Measuring effectiveness in international financial crime prevention: Can we agree on a performance metric?

The attempts at carrying out terrorist attacks have become more prevalent. As a result, an increasing number of countries have become particularly vigilant against the means by which terrorists raise funds to finance their draconian acts against human life and property. Among the many counter-terrorism agencies in operation, governments have set up financial intelligence units (FIUs) within their borders for the purpose of tracking down terrorists’ funds. By investigating reported suspicious transactions, FIUs attempt to weed out financial criminals who use these illegal funds to finance terrorist activity. The prominent role played by FIUs means that their performance is always under the spotlight. By interviewing experts and conducting surveys of those associated with the fight against financial crime, this study investigated perceptions of FIU performance on a comparative basis between American and non-American FIUs. The target group of experts included financial institution personnel, civilian agents, law enforcement personnel, academicians, and consultants. Questions for the interview and surveys were based on the Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard (BSC) methodology. One of the objectives of this study was to help determine the suitability of the BSC to this arena. While FIUs in this study have concentrated on performance by measuring outputs such as the number of suspicious transaction reports investigated, this study calls for a focus on outcomes involving all the parties responsible for financial criminal investigations. It is only through such an integrated approach that these various entities will be able to improve performance in solving financial crime. Experts in financial intelligence strongly believed that the quality and timeliness of intelligence was more important than keeping track of the number of suspicious transaction reports. Finally, this study concluded that the BSC could be appropriately applied to the arena of financial crime prevention even though the emphasis is markedly different from that in the private sector. While priority in the private sector is given to financial outcomes, in this arena employee growth and internal processes were perceived as most important in achieving a satisfactory outcome.

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.