The influence of the cross -race effect on lineup construction and fairness

Lineup procedures have recently garnered extensive empirical attention, in an effort to reduce the number of mistaken identifications that plague the criminal justice system. Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the influence of the lineup constructor or the lineup construction technique on the quality of the lineup. This study examined whether the cross-race effect has an influence on the quality of lineups constructed using a match-to-suspect or match-to-description technique in a series of three phases. Participants generated descriptions of same- and other-race targets in Phase 1, which were used in Phase 2. In Phase 2, participants were asked to create lineups for own-race targets and other-race targets using one of two techniques. The lineups created in this phase were examined for lineup quality in Phase 3 by calculating lineup fairness assessments through the use of a mock witness paradigm. ^ Overall, the results of these experiment phases suggest that the race of those involved in the lineup construction process influences lineups. There was no difference in witness description accuracy in Phase 1, which ran counter to predictions based on the cross-race effect. The cross-race effect was observed, however, in Phases 2 and 3. The lineup construction technique used also influenced several of the process measures, selection estimates, and fairness judgments in Phase 2. Interestingly, the presence of the cross-race effect was in the opposite direction as predicted for some measures in both phases. In Phase 2, the cross-race effect was as predicted for number of foils viewed, but in the opposite direction for average time spent viewing each foil. In Phase 3, the cross-race effect was in the opposite direction than predicted, with higher levels of lineup fairness in other-race lineups. The practical implications of these findings are discussed in relation to lineup fairness within the legal system. ^

Judging psychology experts: Can judges and attorneys distinguish between clinical and experimental psychologists?

A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts are critical to preventing "junk" science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must first evaluate experts' CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts' credentials. Theoretical models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.^ Legal professionals' (N = 150) and undergraduate students' (N = 468) expert witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed participants' decision making processes.^ Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to render decisions.^

Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony on mock-juror decision-making

In attempting to impeach eyewitnesses, attorneys often highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall. This study examined the differential impact of types of inconsistent testimony on mock-juror decisions. Each of 100 community members and 200 undergraduates viewed one of four versions of a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of the eyewitness. I manipulated the types of inconsistent statements given by the eyewitness in the four versions: (1) consistent testimony, (2) information given on-the-stand but not given during the pre-trial investigation, (3) contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial statements, and (4) contradictions made on the witness stand. Subjects exposed to any form of inconsistent testimony were less likely to convict and found the defendant less culpable and the eyewitness less effective. These effects were larger for contradictions than for information given on the stand but not during pre-trial investigations. ^

Jurors' use of social framework evidence

Monahan and Walker (1988) delineated three uses of social science evidence within the courts: social authority, social fact, and social framework. Social authority evidence is social science evidence used in making policy or law. Social fact evidence is social science evidence that describes research undertaken expressly for the case at hand. Social framework evidence involves providing conclusions from previously conducted social science research to assist jurors in evaluating the other evidence in the case. Although this type of evidence has traditionally been presented via expert testimony, Monahan and Walker (1988) have suggested that, because the social science research involved comes from the extant literature and is not the province of any particular expert, it would be more economical to have the judge present this information as part of the judicial instructions to the jury. This study tested the implicit assumption that the presentation of the social framework evidence by the judge will have the same impact on juror verdicts as presentation of this evidence by an expert. ^ Two hundred mock jurors watched a videotaped hostile work environment sexual harassment trial. The social framework evidence consisted of the discussion of factors that have been found to increase the likelihood of sex stereotyping of women by men. The trial included either no social framework evidence, social framework evidence presented by the expert, or social framework evidence presented in judicial instructions. ^ Results indicated that men who heard the social framework evidence from the judge were more likely to vote for the defendant than men who heard no social framework evidence. Men who heard the judicial instruction with the social framework evidence also rated the plaintiff as less credible than the other men and women in the study. Thus, it appears that, for men, social framework evidence presented by the judge harms the plaintiff's case by reducing ratings of her credibility, but the same evidence presented by an expert does not affect men's verdicts. For women, however, social framework evidence, irrespective of who presents it, enhances the plaintiff's case. ^

