Improving civil jury decision-making: Evidentiary and procedural issues

The civil jury has been under attack in recent years for being unreliable and incompetent. Considering the myriad causes for poor civil juror decision-making, the current investigation explores both procedural and evidentiary issues that impact juror's decisions. Specifically, the first phase of this dissertation examines how jurors (mis)use evidence pertaining to the litigants when determining liability and awarding damages. After investigating how jurors utilize evidence, the focus shifts to exploring the utility of procedural reforms designed to improve decision-making (specifically revising the instructions on the laws in the case and bifurcating the damage phases of the trial). Using the results from the first two phases of the research, the final study involves manipulating pieces of evidence related to the litigants while exploring the effects that revising the judicial instructions have on the utilization of evidence in particular and on decision-making in general. ^ This dissertation was run on-line, allowing participants to access the study materials at their convenience. After giving consent, participants read the scenario of a fictitious product liability case with the litigant manipulations incorporated into the summary. Participants answered several attitudinal, case-specific, and comprehension questions, and were instructed to find in favor of one side and award any damages they felt warranted. Exploratory factor analyses, Probit and linear regressions, and path analyses were used to analyze the data (M-plus and SPSS were the software packages used to conduct the analyses). Results indicated that misuse of evidence was fairly frequent, though the mock jurors also utilized evidence appropriately. Although the results did not support bifurcation as a viable procedural reform, revising the judicial instructions did significantly increase comprehension rates. Trends in the data suggested that better decision-making occurred when the revised instructions were used, thus providing empirical support for this procedural reform as a means of improving civil jury decision-making. Implications for actual trials and attorneys are discussed. ^

Jury decision making and the Story Model: How do deliberation style and evidence order influence the story that juries create?

This study investigated the utility of the Story Model for decision making at the jury level by examining the influence of evidence order and deliberation style on story consistency and guilt. Participants were shown a video-taped trial stimulus and then provided case perceptions including a guilt judgment and a narrative about what occurred during the incident. Participants then deliberated for approximately thirty minutes using either an evidence-driven or verdict-driven deliberation style before again providing case perceptions, including a guilt determination, a narrative about what happened during the incident, and an evidence recognition test. Multi-level regression analyses revealed that evidence order, deliberation style and sample interacted to influence both story consistency measures and guilt. Among students, participants in the verdict-driven deliberation condition formed more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the prosecution presented their case in story-order, while participants in the evidence-driven deliberation condition formed more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the defense's case was presented in story-order. Findings were the opposite among community members, with participants in the verdict-driven deliberation condition forming more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the defense's case was presented in story-order, and participants in the evidence-driven deliberation condition forming more consistent pro-prosecution stories when the prosecution's case was presented in story-order. Additionally several story consistency measures influenced guilt decisions. Thus there is some support for the hypothesis that story consistency mediates the influence of evidence order and deliberation style on guilt decisions.

Does expert psychological testimony improve juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness?

Previous research has examined the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of safeguards against erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness identification. In keeping with this agenda, this study examined juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness in the form of foil, instruction, and presentation biases and whether expert psychological testimony further sensitizes jurors to the factors that influence the likelihood of false identifications. One hundred and sixty jury eligible citizens watched versions of a videotaped trial that included information about the identification of the defendant by an eyewitness and that varied the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure. In addition, half of the mock-jurors heard the testimony of an expert psychologist regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. Mock-jurors rendered individual verdicts, rated the defendant's culpability and the suggestiveness and fairness of the identification procedure. Results indicated that jurors are somewhat sensitive to foil bias but are insensitive to instruction and presentation biases. No evidence was found to suggest that expert testimony leads to juror skepticism or juror sensitization. These results question the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identification. ^

The role of death qualification in venirepersons' evaluations of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital trials

