Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

Trade, justice, and the politics of difference: Small developing states in the World Trade Organization

The purpose of this research project was to investigate two distinct types of research questions – one theoretical, the other empirical: (1) What would justice mean in the context of the international trade regime? (2.Using the small developing states of the Commonwealth Caribbean as a case study, what do Commonwealth Caribbean trade negotiators mean when they appeal to justice? Regarding the first question, Iris Young's framework which focuses on the achievement of social justice in a domestic context by acknowledging social differences such as those based on race and gender, was adopted and its relevance argued in the international context of interstate trade negotiation so as to validate the notion of (size, location, and governance capacity) difference in this latter context. The point of departure is that while states are typically treated as equals in international law – as are individuals in liberal political theory – there are significant differences between states which warrant different treatment in the international arena. The study found that this re-formulation of justice which takes account of such differences between states, allows for more adequate policy responses than those offered by the presumption of equal treatment. Regarding the second question, this theoretical perspective was used to analyze the understandings of justice from which Commonwealth Caribbean trade negotiators proceed. Interpretive and ethnographic methods, including participant observation, interviews, field notes, and textual analysis, were employed to analyze their understandings of justice. The study found that these negotiators perceive such justice as being justice to difference because of the distinct characteristics of small developing states which combine to constrain their participation in the international trading system; based on this perception, they seek rules and outcomes in the multilateral trade regime which are sensitive to such different characteristics; and while these issues were examined in a specific region, its findings are relevant for other regions consisting of small developing states, such as those in the ACP group.