Evaluating and improving the opposing expert safeguard against junk science

In Daubert, the Supreme Court opined that opposing expert testimony is an effective safeguard against junk science in the courtroom. Although jurors maybe unable to identify flaws in scientific research without some assistance, social psychological research suggests that people can be trained to make more sophisticated judgments about scientific quality. Further, previous research demonstrated that an opposing expert who addresses the methodology of proffered expert testimony may not enable jurors to evaluate scientific validity. In three studies, I tested why this safeguard was ineffective using a variety of stimulus materials. In the first study, I examined the mediating effect of attitudes on juror decisions within the context of a sexual harassment trial. In the second study, I examined the moderating effect of the presentation of expert credentials on participant decisions regarding child suggestibility literature. In the third study, I tested several improvements to the safeguard using improvements designed to correct for the effects of attitudes and credential presentation on juror decisions within the context of a first-degree murder trial. I found that while opposing expert testimony may have potential as a safeguard, in its current form it is ineffective. That is, a traditional opposing expert caused jurors to be skeptical of all expert testimony rather than sensitizing them to the validity of the research presented at trial. Further, while the improvements tested in this study may have potential to assist jurors in making scientifically sound decisions, more research is needed to further test and refine these improvements. ^

The role of contingency and gaze direction in the emergence of social referencing

The current study assessed the importance of infant detection of contingency and head and eye gaze direction in the emergence of social referencing. Five- to six-month-old infants' detection of affect-object relations and subsequent manual preferences for objects paired with positive expressions were assessed. In particular, the role of contingency between toys' movements and an actress's emotional expressions as well as the role of gaze direction toward the toys' location were examined. Infants were habituated to alternating films of two toys each paired with an actress's affective expression (happy and fearful) under contingent or noncontingent and gaze congruent or gaze incongruent conditions. Results indicated that gaze congruence and contingency between toys' movements and a person's affective expressions were important for infant perception of affect-object relations. Furthermore, infant perception of the relation between affective expressions and toys translated to their manual preferences for the 3-dimensional toys. Infants who received contingent affective responses to the movements of the toys spent more time touching the toy that was previously paired with the positive expression. These findings demonstrate the role of contingency and gaze direction in the emergence of social referencing in the first half year of life.^

Does expert psychological testimony improve juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness?

Previous research has examined the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of safeguards against erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness identification. In keeping with this agenda, this study examined juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness in the form of foil, instruction, and presentation biases and whether expert psychological testimony further sensitizes jurors to the factors that influence the likelihood of false identifications. One hundred and sixty jury eligible citizens watched versions of a videotaped trial that included information about the identification of the defendant by an eyewitness and that varied the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure. In addition, half of the mock-jurors heard the testimony of an expert psychologist regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. Mock-jurors rendered individual verdicts, rated the defendant's culpability and the suggestiveness and fairness of the identification procedure. Results indicated that jurors are somewhat sensitive to foil bias but are insensitive to instruction and presentation biases. No evidence was found to suggest that expert testimony leads to juror skepticism or juror sensitization. These results question the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identification. ^

The role of death qualification in venirepersons' evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials

Death qualification is a part of voir dire that is unique to capital trials. Unlike all other litigation, capital jurors must affirm their willingness to impose both legal standards (either life in prison or the death penalty). Jurors who assert they are able to do so are deemed “death-qualified” and are eligible for capital jury service: jurors who assert that they are unable to do so are deemed “excludable” or “scrupled” and are barred from hearing a death penalty case. During the penalty phase in capital trials, death-qualified jurors weigh the aggravators (i.e., arguments for death) against the mitigators (i.e., arguments for life) in order to determine the sentence. If the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then the jury is to recommend death; if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, then the jury is to recommend life. The jury is free to weigh each aggravating and mitigating circumstance in any matter they see fit. Previous research has found that death qualification impacts jurors' receptiveness to aggravating and mitigating circumstances (e.g., Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). However, these studies utilized the now-defunct Witherspoon rule and did not include a case scenario for participants to reference. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether death qualification affects jurors' endorsements of aggravating and mitigating circumstances when Witt, rather than Witherspoon, is the legal standard for death qualification. Four hundred and fifty venirepersons from the 11 th Judicial Circuit in Miami, Florida completed a booklet of stimulus materials that contained the following: two death qualification questions; a case scenario that included a summary of the guilt and penalty phases of a capital case; a 26-item measure that required participants to endorse aggravators, nonstatutory mitigators, and statutory mitigators on a 6-point Likert scale; and standard demographic questions. Results indicated that death-qualified venirepersons, when compared to excludables, were more likely to endorse aggravating circumstances. Excludable participants, when compared to death-qualified venirepersons, were more likely to endorse nonstatutory mitigators. There was no significant difference between death-qualified and excludable venirepersons with respect to their endorsement of 6 out of 7 statutory mitigators. It would appear that the Furman v. Georgia (1972) decision to declare the death penalty unconstitutional is frustrated by the Lockhart v. McCree (1986) affirmation of death qualification. ^