Death qualification is a part of voir dire that is unique to capital trials. Unlike all other litigation, capital jurors must affirm their willingness to impose both legal standards (either life in prison or the death penalty). Jurors who assert they are able to do so are deemed “death-qualified” and are eligible for capital jury service: jurors who assert that they are unable to do so are deemed “excludable” or “scrupled” and are barred from hearing a death penalty case. During the penalty phase in capital trials, death-qualified jurors weigh the aggravators (i.e., arguments for death) against the mitigators (i.e., arguments for life) in order to determine the sentence. If the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then the jury is to recommend death; if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, then the jury is to recommend life. The jury is free to weigh each aggravating and mitigating circumstance in any matter they see fit. Previous research has found that death qualification impacts jurors' receptiveness to aggravating and mitigating circumstances (e.g., Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988). However, these studies utilized the now-defunct Witherspoon rule and did not include a case scenario for participants to reference. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether death qualification affects jurors' endorsements of aggravating and mitigating circumstances when Witt, rather than Witherspoon, is the legal standard for death qualification. Four hundred and fifty venirepersons from the 11 th Judicial Circuit in Miami, Florida completed a booklet of stimulus materials that contained the following: two death qualification questions; a case scenario that included a summary of the guilt and penalty phases of a capital case; a 26-item measure that required participants to endorse aggravators, nonstatutory mitigators, and statutory mitigators on a 6-point Likert scale; and standard demographic questions. Results indicated that death-qualified venirepersons, when compared to excludables, were more likely to endorse aggravating circumstances. Excludable participants, when compared to death-qualified venirepersons, were more likely to endorse nonstatutory mitigators. There was no significant difference between death-qualified and excludable venirepersons with respect to their endorsement of 6 out of 7 statutory mitigators. It would appear that the Furman v. Georgia (1972) decision to declare the death penalty unconstitutional is frustrated by the Lockhart v. McCree (1986) affirmation of death qualification. ^

Jurors' use of social framework evidence

Monahan and Walker (1988) delineated three uses of social science evidence within the courts: social authority, social fact, and social framework. Social authority evidence is social science evidence used in making policy or law. Social fact evidence is social science evidence that describes research undertaken expressly for the case at hand. Social framework evidence involves providing conclusions from previously conducted social science research to assist jurors in evaluating the other evidence in the case. Although this type of evidence has traditionally been presented via expert testimony, Monahan and Walker (1988) have suggested that, because the social science research involved comes from the extant literature and is not the province of any particular expert, it would be more economical to have the judge present this information as part of the judicial instructions to the jury. This study tested the implicit assumption that the presentation of the social framework evidence by the judge will have the same impact on juror verdicts as presentation of this evidence by an expert. ^ Two hundred mock jurors watched a videotaped hostile work environment sexual harassment trial. The social framework evidence consisted of the discussion of factors that have been found to increase the likelihood of sex stereotyping of women by men. The trial included either no social framework evidence, social framework evidence presented by the expert, or social framework evidence presented in judicial instructions. ^ Results indicated that men who heard the social framework evidence from the judge were more likely to vote for the defendant than men who heard no social framework evidence. Men who heard the judicial instruction with the social framework evidence also rated the plaintiff as less credible than the other men and women in the study. Thus, it appears that, for men, social framework evidence presented by the judge harms the plaintiff's case by reducing ratings of her credibility, but the same evidence presented by an expert does not affect men's verdicts. For women, however, social framework evidence, irrespective of who presents it, enhances the plaintiff's case. ^

Juror need for cognition and sensitivity to methodological flaws in expert evidence

Two studies investigated the influence of juror need for cognition on the systematic and heuristic processing of expert evidence. U.S. citizens reporting for jury duty in South Florida read a 15-page summary of a hostile work environment case containing expert testimony. The expert described a study she had conducted on the effects of viewing sexualized materials on men's behavior toward women. Certain methodological features of the expert's research varied across experimental conditions. In Study 1 (N = 252), the expert's study was valid, contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter bias (internal validity) and relied on a small or large sample (sample size) of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). When the expert's study included trucking employees, high need for cognition jurors in Study 1 rated the expert more credible and trustworthy than did low need for cognition jurors. Jurors were insensitive to variations in the study's internal validity or sample size. Juror ratings of plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. In Study 2 (N = 162), the expert's published or unpublished study (general acceptance) was either valid or lacked an appropriate control group (internal validity) and included a sample of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). High need for cognition jurors in Study 2 found the defendant liable more often and evaluated the expert evidence more favorably when the expert's study was internally valid than when an appropriate control group was missing. Low need for cognition jurors did not differentiate between the internally valid and invalid study. Variations in the study's general acceptance and ecological validity did not affect juror judgments. Juror ratings of expert and plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. The present research demonstrated that the need for cognition moderates juror sensitivity to expert evidence quality and that certain message-related heuristics influence juror judgments when ability or motivation to process systematically is low. ^

