Determinants of local government pension funding: Empirical evidence from Florida

The financial community is well aware that continued underfunding of state and local government pension plans poses many public policy and fiduciary management concerns. However, a well-defined theoretical rationale has not been developed to explain why and how public sector pension plans underfund. This study uses three methods: a survey of national pension experts, an incomplete covariance panel method, and field interviews.^ A survey of national public sector pension experts was conducted to provide a conceptual framework by which underfunding could be evaluated. Experts suggest that plan design, fiscal stress, and political culture factors impact underfunding. However, experts do not agree with previous research findings that unions actively pursue underfunding to secure current wage increases.^ Within the conceptual framework and determinants identified by experts, several empirical regularities are documented for the first time. Analysis of 173 local government pension plans, observed from 1987 to 1992, was conducted. Findings indicate that underfunding occurs in plans that have lower retirement ages, increased costs due to benefit enhancements, when the sponsor faces current year operating deficits, or when a local government relies heavily on inelastic revenue sources. Results also suggest that elected officials artificially inflate interest rate assumptions to reduce current pension costs, consequently shifting these costs to future generations. In concurrence with some experts there is no data to support the assumption that highly unionized employees secure more funding than less unionized employees.^ Empirical results provide satisfactory but not overwhelming statistical power, and only minor predictive capacity. To further explore why underfunding occurs, field interviews were carried out with 62 local government officials. Practitioners indicated that perceived fiscal stress, the willingness of policymakers to advance funding, bargaining strategies used by union officials, apathy by employees and retirees, pension board composition, and the level of influence by internal pension experts has an impact on funding outcomes.^ A pension funding process model was posited by triangulating the expert survey, empirical findings, and field survey results. The funding process model should help shape and refine our theoretical knowledge of state and local government pension underfunding in the future. ^

The political economy of poverty alleviation strategies. The initiative for heavily indebted poor countries in Bolivia: More of the same

In the year 2000, approximately 1.1 billion people lived in extreme poverty while developed countries spent US$600 billion a year on defense. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a recent component of a larger poverty reduction strategy supported by the International Financial Institutions, as well as many developed and developing countries. By implementing lessons of the past fifty years, this program attempts to diminish misery around the globe. As such, it provides debt relief while seeking to enable the poorest countries to simultaneously attain sustainable debt and promote human development. Interest in poverty reduction around the globe reemerged in the 1990s. This study contributes directly to this recent effort by presenting a nuanced approach that builds on the stepping-stones generated by other poverty scholars. To fulfill its goal, this investigation applies a political economy framework. Within this framework, the author conducts an actor-specific analysis. This dissertation addresses the following question: How do domestic and international actors respond to the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies? The author assumes actors desire to maximize their utility calculation and suggests these calculations are based on the player's motivations and external influences. Based on their motivations, the external influences, and the initiative's guidelines, each actor develops a set of expectations. To fulfill those expectations, stake holders utilize one or several strategies. Finally, the actors' ability to achieve their expectations determines each player's assessment of the initiative. The framework described is applied in an in-depth, actor-specific analysis of the HIPC in Bolivia. Bolivia's National Revolution represents the country's first attempt at reducing poverty. Since then, all governments have taken specific steps to combat poverty at the local and national levels. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is one of the most recent macro strategies of this kind. The case study demonstrated that three factors (national ownership, effective sponsorship and the local context) determine the success levels of poverty reduction strategies from abroad. In addition, the investigation clearly shows that poverty reduction is not the sole motivation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. All actors, however, share the dream of poverty reduction.