3 resultados para Optimal Linear Control
em Digital Commons at Florida International University
Resumo:
Adequate care of type 2 diabetes is reflected by the individual’s adherence to dietary guidance; yet, few patients are engaged in diabetes self-care at the recommended level, regardless of race/ethnicity. Few studies on the effect of dietary medical advice on diabetes self-management (DSM) and glycemic control have been conducted on Haitian and African American adults with type 2 diabetes. These relationships were assessed in total of 254 Blacks with type 2 diabetes (Haitian Americans = 129; African Americans = 125) recruited from Miami-Dade and Broward Counties, Florida by community outreach methods. Although dietary advice received was not significantly different between the two Black ethnicities, given advice “to follow a diet” as a predictor of “using food groups” was significant for Haitian Americans, but not for African Americans. Haitian Americans who were advised to follow a diet were approximately 3 times more likely to sometimes or often use food groups (or exchange lists) in planning meals. Less than optimal glycemic control (A1C > 7.2) was inversely related to DSM for African Americans; but the relationship was not significant for Haitian Americans. A one unit increase in DSM score decreased the odds ratio point estimate of having less than optimal glycemic control (A1C > 7.2%) by a factor of 0.94 in African Americans. These results suggest that medical advice for diet plans may not be communicated effectively for DSM for some races/ethnicities. Research aimed at uncovering the enablers and barriers of diet management specific to Black ethnicities with type 2 diabetes is recommended.
Resumo:
This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.
Resumo:
This dissertation is a collection of three economics essays on different aspects of carbon emission trading markets. The first essay analyzes the dynamic optimal emission control strategies of two nations. With a potential to become the largest buyer under the Kyoto Protocol, the US is assumed to be a monopsony, whereas with a large number of tradable permits on hand Russia is assumed to be a monopoly. Optimal costs of emission control programs are estimated for both the countries under four different market scenarios: non-cooperative no trade, US monopsony, Russia monopoly, and cooperative trading. The US monopsony scenario is found to be the most Pareto cost efficient. The Pareto efficient outcome, however, would require the US to make side payments to Russia, which will even out the differences in the cost savings from cooperative behavior. The second essay analyzes the price dynamics of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary emissions trading market. By examining the volatility in market returns using AR-GARCH and Markov switching models, the study associates the market price fluctuations with two different political regimes of the US government. Further, the study also identifies a high volatility in the returns few months before the market collapse. Three possible regulatory and market-based forces are identified as probable causes of market volatility and its ultimate collapse. Organizers of other voluntary markets in the US and worldwide may closely watch for these regime switching forces in order to overcome emission market crashes. The third essay compares excess skewness and kurtosis in carbon prices between CCX and EU ETS (European Union Emission Trading Scheme) Phase I and II markets, by examining the tail behavior when market expectations exceed the threshold level. Dynamic extreme value theory is used to find out the mean price exceedence of the threshold levels and estimate the risk loss. The calculated risk measures suggest that CCX and EU ETS Phase I are extremely immature markets for a risk investor, whereas EU ETS Phase II is a more stable market that could develop as a mature carbon market in future years.