Democracy promotion and Turkey

The dissertation documented the degree of Turkey's involvement in the promotion of democracy in the Arab Middle East (ME). Initially, I investigated why and under what conditions Turkey promotes democracy in the ME, and then I explained strategies through which Turkey promotes democracy in the region. I applied the neo-classical realist theoretical framework and a mixed methodology in the research, and I provided evidence from two sources: face-to-face interviews with the Turkish and foreign officials and common citizens, and the statistical data from institutions, such as the OECD, Turkish Statistical Institute, and World Bank.^ My research indicates that Turkey promotes democracy through seven channels. These channels are official development assistance (ODA), mentoring, demonstrative effect, normative pressure, conditionality, military power, enlargement, and civil society organizations. Turkey promotes democracy in the ME for three substantial reasons: first, to advance its security and economic interests; second, to improve the political, social, and economic conditions of people living in the region; and third, to create long-term regional stability, crucial for cooperation in economic and security realms.^ I attempted to engage in debates with two distinct, but interrelated fields of comparative politics and international relations. My most important contribution to the field is that I documented Turkey's case of democracy promotion regarding the degree of Turkey's involvement in this endeavor, its strategies, specificities, and effectiveness in the region. I also contribute to the field as I explained the difference between democracy promotion policies of a regional power, such as Turkey, and global powers, such as the US. I further engaged in discussions that illuminate some aspects of the interplay between the identity and strategic interests in states' foreign policy decisions.^

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

The social development strategy of the Shiites in Lebanon

This study examines what many scholars have neglected to investigate when addressing post Civil War issues in Lebanon. Most studies have addressed political issues surrounding activities of Shiite movements, such as Harakat Amal or Hizb Allah, while socioeconomic issues have been neglected.^ Imam Musa Sadr challenged the power of traditional Shiite leaders by creating official Shiites institutions and movements like Amal. The Iranian Revolution and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 sparked the creation of Hizb Allah which, not only struggled against its foes, but also provided social services to the Shiites. This development program has been central in creating political legitimacy for Hizb Allah, regardless of its military situation, which suggests that socioeconomic development can transform a militia into a legitimate actor on the Lebanese political scene. The survivability of Shiite parties is therefore tantamount to not only their military might, but also to their social involvement. ^

A case study of the development of the Argentinean community college system

In the 1980's and 1990's, Argentina was undergoing significant political, social and economic changes as a result of the change over from a military driven government to elected governments. A major aspect of the change was an increased emphasis on privatization, and promotion of foreign and domestic investment in Argentina. Higher education leaders were increasingly drawn into developing a national strategy for changing the educational structure to help facilitate changes in other aspects of the society. Preliminary reviews by the Argentinean higher education leaders indicated that adaptation of the American community college promised to help achieve the national goals. ^ The purpose of this study was to determine: if and how the community college concept, an American invention, could be adapted to function in Argentina, a nation with a significantly different history of political, social, cultural and economic development. Achieving this purpose involved: identifying the key leaders in the movement that developed to apply the community college concept in Argentina; the study of their perspectives regarding the movement as it developed; and tracking the assistance given by selected American community college leaders. ^ The case study method was employed in this research, using interview and historical data collection. Key leaders from higher education in the United States and Argentina were interviewed in-depth, to determine their views. An interview protocol with appropriate sub-questions was followed to ensure complete coverage. The interviewees identified several major areas of education in need of change including, the system, access to the system, new areas of study, integration into the hemisphere and, in general, decentralization. Historical review revealed a steady development of the community college concept in Argentina reflected in documentation of events, conceptual writings and legal structures. ^ It was concluded that there is a community college structure beginning to emerge that, so far, in broad outline, follows the structure developed in the United States. It is anticipated however, that future developments will include conceptual aspects to the model reflective of Argentina. ^

Women and development in Senegal: Microcredit and household well being

The challenging living conditions of many Senegalese families, and the absence of a providing spouse, have led women to covet new economic opportunities, such as microcredit loans. These loans offer Senegalese women the possibility to financially support their households and become active participants in their economies by starting or sustaining their micro businesses. The study takes place in Grand-Yoff, an overpopulated peri-urban area of the Senegalese capital city Dakar, where most people face daily survival issues. This research examines the impact of microcredit activities in the household of Senegalese female loan recipients in Grand-Yoff by examining socioeconomic indicators, in particular outcomes of health, education and nutrition.^ The research total sample is constituted of 166 female participants who engage in microcredit activities. The research combines both qualitative and quantitative methods. Data for the study were gathered through interviews, surveys, participant observation, focus-groups with the study participants and some of their household members, and document analysis.^ While some women in the study make steady profits from their business activities, others struggle to make ends meet from their businesses’ meager or unreliable profits. Some study participants who are impoverished have no choice but to invest their loans directly into their households’ dire needs, hence missing their business prerogative. Many women in the study end up in a vicious cycle of debt by defaulting on their loans or making late payments because they do not have the required household and socioeconomic conditions to take advantage of these loans. Therefore, microcredit does not make a significant impact in the households of the poorest female participants. The study finds that microcredit improves the household well-being - especially nutrition, health and education - of the participants who have acquired significant social capital such as a providing spouse, formal education, training, business experience, and belonging to business or social networks.^ The study finds that microcredit’s household impact is intimately tied to the female borrowers’ household conditions and social capital. It is recommended that microcredit services and programs offer their female clients assistance and additional basic services, financial guidance, lower interest rates, and flexible repayment schedules. ^

The use of the Dade County student assistance profile in the identification of at -risk students at a minority senior high school

Current high school completion rates in Dade County and across the nation are considered to be unacceptable. This has led to the development of student assistance profiles to aid in the early identification of students considered to be at risk to allow for some form of intervention. The purpose of this research was to examine the current Dade County Public Schools profile as applied to one specific high school in which most of the students are Hispanic (mostly of Mexican descent) and Black (African-Americans, as well as recent Haitian immigrants). Additionally, the effectiveness of the alternative intervention program provided at this high school--a school within a school--were evaluated. School records of the 1992 in-coming ninth grade class became the initial data base. The individual student records of this cohort were then examined over a four-year period until their expected date or graduation. The DCPS profile used to identify potential dropouts from this group was evaluated, using chi-square and multivariate analysis, to determine its overall effectiveness, as well as the effectiveness of the individual indicators which comprise the profile. The Student Assistance Profile was found to an effective predictor, but it over-identified students from this cohort, particularly minorities, to the extent that it became largely ineffective, especially considering the limited resources available for intervention. The intervention program was found to be ineffective in reducing the dropout rate. Further analysis of the individual indicators used in the DCPS profile as they applied to this school population resulted in the development of an improved profile. By reducing the number of indicators to those found to be most highly associated with failure to graduate--academic performance and absences--a simpler student assistance profile was developed which appears to be better suited to high schools with similar demographics and budget restraints. ^

The social development strategy of the shiites in Lebanon

This study examines what many scholars have neglected to investigate when addressing post Civil War issues in Lebanon. Most studies have addressed political issues surrounding activities of Shiite movements, such as Harakat Amal or Hizb Allah, while socioeconomic issues have been neglected. Imam Musa Sadr challenged the power of traditional Shiite leaders by creating official Shiites institutions and movements like Amal. The Iranian Revolution and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 sparked the creation of Hizb Allah which, not only struggled against its foes, but also provided social services to the Shiites. This development program has been central in creating political legitimacy for Hizb Allah, regardless of its military situation, which suggests that socioeconomic development can transform a militia into a legitimate actor on the Lebanese political scene. The survivability of Shiite parties is therefore tantamount to not only their military might, but also to their social involvement.