The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

The effects of defendant account on damage award decisions

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the manner in which civil defendants account for their behavior influences compensatory and punitive damage awards. Jurors read three civil trial summaries, in which I manipulated injury severity (high vs. low), defendant reprehensibility (high vs. low), defendant status (individual vs. corporate), and account (concession, excuse, justification or refusal) in a factorial design. I also included four control groups in which the defendant stipulated liability. In all other conditions, participants read that a jury had found the defendant negligent. Only defendant reprehensibility influenced punitive awards. Both plaintiff injury and defendant reprehensibility influenced compensatory awards. When individuals offered justifications and when corporations offered excuses, jurors awarded lower compensatory awards against low reprehensibility defendants than against high reprehensibility defendants. Negligence stipulations led to lower damage awards for individuals than for corporations. Additionally, concessions tended to produce lower awards when combined with a stipulation of negligence as opposed to a jury decision. These findings support the hypothesis that in cases in which the defendant is clearly negligent, circumstances exist in which stipulating negligence and offering an apologetic account will lead to reduced damage awards decisions. Results indicate that individual and corporate defendants offering justifications and refusals should first consider the reprehensibility of their actions. In a broader realm, findings demonstrate that the manner in which a jury perceives the explanation given by the defendant is dependent upon defendant characteristics and case-specific factors. ^

Improving civil jury decision-making: Evidentiary and procedural issues

The civil jury has been under attack in recent years for being unreliable and incompetent. Considering the myriad causes for poor civil juror decision-making, the current investigation explores both procedural and evidentiary issues that impact juror's decisions. Specifically, the first phase of this dissertation examines how jurors (mis)use evidence pertaining to the litigants when determining liability and awarding damages. After investigating how jurors utilize evidence, the focus shifts to exploring the utility of procedural reforms designed to improve decision-making (specifically revising the instructions on the laws in the case and bifurcating the damage phases of the trial). Using the results from the first two phases of the research, the final study involves manipulating pieces of evidence related to the litigants while exploring the effects that revising the judicial instructions have on the utilization of evidence in particular and on decision-making in general. ^ This dissertation was run on-line, allowing participants to access the study materials at their convenience. After giving consent, participants read the scenario of a fictitious product liability case with the litigant manipulations incorporated into the summary. Participants answered several attitudinal, case-specific, and comprehension questions, and were instructed to find in favor of one side and award any damages they felt warranted. Exploratory factor analyses, Probit and linear regressions, and path analyses were used to analyze the data (M-plus and SPSS were the software packages used to conduct the analyses). Results indicated that misuse of evidence was fairly frequent, though the mock jurors also utilized evidence appropriately. Although the results did not support bifurcation as a viable procedural reform, revising the judicial instructions did significantly increase comprehension rates. Trends in the data suggested that better decision-making occurred when the revised instructions were used, thus providing empirical support for this procedural reform as a means of improving civil jury decision-making. Implications for actual trials and attorneys are discussed. ^

Predicting jurors' decisions: The effects of repeated expression and forewarning in civil voir dire

To help lawyers uncover jurors' attitudes and predict verdict, litigation experts recommend that attorneys encourage jurors to repeatedly express their attitudes during voir dire. While social cognitive literature has established that repeated expression of attitudes increases accessibility and behavior predictability, the persuasive twist on the method exercised in trials deserves empirical investigation. Only one study has examined the use of repeated expression within a legal context with the results finding that the tactic increased accessibility, but did not influence the attitude verdict relationship. This dissertation reexamines the ability of civil attitudes to predict verdict in a civil trial and investigates the use of repeated expression as a persuasive tactic utilized by both parties (Plaintiff and Defense) within a civil voir dire in an attempt to increase attitudinal strength, via accessibility, and change attitudes to better predict verdict. This project also explores potential moderators, repetition by the opposing party and the use of a forewarning, to determine their ability to counter the effects of repeated expression on attitudes and verdict.^ This dissertation project asked subjects to take on the role of jurors in a civil case. During the voir dire questioning session, the number of times the participants were solicited to express their attitudes towards litigation crisis by both parties was manipulated (one vs. five). Also manipulated was the inclusion of a forewarning statement from the plaintiff, within which mock jurors were cautioned about the repeated tactics that the defense may use to influence their attitudes. Subsequently, participants engaged in a response latency task which measured the accessibility of their attitudes towards various case-related issues. After reading a vignette of a fictitious personal injury case, participants rendered verdict decisions and responded to an attitude evaluation scale. Exploratory factor analyses, Probit regressions, and path analyses were used to analyze the data. Results indicated that the act of repeated expression influenced both the accessibility and value of litigation crisis attitudes thus increasing the attitude-verdict relationship, but only when only one party engaged in it. Furthermore, the forewarning manipulation did moderate the effect of repeated expression on attitude change and verdict, supporting our hypothesis.^

Jury decision making and the Story Model: How do deliberation style and evidence order influence the story that juries create?

