officials, attending community meetings, and reviewing relevant local documents. Based on the case studies and the relevant literature, a survey was developed and sent to 445 local officials in 67 general-purpose municipalities in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, Florida. The findings of the case studies and the survey suggest that local officials' preferences of performance measures are influenced by their perception of utilities of performance measures and their desire to measure the achievement of organizational goals. The author concludes that a consensus among local officials for outcome-oriented performance measures is easier to achieve if a prospective performance measurement system is designed for reporting and management purposes rather than for budgeting purposes. ^

Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua

A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attachés in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

Using the Big -Five personality factors in the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, California Psychological Inventory, and Inwald Personality Inventory to predict police performance

The purpose of this study was to determine the degree to which the Big-Five personality taxonomy, as represented by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), California Psychological Inventory (CPI), and Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI) scales, predicted a variety of police officer job performance criteria. Data were collected archivally for 270 sworn police officers from a large Southeastern municipality. Predictive data consisted of scores on the MMPI, CPI, and IPI scales as grouped in terms of the Big-Five factors. The overall score on the Wonderlic was included in order to assess criterion variance accounted for by cognitive ability. Additionally, a psychologist's overall rating of predicted job fit was utilized to assess the variance accounted for by a psychological interview. Criterion data consisted of supervisory ratings of overall job performance, State Examination scores, police academy grades, and termination. Based on the literature, it was hypothesized that officers who are higher on Extroversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and lower on Neuroticism, otherwise known as the Big-Five factors, would outperform their peers across a variety of job performance criteria. Additionally, it was hypothesized that police officers who are higher in cognitive ability and masculinity, and lower in mania would also outperform their counterparts. Results indicated that many of the Big-Five factors, namely, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Openness to Experience, were predictive of several of the job performance criteria. Such findings imply that the Big-Five is a useful predictor of police officer job performance. Study limitations and implications for future research are discussed. ^

Acceptable vs. marginal police officers' psychological ratings : a longitudinal comparison of job performance

Archival research was conducted on the inception of preemployment psychological testing, as part of the background screening process, to select police officers for a local police department. Various issues and incidents were analyzed to help explain why this police department progressed from an abbreviated version of a psychological battery, to a much more sophisticated and comprehensive set of instruments. While doubts about psychological exams do exist, research has shown that many are valid and reliable in predicting job performance of police candidates. During a three year period, a police department hired 162 candidates (133 males and 29 females) who received "acceptable" psychological ratings and 71 candidates (58 males and 13 females) who received "marginal" psychological ratings. A document analysis consisted of variables that have been identified as job performance indicators which police psychological testing tries to predict, and "screen in" or "screen out" appropriate applicants. The areas of focus comprised the 6-month police academy, the 4-month Field Training Officer (FTO) Program, the remaining probationary period, and yearly performance up to five years of employment. Specific job performance variables were the final academy grade average, supervisors' evaluation ratings, reprimands, commendations, awards, citizen complaints, time losses, sick time usage, reassignments, promotions, and separations. A causal-comparative research design was used to determine if there were significant statistical differences in these job performance variables between police officers with "acceptable" psychological ratings and police officers with "marginal" psychological ratings. The results of multivariate analyses of variance, t-tests, and chi-square procedures as applicable, showed no significant differences between the two groups on any of the job performance variables.

The Effect of Rapport Building in Police Interrogations: Can Rapport Improve the Diagnosticity of Confession Evidence?

Police investigators rely heavily on eliciting confessions from suspects to solve crimes and prosecute offenders. Therefore, it is essential to develop evidence-based interrogation techniques that will motivate guilty suspects to confess but minimize false confessions from the innocent. Currently, there is little scientific support for specific interrogation techniques that may increase true confessions and decrease false confessions. Rapport building is a promising possibility. Despite its recommendation in police interrogation guidelines, there is no scientific evidence showing the effect of rapport building in police interrogations. The current study examined, experimentally, whether using rapport as an interrogation technique would influence participants’ decisions to confess to a wrongdoing. It was hypothesized that building rapport with participants would lead to more true confessions and fewer false confessions than not building rapport. One hundred and sixty nine undergraduates participated in the study. Participants worked on logic problems together and individually, with a study confederate. The confederate asked half of the participants for help in one of the individual problems – effectively breaking the rules of the study. After working on these problems, a research assistant playing the role of interviewer came into the room, built rapport or not with participants, accused all participants of cheating by sharing answers on the individual problems, and asked them to sign a statement admitting their guilt. Results indicated that guilty participants were more likely to sign the confession statement than innocent participants. However, there were no significant differences on participants’ confession decisions based on the level of rapport they experienced. Results do not provide support for the hypothesis that building rapport increases the likelihood of obtaining true confessions and decreases the likelihood of obtaining false confessions. These findings suggest that, despite the overwhelming recommendation for the use of rapport with suspects, its actual implementation may not have a direct impact on the outcome of interrogations.