Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

The Cuban military in Angola: The limits of internationalism

The Cuban military involvement in Angola has often been seen as a response to the wishes of the former Soviet Union. Yet, Castro intervened in Angola following his theory of internationalism. Internationalism, as conceived by Castro, sent Cubans on a voluntary basis to serve abroad, either in the military or in the civilian sector. This thesis will illustrate that from its inception, Castro sent military troops to Angola to divert domestic concerns and to boost Cuba's alliances throughout the world. Angola is different from other internationalist missions, because in Angola--for the first time--regular combat troops were used. Castro intervened in Angola to prevent a collapse of the Moviemento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) government, and stayed on to ensure the viability of the MPLA. The primary sources are interviews conducted by the author, of participants in the Angolan civil war. The secondary sources consulted are works on Cuba, Southern Africa, Portuguese colonialism and Angola. ^

Correlates of voluntary HIV testing and counseling among middle aged and older Latinas

This study identifies and describes HIV Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) of middle aged and older Latinas. The rate of new cases of HIV in people age 45 and older is rapidly increasing, with a 40.6% increase in the numbers of older Latinas infected with HIV between 1998 and 2002. Despite this increase, there is paucity of research on this population. This research seeks to address the gap through a secondary data analysis of Latina women. The aim of this study is twofold: (1) Develop and empirically test a multivariate model of VCT utilization for middle aged and older Latinas; (2) To test how the three individual components of the Andersen Behavioral Model impact VCT for middle aged and older Latinas. The study is organized around the three major domains of the Andersen Behavioral Model of service use that include: (a) predisposing factors; (b) enabling characteristics and (c) need. Logistic regression using structural equation modeling techniques were used to test multivariate relationships of variables on VCT for a sample of 135 middle age and older Latinas residing in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Over 60% of participants had been tested for HIV. Provider endorsement was found to he the strongest predictor of VCT (odds ration [OR] 6.38), followed by having a clinic as a regular source of healthcare (OR=3.88). Significant negative associations with VCT included self rated health status (OR=.592); Age (OR=.927); Spanish proficiency (OR=.927); number of sexual partners (OR=.613) and consumption of alcohol during sexual activity (.549). As this line of inquiry provides a critical glimpse into the VCT of older Latinas, recommendations for enhanced service provision and research will he offered.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.