Florida International University School of Medicine to add $1 billion to South Florida's economy

Official Florida International University press release on the economic impact expected to result from the establishment of a School of Medicine in South Florida.

The international impact of productivity shocks

Even though many studies have confirmed the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) finding that savings and investment rates are highly correlated, there is no consensus on the major reason for this correlation. The purpose of this dissertation is to develop theoretical models and calibrate and simulate these to compare their implications to explain the observed time-series comovement between savings and investment in an attempt to show that this high correlation may stem from technological shocks.^ The dissertation is comprised of three studies. The first two studies construct overlapping-generations, two-economy models of saving and investment under conditions of perfect international capital mobility. The second study differs from the first by endogenizing the labor supply. Employing simulations, the models are used to generate time-series for savings and investment. These are then compared with the actual data for specific economies. The models show that productivity shocks produce a high correlation between savings and investment. Further, while the model with exogenous labor supply displays monotonic adjustment, the economy with endogenous labor supply adjusts cyclically.^ The third model, on the other hand, constructs a general equilibrium model for a small open economy. The study is based on two important elements: adjustment costs in investment and endogenous, recursive time preferences. Again, the simulation results show that the model generates, at least in a significant part of the adjustment path, a positive correlation between domestic savings and investment in response to a supply shock. ^

The impacts of trade policy reforms on the Sri Lankan economy

This dissertation presents an analysis of the impacts of trade policy reforms in Sri Lanka. A Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model is constructed with detailed description of the domestic production structure and foreign trade. The model is then used to investigate the effects of trade policy reforms on resource allocation and welfare.^ Prior to 1977, Sri Lanka maintained stringent control over its imports through rigid quantitative restrictions. A new economic policy reform package was introduced in 1977, and it shifted Sri Lanka's development strategy toward an export oriented policy regime. The shift of policy focus from a restrictive trade regime toward a more open trade regime is expected to have a significant impact on the volume of external trade, domestic production structure, allocation of resources, and social welfare.^ Simulations are carried out to assess the effects of three major policy reforms: (1) a devaluation of the Sri Lanka rupee, (2) a partial or a complete elimination of export duties, and (3) a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties.^ Simulation results indicate that the macroeconomic impact of a devaluation-cum-removal of export duties can be substantial. They also suggest that the resource-pull effects of a devaluation and a devaluation-cum-export duty removal policy are significant. However, the model shows that a devaluation combined with an export duty reduction is likely to be a superior strategy. ^

The political economy of sovereign debt

This dissertation examines international lending arrangements between a competitive foreign investor and a less-developed country. Given that the benefits and costs of borrowing are distributed unequally across society, it is of interest to examine the conditions under which borrowing occurs and how the borrowed funds are allocated. Three theoretical models are developed to consider optimal lending arrangements in the presence of sovereign risk. The models show how a society's level and distribution of wealth influences its access to loans and the terms of the loan agreements. Optimal loan contracts are established, which place either a debt ceiling or a debt floor on the amount of the loan that, will be offered. ^

The political economy of poverty alleviation strategies. The initiative for heavily indebted poor countries in Bolivia: More of the same

In the year 2000, approximately 1.1 billion people lived in extreme poverty while developed countries spent US$600 billion a year on defense. The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative is a recent component of a larger poverty reduction strategy supported by the International Financial Institutions, as well as many developed and developing countries. By implementing lessons of the past fifty years, this program attempts to diminish misery around the globe. As such, it provides debt relief while seeking to enable the poorest countries to simultaneously attain sustainable debt and promote human development. Interest in poverty reduction around the globe reemerged in the 1990s. This study contributes directly to this recent effort by presenting a nuanced approach that builds on the stepping-stones generated by other poverty scholars. To fulfill its goal, this investigation applies a political economy framework. Within this framework, the author conducts an actor-specific analysis. This dissertation addresses the following question: How do domestic and international actors respond to the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies? The author assumes actors desire to maximize their utility calculation and suggests these calculations are based on the player's motivations and external influences. Based on their motivations, the external influences, and the initiative's guidelines, each actor develops a set of expectations. To fulfill those expectations, stake holders utilize one or several strategies. Finally, the actors' ability to achieve their expectations determines each player's assessment of the initiative. The framework described is applied in an in-depth, actor-specific analysis of the HIPC in Bolivia. Bolivia's National Revolution represents the country's first attempt at reducing poverty. Since then, all governments have taken specific steps to combat poverty at the local and national levels. The Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) is one of the most recent macro strategies of this kind. The case study demonstrated that three factors (national ownership, effective sponsorship and the local context) determine the success levels of poverty reduction strategies from abroad. In addition, the investigation clearly shows that poverty reduction is not the sole motivation in the implementation of poverty alleviation strategies. All actors, however, share the dream of poverty reduction.

