Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

Maximum Justifiable Investment Analysis Determines Property Valuation

Investors and developers are often faced with the task of determining the worth or value of a real estate entity that presently exists or is proposed for development. This article explains the process for determining the value of a proposed project and, subsequently, the maximum investment dollars the project can cover, while at the same time producing a reasonable return for the investor. A proposed 300-room hotel serves as the real estate entity to be analyzed.

A decision support framework for infrastructure maintenance investment decision-making

Infrastructure management agencies are facing multiple challenges, including aging infrastructure, reduction in capacity of existing infrastructure, and availability of limited funds. Therefore, decision makers are required to think innovatively and develop inventive ways of using available funds. Maintenance investment decisions are generally made based on physical condition only. It is important to understand that spending money on public infrastructure is synonymous with spending money on people themselves. This also requires consideration of decision parameters, in addition to physical condition, such as strategic importance, socioeconomic contribution and infrastructure utilization. Consideration of multiple decision parameters for infrastructure maintenance investments can be beneficial in case of limited funding. Given this motivation, this dissertation presents a prototype decision support framework to evaluate trade-off, among competing infrastructures, that are candidates for infrastructure maintenance, repair and rehabilitation investments. Decision parameters' performances measured through various factors are combined to determine the integrated state of an infrastructure using Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT). The integrated state, cost and benefit estimates of probable maintenance actions are utilized alongside expert opinion to develop transition probability and reward matrices for each probable maintenance action for a particular candidate infrastructure. These matrices are then used as an input to the Markov Decision Process (MDP) for the finite-stage dynamic programming model to perform project (candidate)-level analysis to determine optimized maintenance strategies based on reward maximization. The outcomes of project (candidate)-level analysis are then utilized to perform network-level analysis taking the portfolio management approach to determine a suitable portfolio under budgetary constraints. The major decision support outcomes of the prototype framework include performance trend curves, decision logic maps, and a network-level maintenance investment plan for the upcoming years. The framework has been implemented with a set of bridges considered as a network with the assistance of the Pima County DOT, AZ. It is expected that the concept of this prototype framework can help infrastructure management agencies better manage their available funds for maintenance.