18 resultados para Peasantry--Central America.

em Digital Commons at Florida International University


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It is often speculated that the high allocation of funds to retirement pension systems has influenced the capacity of Central American and Dominican Republic military to modernize. Yet, the comparative study of the allocation of pension and social funds in these particular countries suggest that there is not direct linkage between the poor funding of military modernization plans and the allocation of funds to military pension systems. The research conducted on this subject shows the following results: 1. The Dominican Republic is the only country that has embarked on a considerable procurement of modern equipment and still reports the largest proportion of social expenditures. 2. El Salvador’s defense budget allocates minimal funding to Social Welfare Institute, which as alternative sources of funding. In 2009, El Salvador increased 15 percent funding to the military to respond to increased role in domestic security issues. 3. The Guatemalan defense expenditure on social programs is fairly low, but it has grown during the past six years due to processes of demobilization. However, the Military Social Welfare Institute is administered by a decentralized institution funded directly by the Ministry of Finance. If it were to be considered as a part of the defense budget, its social expenses would account for almost 16% of it. 4. The Honduran Defense Budget has faced a considerable enlargement during the past four years, with social spending expenses taken precedence over modernization efforts. 2 5. The Nicaraguan system of military pensions is administered by a decentralized entity (IPSM) through a system of salary deductions. Information on the funding of this entity is inconclusive. The Nicaraguan Defense spending on social services has reported a drastic 90% drop since the year 2007.

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Climate change has been a security issue for mankind since Homo sapiens first emerged on the planet, driving him to find new and better food, water, shelter, and basic resources for survival and the advancement of civilization. Only recently, however, has the rate of climate change coupled with man’s knowledge of his own role in that change accelerated, perhaps profoundly, changing the security paradigm. If we take a ―decades‖ look at the security issue, we see competition for natural resources giving way to Cold War ideological containment and deterrence, itself giving way to non-state terrorism and extremism. While we continue to defend against these threats, we are faced with even greater security challenges that inextricably tie economic, food and human security together and where the flash points may not provide clearly discernable causes, as they will be intrinsically tied to climate change. Several scientific reports have revealed that the modest development gains that can be realized by some regions could be reversed by climate change. This means that climate change is not just a long-term environmental threat as was widely believed, but an economic and developmental disaster that is unfolding. As such, addressing climate change has become central to the development and poverty reduction by the World Bank and other financial institutions. In Latin America, poorer countries and communities, such as those found in Central America, will suffer the hardest because of weaker resilience and greater reliance on climatesensitive sectors such as agriculture. The US should attempt to deliver capability to assist these states to deal with the effects of climate change.

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Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

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A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attachés in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen.

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The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

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Taken together, the six nations of Central America count a population of roughly 40 million people and an energy market equal in size to that of Colombia, sufficient to benefit from economies of scale. The region has traditionally been a net importer of hydrocarbons, and hydroelectricity has dominated electric generation. But more recently, thermoelectric generation (diesel and fuel oil) has greatly increased as a percentage of the regional generation market. Progress has been made across the region’s electric sector, beginning with reforms in the 1990s and the 1996 signing of a regional treaty aimed at the development of a regional energy integration project – the Central American Electrical Interconnection System, or SIEPAC. A fundamental SIEPAC goal is to set up a regional electric market and a regulatory system. Indeed, after many years of development, SIEPAC is poised to open a new chapter in Central Americas electric infrastructure and market. But this new era must contend with critical issues such as the need to consolidate the regional electric market, political issues surrounding the venture, and security concerns. Moreover, local conflicts, in different degrees, have become priorities for policymakers, and these are possible barriers to completing the project. The goals of the SIEPAC project and of deepening the broader electric integration process are possible if national and regional decision makers understand that cooperative decision making will produce better results than separate national decision making. Enhanced regional understanding and cooperative decision making, combined with an effort to reorient the terminology and dialogue vis-à-vis energy efficiency in Central America, form the core recommendations of this paper.

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For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

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The conflicts of the past decade in Central America have produced substantial refugee movements into neighboring nations. Costa Rica has had to cope with an influx of refugees and migrants as large as 10 percent of its population. This work presents a case study of the situation in Costa Rica, focusing on the issue of refugee integration into the host society. It draws on qualitative field research conducted in that country during 1986. The study discusses the evolution of the Costa Rican state's response to the refugee crisis and analyzes the characteristics and impact of policies undertaken by various state bureaucracies. It also describes the assistance efforts of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and private voluntary organizations, along with their interaction with the Costa Rican state. The study concludes that the government's need to maintain firm control of refugee programs has overshadowed its commitment to refugee integration. In so doing, the humanitarian purpose of refugee assistance has been compromised.

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Isla del Coco (Cocos Island) is a small volcanic island located in the Pacific 500 km west of Costa Rica. Three collecting trips to Isla del Coco, in addition to herbarium research, were completed in order to assess the floristic diversity of the island. The current flora of Isla del Coco contains 262 plant species of which 37 (19.4%) are endemic. This study reports 58 species as new to the island. Seventy-one species (27.1%) were identified as introduced by humans. In addition, five potentially invasive plant species are identified. Seven vegetation types are identified on the island: bayshore, coastal cliff, riparian, low elevation humid forest, high elevation cloud forest, landslide and islet. ^ The biogeographic affinities of the native and endemic species are with Central America/northern South America and to a lesser extent, the Caribbean. Endemic species in the genus Epidendrum were investigated to determine whether an insular radiation event had produced two species found on Isla del Coco. Phylogenetic analysis of the internal transcribed spacer (ITS) of nuclear ribosomal DNA was not able to disprove that the endemic species in this genus are not sister species. Molecular biogeographic analyses of ITS sequence data determined that the Isla del Coco endemic species in the genera Epidendrum, Pilea and Psychotria are most closely related to Central American/northern South American taxa. No biogeographical links were found between the floras of Isla del Coco and the Galápagos Islands. ^ The native and endemic plant diversity of Isla del Coco is threatened with habitat degradation by introduced pigs and deer, and to a lesser extent, by exotic plant species. The IUCN Red List and RAREplants criteria were used to assess the extinction threat for the 37 endemic plant taxa found on the island. All of the endemic species are considered threatened with extinction at the Critically Endangered (CR) by the IUCN criteria or either CR or Endangered (EN) using RAREplants methodology. ^