This study investigated the utility of the Story Model for decision making at the jury level by examining the influence of evidence order and deliberation style on story consistency and guilt. Participants were shown a video-taped trial stimulus and then provided case perceptions including a guilt judgment and a narrative about what occurred during the incident. Participants then deliberated for approximately thirty minutes using either an evidence-driven or verdict-driven deliberation style before again providing case perceptions, including a guilt determination, a narrative about what happened during the incident, and an evidence recognition test. Multi-level regression analyses revealed that evidence order, deliberation style and sample interacted to influence both story consistency measures and guilt. Among students, participants in the verdict-driven deliberation condition formed more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the prosecution presented their case in story-order, while participants in the evidence-driven deliberation condition formed more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the defense's case was presented in story-order. Findings were the opposite among community members, with participants in the verdict-driven deliberation condition forming more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the defense's case was presented in story-order, and participants in the evidence-driven deliberation condition forming more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the prosecution's case was presented in story-order. Additionally several story consistency measures influenced guilt decisions. Thus there is some support for the hypothesis that story consistency mediates the influence of evidence order and deliberation style on guilt decisions.

Detecting deception: Identifying differences in liars' and truth tellers' verbal strategies

Deception research has traditionally focused on three methods of identifying liars and truth tellers: observing non-verbal or behavioral cues, analyzing verbal cues, and monitoring changes in physiological arousal during polygraph tests. Research shows that observers are often incapable of discriminating between liars and truth tellers with better than chance accuracy when they use these methods. One possible explanation for observers' poor performance is that they are not properly applying existing lie detection methods. An alternative explanation is that the cues on which these methods — and observers' judgments — are based do not reliably discriminate between liars and truth tellers. It may be possible to identify more reliable cues, and potentially improve observers' ability to discriminate, by developing a better understanding of how liars and truth tellers try to tell a convincing story. ^ This research examined (a) the verbal strategies used by truthful and deceptive individuals during interviews concerning an assigned activity, and (b) observers' ability to discriminate between them based on their verbal strategies. In Experiment I, pre-interview instructions manipulated participants' expectations regarding verifiability; each participant was led to believe that the interviewer could check some types of details, but not others, before deciding whether the participant was being truthful or deceptive. Interviews were then transcribed and scored for quantity and type of information provided. In Experiment II, observers listened to a random sample of the Experiment I interviews and rendered veracity judgments; half of the observers were instructed to judge the interviews according to the verbal strategies used by liars and truth tellers and the other half were uninstructed. ^ Results of Experiment I indicate that liars and truth tellers use different verbal strategies, characterized by a differential amount of detail. Overall, truthful participants provided more information than deceptive participants. This effect was moderated by participants' expectations regarding verifiability such that truthful participants provided more information only with regard to verifiable details. Results of Experiment II indicate that observers instructed about liars' and truth tellers' verbal strategies identify them with greater accuracy than uninstructed observers. ^

Development of face recognition: Infancy to early childhood

Perception and recognition of faces are fundamental cognitive abilities that form a basis for our social interactions. Research has investigated face perception using a variety of methodologies across the lifespan. Habituation, novelty preference, and visual paired comparison paradigms are typically used to investigate face perception in young infants. Storybook recognition tasks and eyewitness lineup paradigms are generally used to investigate face perception in young children. These methodologies have introduced systematic differences including the use of linguistic information for children but not infants, greater memory load for children than infants, and longer exposure times to faces for infants than for older children, making comparisons across age difficult. Thus, research investigating infant and child perception of faces using common methods, measures, and stimuli is needed to better understand how face perception develops. According to predictions of the Intersensory Redundancy Hypothesis (IRH; Bahrick & Lickliter, 2000, 2002), in early development, perception of faces is enhanced in unimodal visual (i.e., silent dynamic face) rather than bimodal audiovisual (i.e., dynamic face with synchronous speech) stimulation. The current study investigated the development of face recognition across children of three ages: 5 – 6 months, 18 – 24 months, and 3.5 – 4 years, using the novelty preference paradigm and the same stimuli for all age groups. It also assessed the role of modality (unimodal visual versus bimodal audiovisual) and memory load (low versus high) on face recognition. It was hypothesized that face recognition would improve across age and would be enhanced in unimodal visual stimulation with a low memory load. Results demonstrated a developmental trend (F(2, 90) = 5.00, p = 0.009) with older children showing significantly better recognition of faces than younger children. In contrast to predictions, no differences were found as a function of modality of presentation (bimodal audiovisual versus unimodal visual) or memory load (low versus high). This study was the first to demonstrate a developmental improvement in face recognition from infancy through childhood using common methods, measures and stimuli consistent across age.