Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Regulating Casino Gaming: A Checklist for States Considering It

In his essay - Regulating Casino Gaming: A Checklist for States Considering It – by Leonard E. Goodall, Professor of Management and Public Administration, College of Business and Econornics, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Professor Goodall initially states: “Since various states are likely to continue to debate the issue of the establishment of legal casinos, and since states considering legal casinos must also decide how best to regulate them, the author discusses the similarities and contrasts in the regulatory systems already in operation.” Certainly not all states have solicited casino gaming, or what people generally refer to as gambling, but many have and the list is growing. If casinos are to be, and indications are that many more states will endorse gaming as a source of revenue, then regulating them must follow as a matter of due course says the author. Keep in mind this essay was written in 1988, and the actuality of casino gaming has indeed come to fruition in many states. “Nevada, having legalized casino gaming in 1931, has over a half-century of experience with the regulatory process,” Professor Goodall informs. “When New Jersey approved the establishment of casinos in Atlantic City in 1976, state officials studied the Nevada system carefully and adopted many of Nevada's procedures.” Professor Goodall bullet-points at least 7 key elements that states wanting to pursue gaming should, or in the cases of Nevada and New Jersey, have already addressed in regard to regulation of the industry. Goodall parses, in more detail, those essentials. The ultimate form of regulation is ownership Goodall says. Either state run, or private are the logical options. “The arguments for private ownership have been both pragmatic and political,” Goodall says. “Legislators, like the general public, are skeptical of the ability of state bureaucracies to run big businesses in an efficient manner. Many of them also believe regulation can be more effective if there is at least an arm's-length distance between regulation and ownership,” the professor opines. Additionally important to consider is the purpose of legalization, says Goodall. Are the proceeds earmarked for general funds, or to be used specifically? Geographic considerations are key, Goodall points out. “This decision will depend partly on a state's reasons for having casinos in the first place,” he expands. “New Jersey's policy, for example, is obviously consistent with its goal of using casinos to reinvigorate Atlantic City.” “In both states, one of the most important functions of the regulatory agencies is that of licensing, the process of investigating individuals or organizations and then authorizing them to participate in the gaming business,” Goodall provides. In closing, Goodall says there is no need for ensuing states to reinvent the wheel when it comes to casino gaming regulation. Nevada and New Jersey already provide two good designs from which to emulate and/or build upon.