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Amphibian populations are declining even in pristine areas in many parts of the world, and in the Neotropics most such enigmatic amphibian declines have occurred in mid- to high-elevation sites. However, amphibian populations have also declined at La Selva Biological Station in the lowlands of Costa Rica, and similar declines in populations of lizards have occurred at the site as well. To set the stage for describing amphibian declines at La Selva, I thoroughly review knowledge of amphibian decline and amphibian conservation in Central America: I describe general patterns in biodiversity, evaluate major patterns in and ecological correlates of threat status, review trends in basic and applied conservation literature, and recommend directions for future research. I then synthesize data on population densities of amphibians, as well as ecologically similar reptiles, over a 35-year periods using quantitative datasets from a range of studies. This synthesis identifies assemblage-wide declines of approximately 75% for both amphibians and reptiles between 1970 and 2005. Because these declines defy patterns most commonly reported in the Neotropics, it is difficult to assess causality evoking known processes associated with enigmatic decline events. I conduct a 12-month pathogen surveillance program to evaluate infection of frogs by the amphibian chytrid fungus, an emerging pathogen linked to decline events worldwide Although lowland forests are generally believed to be too warm for presence or adverse population effects of chytridiomycosis, I present evidence for seasonal patterns in infection prevalence with highest prevalence in the coolest parts of the year. Finally, I conducted a 16-month field experiment to explore the role of changes to dynamics of leaf litter, a critical resource for both frogs and lizards. Population responses by frogs and lizards indicate that litter regulates population densities of frogs and lizards, particularly those species with the highest decline rate. My work illustrates that sites that are assumed to be pristine are likely impacted by a variety of novel stressors, and that even fauna within protected areas may be suffering unexpected declines.

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Natural environmental gradients provide important information about the ecological constraints on plant and microbial community structure. In a tropical peatland of Panama, we investigated community structure (forest canopy and soil bacteria) and microbial community function (soil enzyme activities and respiration) along an ecosystem development gradient that coincided with a natural P gradient. Highly structured plant and bacterial communities that correlated with gradients in phosphorus status and soil organic matter content characterized the peatland. A secondary gradient in soil porewater NH4 described significant variance in soil microbial respiration and β-1-4-glucosidase activity. Covariation of canopy and soil bacteria taxa contributed to a better understanding of ecological classifications for biotic communities with applicability for tropical peatland ecosystems of Central America. Moreover, plants and soils, linked primarily through increasing P deficiency, influenced strong patterning of plant and bacterial community structure related to the development of this tropical peatland ecosystem.

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Access to the Internet has grown exponentially in Latin America over the past decade. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimates that in 2009 there were 144.5 million Internet users in South America, 6.4 million in Central America, and 8.2 million in the Caribbean, or a total 159.2 million users in all of Latin America.1 At that time, ITU reported an estimated 31 million Internet users in Mexico, which would bring the overall number of users in Latin America to 190.2 million people. More recent estimates published by Internet World Stats place Internet access currently at an estimated 204.6 million out of a total population of 592.5 million in the region (this figure includes Mexico).2 According to those figures, 34.5 per cent of the Latin American population now enjoys Internet access. In recent years, universal access policies contributed to the vast increase in digital literacy and Internet use in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica. Whereas the latter was the first country in the region to adopt a policy of universal access, the most expansive and successful digital inclusion programs in the region have taken hold in Brazil and Chile. These two countries have allocated considerable resources to the promotion of digital literacy and Internet access among low income and poor populations; in both cases, civil society groups significantly assisted in the promotion of inclusion at the grassroots level. Digital literacy and Internet access have come to represent, particularly in the area of education, a welcome complementary resource for populations chronically underserved in nations with a long-standing record of inadequate public social services. Digital inclusion is vastly expanding throughout the region, thanks to stabilizing economies, increasingly affordable technology, and the rapid growth in the supply of cellular mobile telephony. A recent study by the global advertising agency Razorfish revealed significant shifts in the demographics of digital inclusion in the major economies of South America, where Web access is rapidly increasing amid the lower middle class and the working poor.3 Several researchers have suggested that Internet access will bring about greater civic participation and engagement, although skeptics remain unsure this could happen in Latin America. Yet, there have been some recent instances of political mobilization facilitated through the use of the Web and social media applications, starting in Chile when “smart mobs” nationwide demonstrated against former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet when she failed to enact education reforms in May 2006. The Internet has also been used by marginalized groups and by guerrillas groups to highlight their stories. In sum, Internet access in Latin is no longer a medium restricted to the elite. It is rather a public sphere upon which civil society has staked its claim. Some of the examples noted in this study point toward a developing trend whereby civil society, through online grassroots movements, is able to effectively pressure public officials, instill transparency and demand accountability in government. Access to the Internet has also made it possible for voices on the margins to participate in the conversation in a way that was never previously feasible. 1 International Telecommunications Union [ITU], “Information Technology Public & Report,” accessed May 15, 2011, http://www.itu.int/. 2 Internet World Stats, “Internet Usage Statistics for the Americas,” accessed March 24, 2011, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm 3 J. Crump, “The finch and the fox,” London, UK (2010), http://www.slideshare.net/razorfishmarketing/the-finch-and-the-fox.