The political economy of inequality and growth: Essays on sovereign debt, democracy and saving

This dissertation addresses three issues in the political economy of growth literature. The first study empirically tests the hypothesis that income inequality influences the size of a country's sovereign debt for a sample of developing countries for the period 1970–1990. The argument examined is that governments tend to yield to popular pressures to engage in redistributive policies, partially financed by foreign borrowing. Facing increased risk of default, international creditors limit the credit they extend, with the result that borrowing countries invest less and grow at a slower pace. The findings do not seem to support the negative relationship between inequality and sovereign debt, as there is evidence of increases in multilateral, countercyclical flows until the mid 1980s in Latin America. The hypothesis would hold for the period 1983–1990. Debt flows and levels seem to be positively correlated with growth as expected. ^ The second study empirically investigates the hypothesis that pronounced levels of inequality lead to unconsolidated democracies. We test the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between inequality and democracy for a sample of Latin American countries for the period 1970–2000, where democracy appears to consolidate at some intermediate level of inequality. We find that the nonmonotonic relationship holds using instrumental variables methods. Bolivia seems to be a case of unconsolidated democracy. The positive relationship between per capita income and democracy disappears once fixed effects are introduced. ^ The third study explores the nonlinear relationship between per capita income and private saving levels in Latin America. Several estimation methods are presented; however, only the estimation of a dynamic specification through a state-of-the-art general method of moments estimator yields consistent estimates with increased efficiency. Results support the hypothesis that income positively affects private saving, while system GMM reveals nonlinear effects at income levels that exceed the ones included in this sample for the period 1960–1994. We also find that growth, government dissaving, and tightening of credit constraints have a highly significant and positive effect on private saving. ^

Essays in open economy macroeconomics

Research macroeconomists have witnessed remarkable methodological developments in mathematical, statistical, and computational tools during the last two decades. The three essays in this dissertation took advantage of these advances to analyze important macroeconomic issues. ^ The first essay, “ Habit Formation, Adjustments Costs, and International Business Cycle Puzzles” analyzes the extent to which incorporating habit formation and adjustment costs in investment in a one-good two-country general equilibrium model would help overcome some of the international business cycle puzzles. Unlike standard results in the literature, the model generates persistent, cyclical adjustment paths in response to shocks. It also yields positive cross-country correlations in consumption, employment, investment, and output. Cross-country correlations in output are higher than the ones in consumption. This is qualitatively consistent with the stylized facts. These results are particularly striking given the predicted negative correlations in investment, employment, and output that are typically found in the literature. ^ The second essay, “Comparison Utility, Endogenous Time Preference, and Economic Growth,” uses World War II as a natural experiment to analyze the degree to which a model where consumers' preferences exhibit comparison-based utility and endogenous discounting is able to improve upon existing models in mimicking the transitional dynamics of an economy after a shock that destroys part of its capital stock. The model outperforms existing ones in replicating the behavior of the saving rate (both on impact and along the transient paths) after this historical event. This result brings additional support to the endogenous rate of time preference being a crucial element in growth models. ^ The last essay, “Monetary Policy under Fear of Floating: Modeling the Dominican Economy,” presents a small scale macroeconomic model for a country (Dominican Republic) characterized by a strong presence of fear of floating (reluctance to have a flexible exchange rate regime) in the conduct of monetary policy. The dynamic responses of this economy to external shocks that are of interest for monetary policy purposes are analyzed under two alternative interest rate policy rules: One being the standard Taylor rule and another that responds explicitly to deviations of the exchange rate with respect to its long-term trend. ^

Essays on political economy

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms.^ The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values.^ The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.^

Three essays on labor liberalization and its effects on world economy

This dissertation consists of three theoretical essays on immigration, international trade and political economy. The first two essays analyze the political economy of immigration in developed countries. The third essay explores new ground on the effects of labor liberalization in developing countries. Trade economists have witnessed remarkable methodological developments in mathematical and game theoretical models during the last seventy years. This dissertation benefits from these advances to analyze economic issues related to immigration. The first essay applies a long run general equilibrium trade model similar to Krugman (1980), and blends it with the median voter ala-Mayer (1984) framework. The second essay uses a short run general equilibrium specific factor trade model similar to Jones (1975) and incorporates it with the median voter model similar to Benhabib (1997). The third essay employs a five stage game theoretical approach similar to Vogel (2007) and solves it by the method of backward induction. The first essay shows that labor liberalization is more likely to come about in societies that have more taste for varieties, and that workers and capital owners could share the same positive stance toward labor liberalization. In a dynamic model, it demonstrates that the median voter is willing to accept fewer immigrants in the first period in order to preserve her domestic political influence in the second period threatened by the naturalization of these immigrants. The second essay shows that the liberalization of labor depends on the host country's stock and distribution of capital, and the number of groups of skilled workers within each country. I demonstrate that the more types of goods both countries produce, the more liberal the host country is toward immigration. The third essay proposes a theory of free movement of goods and labor between two economies with imperfect labor contracts. The heart of my analysis lies in the determinants of talent development where individuals' decisions to emigrate are related to the fixed costs of emigration. Finally, free trade and labor affect income via an indirect effect on individuals' incentives to invest in the skill levels and a direct effect on the prices of goods.

