Judging psychology experts: Can judges and attorneys distinguish between clinical and experimental psychologists?

A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts are critical to preventing "junk" science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must first evaluate experts' CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts' credentials. Theoretical models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.^ Legal professionals' (N = 150) and undergraduate students' (N = 468) expert witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed participants' decision making processes.^ Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to render decisions.^

How effective is the motion-to -suppress safeguard? Judges' perceptions of the suggestiveness and fairness of biased lineup procedures

The motion-to-suppress safeguard is designed to prevent false eyewitness identifications from leading to wrongful convictions. This safeguard is effective only if judges are sensitive to factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. The present study assessed judicial sensitivity to foil, instruction, and presentation biases. Judges $(N=99)$ read a description of a hypothetical crime, perpetrator, and identification procedure, followed by a motion to suppress the identification. Judges completed a questionnaire in which they ruled on the motion and rated the lineup's suggestiveness and fairness. Foil bias and instruction bias influenced judges' rulings and lineup evaluations as predicted. Hypotheses concerning presentation bias were not supported. Results suggest a need to standardize and record identification procedures and to further educate judges about psychological research on eyewitness memory. ^

The acceptability and utility of voir dire questionnaires in Florida Circuit Civil Court

This study examined the acceptability and utility of the content of an extensive automobile tort voir dire questionnaire in Florida Circuit Civil Court. The ultimate purpose was to find questionnaire items from established measures that have demonstrated utility in uncovering biases that were at the same time not objectionable to the courts. The survey instrument included a venireperson questionnaire that used case-specific attitudinal and personality measures as well as typical information asked about personal history. The venireperson questionnaire incorporated measures that have proven reliable in other personal injury studies (Hans, & Lofquist, 1994). In order to examine judges' ratings, the questionnaire items were grouped into eight categories. Claims Consciousness scale measures general attitudes towards making claims based on one's legal rights. Belief in a Just World measures how sympathetic the juror would be to people who have suffered injuries. Political Efficacy is another general attitude scale that identifies attitudes towards the government. Litigation Crisis scales elicits attitudes about civil litigation. Case Specific Beliefs about Automobile Accidents and Litigation were taken from questionnaires developed and used in auto torts and other personal injury cases. Juror's personal history was divided into Demographics and Trial Relevant Attitudes. Ninety-seven circuit civil judges critiqued the questionnaire for acceptability, relevance to the type of case presented, and usefulness to attorneys for determining peremptories. ^ The majority of judges' responses confirmed that the central dimension in judicial thinking is juror qualification rather than juror partiality. Only three of the eight voir dire categories were considered relevant by more than 50 percent of the judges: Trial Relevant Experiences, Juror Demographics, and Tort Reform. Additionally, several acceptable items from generally disapproved categories were identified among the responses. These were general and case specific attitudinal items that are related to tort reform. We discuss the utility of voir dire items for discerning juror partiality. ^

The differential effects of *American and British trial proceedings on juror decision-making

Seven basic elements differentiate British from American trial procedures: confining attorneys to their tables; dealing with objections outside the presence of the jury; resolving disagreements between attorneys prior to objections being made; presenting the defense opening statement at the close of the prosecution case; the judge directly questions witnesses and has a wider latitude in controlling the evidence; and the judge gives a summation of all the evidence presented to the jury (Fulero & Turner, 1997). The present experiment examined the influence of these different courtroom procedures, judges' non-verbal behavior, and evidence strength on juror decision-making. Using models of persuasion to understand how the varying elements may effect juror decision-making, it was predicted that trials following American courtroom procedures would be more distracting for jurors and as such, they would be more likely to rely on the peripheral cue of the judge's expectations for trial outcome as expressed in his nonverbal behavior. In trials following British procedures jurors should be less distracted and better able to scrutinize the strength of the evidence that in turn should minimize the influence of the judge's nonverbal behavior. Two hundred forty-five participants viewed a mock civil trial in which courtroom procedure, judge's nonverbal behavior, and evidence strength were varied. Analyses suggest that courtroom procedure and evidence strength influenced the direction of participants' verdicts, but that judge's nonverbal behavior did not have a direct impact on verdict preference. Judge's nonverbal behavior appeared to influence other measures related to verdict. Participants were more confident in their verdicts when they agreed with judge's nonverbal behavior and when they viewed British courtroom procedures. Participants were more likely to return estimates of the defendant's liability that reflected judge's nonverbal behavior and a congruency with evidence strength. Participants also recalled more facts in the British conditions than in the American conditions. These findings are interpreted as indicating the importance of the impact of trial procedures and of nonverbal influence. ^