The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

The effects of defendant account on damage award decisions

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the manner in which civil defendants account for their behavior influences compensatory and punitive damage awards. Jurors read three civil trial summaries, in which I manipulated injury severity (high vs. low), defendant reprehensibility (high vs. low), defendant status (individual vs. corporate), and account (concession, excuse, justification or refusal) in a factorial design. I also included four control groups in which the defendant stipulated liability. In all other conditions, participants read that a jury had found the defendant negligent. Only defendant reprehensibility influenced punitive awards. Both plaintiff injury and defendant reprehensibility influenced compensatory awards. When individuals offered justifications and when corporations offered excuses, jurors awarded lower compensatory awards against low reprehensibility defendants than against high reprehensibility defendants. Negligence stipulations led to lower damage awards for individuals than for corporations. Additionally, concessions tended to produce lower awards when combined with a stipulation of negligence as opposed to a jury decision. These findings support the hypothesis that in cases in which the defendant is clearly negligent, circumstances exist in which stipulating negligence and offering an apologetic account will lead to reduced damage awards decisions. Results indicate that individual and corporate defendants offering justifications and refusals should first consider the reprehensibility of their actions. In a broader realm, findings demonstrate that the manner in which a jury perceives the explanation given by the defendant is dependent upon defendant characteristics and case-specific factors. ^

Judging psychology experts: Can judges and attorneys distinguish between clinical and experimental psychologists?

A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts are critical to preventing "junk" science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must first evaluate experts' CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts' credentials. Theoretical models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.^ Legal professionals' (N = 150) and undergraduate students' (N = 468) expert witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed participants' decision making processes.^ Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to render decisions.^

The differential effects of *American and British trial proceedings on juror decision-making

Seven basic elements differentiate British from American trial procedures: confining attorneys to their tables; dealing with objections outside the presence of the jury; resolving disagreements between attorneys prior to objections being made; presenting the defense opening statement at the close of the prosecution case; the judge directly questions witnesses and has a wider latitude in controlling the evidence; and the judge gives a summation of all the evidence presented to the jury (Fulero & Turner, 1997). The present experiment examined the influence of these different courtroom procedures, judges' non-verbal behavior, and evidence strength on juror decision-making. Using models of persuasion to understand how the varying elements may effect juror decision-making, it was predicted that trials following American courtroom procedures would be more distracting for jurors and as such, they would be more likely to rely on the peripheral cue of the judge's expectations for trial outcome as expressed in his nonverbal behavior. In trials following British procedures jurors should be less distracted and better able to scrutinize the strength of the evidence that in turn should minimize the influence of the judge's nonverbal behavior. Two hundred forty-five participants viewed a mock civil trial in which courtroom procedure, judge's nonverbal behavior, and evidence strength were varied. Analyses suggest that courtroom procedure and evidence strength influenced the direction of participants' verdicts, but that judge's nonverbal behavior did not have a direct impact on verdict preference. Judge's nonverbal behavior appeared to influence other measures related to verdict. Participants were more confident in their verdicts when they agreed with judge's nonverbal behavior and when they viewed British courtroom procedures. Participants were more likely to return estimates of the defendant's liability that reflected judge's nonverbal behavior and a congruency with evidence strength. Participants also recalled more facts in the British conditions than in the American conditions. These findings are interpreted as indicating the importance of the impact of trial procedures and of nonverbal influence. ^

Twelve certain men: The impact of emotional appraisals on juror decision-making

Our jury system is predicated upon the expectation that jurors engage in systematic processing when considering evidence and making decisions. They are instructed to interpret facts and apply the appropriate law in a fair, dispassionate manner, free of all bias, including that of emotion. However, emotions containing an element of certainty (e.g., anger and happiness, which require little cognitive effort in determining their source) can often lead people to engage in superficial, heuristic-based processing. Compare this to uncertain emotions (e.g., hope and fear, which require people to seek out explanations for their emotional arousal), which instead has the potential to lead them to engage in deeper, more systematic processing. The purpose of the current research is in part to confirm past research (Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Semmler & Brewer, 2002) that uncertain emotions (like fear) can influence decision-making towards a more systematic style of processing, whereas more certain emotional states (like anger) will lead to a more heuristic style of processing. Studies One, Two, and Three build upon this prior research with the goal of improving methodological rigor through the use of film clips to reliably induce emotions, with awareness of testimonial details serving as measures of processing style. The ultimate objective of the current research was to explore this effect in Study Four by inducing either fear, anger, or neutral emotion in mock jurors, half of whom then followed along with a trial transcript featuring eight testimonial inconsistencies, while the other participants followed along with an error-free version of the same transcript. Overall rates of detection for these inconsistencies was expected to be higher for the uncertain/fearful participants due to their more effortful processing compared to certain/angry participants. These expectations were not fulfilled, with significant main effects only for the transcript version (with or without inconsistencies) on overall inconsistency detection rates. There are a number of plausible explanations for these results, so further investigation is needed.

Examining Moderators of the Hindsight Bias in the Context of Civil Legal Decision-Making: Counterfactuals, Causal Proximity, and Self-Referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.

Quantification of standards of proof thresholds in criminal and civil litigation

Standards of proof in law serve the purpose of instructing juries as to the expected levels of confidence in determinations of fact. In criminal trials, to reach a guilty verdict a jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, and in civil trials by a preponderance of the evidence. The purposes of this study are to determine the quantitative thresholds used to make these determinations; to ascertain the levels of juror agreement with basic principles of justice; and to try to predict thresholds and beliefs by juror personality characteristics. Participants read brief case descriptions and indicated thresholds in percentages, their beliefs in various principles, and completed three personality measures. A 92-94% threshold in criminal and an 80% threshold in civil matters was found; but prediction by personality was not supported. Significant percentages of jurors disavowed the presumptions of innocence and right to counsel.

Twelve Certain Men: The Impact of Emotional Appraisals on Juror Decision-Making

Our jury system is predicated upon the expectation that jurors engage in systematic processing when considering evidence and making decisions. They are instructed to interpret facts and apply the appropriate law in a fair, dispassionate manner, free of all bias, including that of emotion. However, emotions containing an element of certainty (e.g., anger and happiness, which require little cognitive effort in determining their source) can often lead people to engage in superficial, heuristic-based processing. Compare this to uncertain emotions (e.g., hope and fear, which require people to seek out explanations for their emotional arousal), which instead has the potential to lead them to engage in deeper, more systematic processing. The purpose of the current research is in part to confirm past research (Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Semmler & Brewer, 2002) that uncertain emotions (like fear) can influence decision-making towards a more systematic style of processing, whereas more certain emotional states (like anger) will lead to a more heuristic style of processing. Studies One, Two, and Three build upon this prior research with the goal of improving methodological rigor through the use of film clips to reliably induce emotions, with awareness of testimonial details serving as measures of processing style. The ultimate objective of the current research was to explore this effect in Study Four by inducing either fear, anger, or neutral emotion in mock jurors, half of whom then followed along with a trial transcript featuring eight testimonial inconsistencies, while the other participants followed along with an error-free version of the same transcript. Overall rates of detection for these inconsistencies was expected to be higher for the uncertain/fearful participants due to their more effortful processing compared to certain/angry participants. These expectations were not fulfilled, with significant main effects only for the transcript version (with or without inconsistencies) on overall inconsistency detection rates. There are a number of plausible explanations for these results, so further investigation is needed.