Essays on international lending and increasing returns to scale

Standard economic theory suggests that capital should flow from rich countries to poor countries. However, capital has predominantly flowed to rich countries. The three essays in this dissertation attempt to explain this phenomenon. The first two essays suggest theoretical explanations for why capital has not flowed to the poor countries. The third essay empirically tests the theoretical explanations.^ The first essay examines the effects of increasing returns to scale on international lending and borrowing with moral hazard. Introducing increasing returns in a two-country general equilibrium model yields possible multiple equilibria and helps explain the possibility of capital flows from a poor to a rich country. I find that a borrowing country may need to borrow sufficient amounts internationally to reach a minimum investment threshold in order to invest domestically.^ The second essay examines how a poor country may invest in sectors with low productivity because of sovereign risk, and how collateral differences across sectors may exacerbate the problem. I model sovereign borrowing with a two-sector economy: one sector with increasing returns to scale (IRS) and one sector with diminishing returns to scale (DRS). Countries with incomes below a threshold will only invest in the DRS sector, and countries with incomes above a threshold will invest mostly in the IRS sector. The results help explain the existence of a bimodal world income distribution.^ The third essay empirically tests the explanations for why capital has not flowed from the rich to the poor countries, with a focus on institutions and initial capital. I find that institutional variables are a very important factor, but in contrast to other studies, I show that institutions do not account for the Lucas Paradox. Evidence of increasing returns still exists, even when controlling for institutions and other variables. In addition, I find that the determinants of capital flows may depend on whether a country is rich or poor.^

Essays on the political economy of trade policy and economic *development

This dissertation studies the political economy of trade policy in a developing country, namely Turkey, under different economic and political regimes. The research analyzes the effects of these different regimes on the import structure, the trade policy and the industrialization process in Turkey and derives implications for aggregate welfare. ^ In the second chapter, the effects of trade liberalization policies on import demand are examined. Using disaggregated industry-level data, import demand elasticities for various sectors have been computed, analyzed under different economic regimes, and compared with those of developed countries. The results are statistically significant and reliable, and conform to the predictions of economic theory. Estimation of these elasticities is also a necessary ingredient for the third chapter of the dissertation. ^ The third chapter examines the predictions of the state-of-the-art “Protection For Sale” model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). Employing advanced econometric methods and a unique data set, strong support is found for the fundamental predictions of the model in the context of Turkey. Specifically, the government is found to attach a much higher weight to social welfare than to political contributions. This weight is higher under the democratic regime than under the dictatorship, a result potentially of interest to all researchers in the area of political economy. ^ The fourth chapter looks at the effects of industry concentration and import price shocks on protection, promotion and the choice of policy instruments in Turkey. In this context, it examines and finds support for the predictions of some well-known models in the literature. ^

Essays in Open Economy Macroeconomics

Research macroeconomists have witnessed remarkable methodological developments in mathematical, statistical, and computational tools during the last two decades. The three essays in this dissertation took advantage of these advances to analyze important macroeconomic issues. The first essay, “ Habit Formation, Adjustments Costs, and International Business Cycle Puzzles” analyzes the extent to which incorporating habit formation and adjustment costs in investment in a one-good two-country general equilibrium model would help overcome some of the international business cycle puzzles. Unlike standard results in the literature, the model generates persistent, cyclical adjustment paths in response to shocks. It also yields positive cross-country correlations in consumption, employment, investment, and output. Cross-country correlations in output are higher than the ones in consumption. This is qualitatively consistent with the stylized facts. These results are particularly striking given the predicted negative correlations in investment, employment, and output that are typically found in the literature. The second essay, “Comparison Utility, Endogenous Time Preference, and Economic Growth,” uses World War II as a natural experiment to analyze the degree to which a model where consumers' preferences exhibit comparison-based utility and endogenous discounting is able to improve upon existing models in mimicking the transitional dynamics of an economy after a shock that destroys part of its capital stock. The model outperforms existing ones in replicating the behavior of the saving rate (both on impact and along the transient paths) after this historical event. This result brings additional support to the endogenous rate of time preference being a crucial element in growth models. The last essay, “Monetary Policy under Fear of Floating: Modeling the Dominican Economy,” presents a small scale macroeconomic model for a country (Dominican Republic) characterized by a strong presence of fear of floating (reluctance to have a flexible exchange rate regime) in the conduct of monetary policy. The dynamic responses of this economy to external shocks that are of interest for monetary policy purposes are analyzed under two alternative interest rate policy rules: One being the standard Taylor rule and another that responds explicitly to deviations of the exchange rate with respect to its long-term trend.

Essays On Political Economy

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms. The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values. The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.

Essays on the political economy of the dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties.