Local officials' preferences of performance measurements: A study of local police services

The purpose of this study is to identify the determinants of local officials' preferences of performance measures under the assumption that public officials' consensus on performance measures can enhance the accountability in public service delivery. This research consists of two steps: multiple case studies and a survey. The author conducted the case studies in five general-purpose municipalities in Florida, interviewing 25 local officials, attending community meetings, and reviewing relevant local documents. Based on the case studies and the relevant literature, a survey was developed and sent to 445 local officials in 67 general-purpose municipalities in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties, Florida. The findings of the case studies and the survey suggest that local officials' preferences of performance measures are influenced by their perception of utilities of performance measures and their desire to measure the achievement of organizational goals. The author concludes that a consensus among local officials for outcome-oriented performance measures is easier to achieve if a prospective performance measurement system is designed for reporting and management purposes rather than for budgeting purposes. ^

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin: A comparative analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and development, undermines government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of recent anti-corruption efforts of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGO/NGOs), Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be worsening in the post-Cold War period. This dissertation discovers why IGO/NGO efforts to arrest corruption are failing by investigating the domestic and international causes of political corruption in the Caribbean. The dissertation's theoretical framework centers on an interdisciplinary model of the causes of political corruption built within the rule-oriented constructivist approach to social science. The model first employs a rational choice analysis that broadly explains the varying levels of political corruption found across the region. The constructivist theory of social rules is then used to develop the structural mechanisms that further explain the region's levels of political corruption. The dissertation advances its theory of the causes of political corruption through qualitative disciplined-configurative case studies of political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica. The dissertation finds that IGO/NGO sponsored anti-corruption programs are failing because they employ only technical measures (issuing anti-corruption laws and regulations, providing transparency in accounting procedures, improving freedom of the press, establishing electoral reforms, etc.). While these IGO/NGO technical measures are necessary, they are not sufficient to arrest the Caribbean's political corruption problems. This dissertation concludes that to be successful, IGO/NGO anti-corruption programs must also include social measures, e.g., building civil societies and modernizing political cultures, for there to be any hope of lowering political corruption levels and improving Caribbean social conditions. The dissertation also highlights the key role of Caribbean governing elite in constructing the political and economic structures that cause their states' political corruption problems. ^

Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua

A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attachés in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

Using the Big -Five personality factors in the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, California Psychological Inventory, and Inwald Personality Inventory to predict police performance

The purpose of this study was to determine the degree to which the Big-Five personality taxonomy, as represented by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), California Psychological Inventory (CPI), and Inwald Personality Inventory (IPI) scales, predicted a variety of police officer job performance criteria. Data were collected archivally for 270 sworn police officers from a large Southeastern municipality. Predictive data consisted of scores on the MMPI, CPI, and IPI scales as grouped in terms of the Big-Five factors. The overall score on the Wonderlic was included in order to assess criterion variance accounted for by cognitive ability. Additionally, a psychologist's overall rating of predicted job fit was utilized to assess the variance accounted for by a psychological interview. Criterion data consisted of supervisory ratings of overall job performance, State Examination scores, police academy grades, and termination. Based on the literature, it was hypothesized that officers who are higher on Extroversion, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and lower on Neuroticism, otherwise known as the Big-Five factors, would outperform their peers across a variety of job performance criteria. Additionally, it was hypothesized that police officers who are higher in cognitive ability and masculinity, and lower in mania would also outperform their counterparts. Results indicated that many of the Big-Five factors, namely, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Openness to Experience, were predictive of several of the job performance criteria. Such findings imply that the Big-Five is a useful predictor of police officer job performance. Study limitations and implications for future research are discussed. ^

Acceptable vs. marginal police officers' psychological ratings : a longitudinal comparison of job performance

Archival research was conducted on the inception of preemployment psychological testing, as part of the background screening process, to select police officers for a local police department. Various issues and incidents were analyzed to help explain why this police department progressed from an abbreviated version of a psychological battery, to a much more sophisticated and comprehensive set of instruments. While doubts about psychological exams do exist, research has shown that many are valid and reliable in predicting job performance of police candidates. During a three year period, a police department hired 162 candidates (133 males and 29 females) who received "acceptable" psychological ratings and 71 candidates (58 males and 13 females) who received "marginal" psychological ratings. A document analysis consisted of variables that have been identified as job performance indicators which police psychological testing tries to predict, and "screen in" or "screen out" appropriate applicants. The areas of focus comprised the 6-month police academy, the 4-month Field Training Officer (FTO) Program, the remaining probationary period, and yearly performance up to five years of employment. Specific job performance variables were the final academy grade average, supervisors' evaluation ratings, reprimands, commendations, awards, citizen complaints, time losses, sick time usage, reassignments, promotions, and separations. A causal-comparative research design was used to determine if there were significant statistical differences in these job performance variables between police officers with "acceptable" psychological ratings and police officers with "marginal" psychological ratings. The results of multivariate analyses of variance, t-tests, and chi-square procedures as applicable, showed no significant differences between the two groups on any of the job performance variables.

The Effect of Rapport Building in Police Interrogations: Can Rapport Improve the Diagnosticity of Confession Evidence?

Police investigators rely heavily on eliciting confessions from suspects to solve crimes and prosecute offenders. Therefore, it is essential to develop evidence-based interrogation techniques that will motivate guilty suspects to confess but minimize false confessions from the innocent. Currently, there is little scientific support for specific interrogation techniques that may increase true confessions and decrease false confessions. Rapport building is a promising possibility. Despite its recommendation in police interrogation guidelines, there is no scientific evidence showing the effect of rapport building in police interrogations. The current study examined, experimentally, whether using rapport as an interrogation technique would influence participants’ decisions to confess to a wrongdoing. It was hypothesized that building rapport with participants would lead to more true confessions and fewer false confessions than not building rapport. One hundred and sixty nine undergraduates participated in the study. Participants worked on logic problems together and individually, with a study confederate. The confederate asked half of the participants for help in one of the individual problems – effectively breaking the rules of the study. After working on these problems, a research assistant playing the role of interviewer came into the room, built rapport or not with participants, accused all participants of cheating by sharing answers on the individual problems, and asked them to sign a statement admitting their guilt. Results indicated that guilty participants were more likely to sign the confession statement than innocent participants. However, there were no significant differences on participants’ confession decisions based on the level of rapport they experienced. Results do not provide support for the hypothesis that building rapport increases the likelihood of obtaining true confessions and decreases the likelihood of obtaining false confessions. These findings suggest that, despite the overwhelming recommendation for the use of rapport with suspects, its actual implementation may not have a direct impact on the outcome of interrogations.