The direct investments in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s of multinational enterprises headquartered in Spain

This thesis explains why multinational enterprises (MNEs) headquartered in Spain made significant investments in Latin America in the 1990s. Two independent variables are considered: structural reforms in Latin America, and liberalization in Spain. The first independent variable concerns the ways in which Latin American governments adopted a series of reforms that made their economies attractive to foreign investors. The second variable explains how the prospects of liberalization and foreign competition led Spanish firms to invest abroad in order to expand their businesses. The study will also show the competitive advantage of Spanish MNEs, vis-a-vis other foreign and local competitors in Latin America. This thesis takes an international political economy approach. The core of the thesis shows the development of Spanish direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. The theoretical perspectives on MNEs are provided by theory of the firm, industrial organizations theory and alliance theory. ^

The advantage of Spanish multinational enterprises in Latin America

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Spain made large foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Latin America between 1990 and 2002, making Spain the second largest direct investor in this region since 1998, behind the United States. This dissertation explains the reasons that led Spanish firms to make these FDIs, as well as their operations in Latin America. Seven Spanish MNEs were included in this study, BBVA and SCH (banking), Telefónica (telecommunications), Endesa, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa (public utilities), and Repsol-YPF (oil and natural gas). Quantitative and qualitative data were used. Data were collected from the firms' annual reports, from their archives and from personal interviews with senior executives, as well as from academic and specialized publications. ^ Results indicate that the large Spanish FDIs in Latin America were highly concentrated in a few firms from five sectors. The FDIs of these firms alone accounted for 70 percent of total Spanish FDI in Latin America in this period. The reasons for these investments were firm-specific and sector specific. A series of institutional conditions existed in Spain between the 1970s and the 1990s that allowed the employees of the firms to develop the knowledge and devise strategies to adjust to that set of conditions. First, the policies of the Spanish state favored the creation of large firms in these sectors, operating under conditions of monopoly sometimes. Secondly, the consumers put pressure on the firms to provide better and cheaper products as the Spanish economy grew and modernized. Thirdly, the employees of the firms had to adjust their services and products to the demands of the consumers and to the constraints of the state and the market. They adjusted the internal organization of the firm to be able to produce the goods and services that the market demanded. Externally, they also adopted patterns of interaction with outside agents and institutions. This patterned behavior was the “corporate culture” of each firm and the “normative framework” in which their employees operated. When the managers of the firms perceived that there were similar conditions in Latin America, they decided to operate there as well by making FDIs. ^

Why and how multinational corporations influence the trade negotiation process in Latin America

This thesis examines two research questions: (1) Why do Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) try to influence trade negotiations in the Latin American context? and (2) How do MNEs influence the trade negotiation process in Latin America? The results show that the MNE's main reasons for participation are: (1) to gain market access and, specifically, to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers; (2) to create a beneficial regulatory environment for the MNE; and (3) to set the rules of the game by influencing the business environment in which its industry or its specific company is required to operate. The main approaches reported by the interviewees as to how MNEs participate are: (1) the MNE directly lobbies domestic government officials, principally the United States Trade Representative office; (2) a business, trade or industry association lobbies domestic government officials on the MNE's behalf; and (3) the MNE lobbies Congress.

Secondary stakeholders as agents of influence: Three essays on political risk, reputation, and multinational performance

Organizational researchers have recently taken an interest in the ways in which social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other secondary stakeholders attempt to influence corporate behavior. Scholars, however, have yet to carefully probe the link between secondary stakeholder legal action and target firm stock market performance. This is puzzling given the sharp rise in NGO-initiated civil lawsuits against corporations in recent years for alleged overseas human rights abuses and environmental misconduct. Furthermore, few studies have considered how such lawsuits impact a target firm’s intangible assets, namely its image and reputation. Structured in the form of three essays, this dissertation examined the antecedents and consequences of secondary stakeholder legal activism in both conceptual and empirical settings. ^ Essay One argued that conventional approaches to understanding political risk fail to account for the reputational risks to multinational enterprises (MNEs) posed by transnational networks of human rights NGOs employing litigation-based strategies. It offered a new framework for understanding this emerging challenge to multinational corporate activity. Essay Two empirically tested the relationship between the filing of human rights-related civil lawsuits and corporate stock market performance using an event study methodology and regression analysis. The statistical analysis performed showed that target firms experience a significant decline in share price upon filing and that both industry and nature of the lawsuit are significantly and negatively related to shareholder wealth. Essay Three drew upon social movement and social identity theories to develop and test a set of hypotheses on how secondary stakeholder groups select their targets for human rights-related civil lawsuits. The results of a logistic regression model offered support for the proposition that MNE targets are chosen based on both interest and identity factors. The results of these essays suggest that legal action initiated by secondary stakeholder groups is a new and salient threat to multinational business and that firms doing business in countries with weak political institutions should factor this into corporate planning and take steps to mitigate their exposure to such risks.^