The construction and optimization of an ion mobility spectrometer for the analysis of explosives and drugs

Today, over 15,000 Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) analyzers are employed at worldwide security checkpoints to detect explosives and illicit drugs. Current portal IMS instruments and other electronic nose technologies detect explosives and drugs by analyzing samples containing the headspace air and loose particles residing on a surface. Canines can outperform these systems at sampling and detecting the low vapor pressure explosives and drugs, such as RDX, PETN, cocaine, and MDMA, because these biological detectors target the volatile signature compounds available in the headspace rather than the non-volatile parent compounds of explosives and drugs.^ In this dissertation research volatile signature compounds available in the headspace over explosive and drug samples were detected using SPME as a headspace sampling tool coupled to an IMS analyzer. A Genetic Algorithm (GA) technique was developed to optimize the operating conditions of a commercial IMS (GE Itemizer 2), leading to the successful detection of plastic explosives (Detasheet, Semtex H, and C-4) and illicit drugs (cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana). Short sampling times (between 10 sec to 5 min) were adequate to extract and preconcentrate sufficient analytes (> 20 ng) representing the volatile signatures in the headspace of a 15 mL glass vial or a quart-sized can containing ≤ 1 g of the bulk explosive or drug.^ Furthermore, a research grade IMS with flexibility for changing operating conditions and physical configurations was designed and fabricated to accommodate future research into different analytes or physical configurations. The design and construction of the FIU-IMS were facilitated by computer modeling and simulation of ion’s behavior within an IMS. The simulation method developed uses SIMION/SDS and was evaluated with experimental data collected using a commercial IMS (PCP Phemto Chem 110). The FIU-IMS instrument has comparable performance to the GE Itemizer 2 (average resolving power of 14, resolution of 3 between two drugs and two explosives, and LODs range from 0.7 to 9 ng). ^ The results from this dissertation further advance the concept of targeting volatile components to presumptively detect the presence of concealed bulk explosives and drugs by SPME-IMS, and the new FIU-IMS provides a flexible platform for future IMS research projects.^

Essays on Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.

The Construction and Optimization on an Ion Mobility Spectrometer for the Analysis of Explosives and Drugs

Today, over 15,000 Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) analyzers are employed at worldwide security checkpoints to detect explosives and illicit drugs. Current portal IMS instruments and other electronic nose technologies detect explosives and drugs by analyzing samples containing the headspace air and loose particles residing on a surface. Canines can outperform these systems at sampling and detecting the low vapor pressure explosives and drugs, such as RDX, PETN, cocaine, and MDMA, because these biological detectors target the volatile signature compounds available in the headspace rather than the non-volatile parent compounds of explosives and drugs. In this dissertation research volatile signature compounds available in the headspace over explosive and drug samples were detected using SPME as a headspace sampling tool coupled to an IMS analyzer. A Genetic Algorithm (GA) technique was developed to optimize the operating conditions of a commercial IMS (GE Itemizer 2), leading to the successful detection of plastic explosives (Detasheet, Semtex H, and C-4) and illicit drugs (cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana). Short sampling times (between 10 sec to 5 min) were adequate to extract and preconcentrate sufficient analytes (> 20 ng) representing the volatile signatures in the headspace of a 15 mL glass vial or a quart-sized can containing ≤ 1 g of the bulk explosive or drug. Furthermore, a research grade IMS with flexibility for changing operating conditions and physical configurations was designed and fabricated to accommodate future research into different analytes or physical configurations. The design and construction of the FIU-IMS were facilitated by computer modeling and simulation of ion’s behavior within an IMS. The simulation method developed uses SIMION/SDS and was evaluated with experimental data collected using a commercial IMS (PCP Phemto Chem 110). The FIU-IMS instrument has comparable performance to the GE Itemizer 2 (average resolving power of 14, resolution of 3 between two drugs and two explosives, and LODs range from 0.7 to 9 ng). The results from this dissertation further advance the concept of targeting volatile components to presumptively detect the presence of concealed bulk explosives and drugs by SPME-IMS, and the new FIU-IMS provides a flexible platform for future IMS research projects.

Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. ^ Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. ^ Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.^