Essays on the political economy of the Dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. ^ The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties. ^

Essays on the political economy of the dominican reform process

This dissertation provides an analytical framework to study the political economy of policy reform in the Dominican Republic during the nineties. Based on a country study, I develop two theoretical models that replicate the mechanisms of policy approval in developing countries with weak democracies. The first model considers a pro-reform President who submits a tariff bill to an anti-reform Congress dominated by the opposition party. In between, two opposing lobbies try to get their favored policy approved. Lobbies act as Stackelberg leaders vis a vis a weak President. The behavior of the Congress is determined exogenously while the lobbies act strategically pursuing the approval of the reform bill and indirectly affecting the President's decision. I show that in such a setting external agents like the Press play an important role in the decision-making process of the political actors. The second model presents a similar framework. However, the President, who is a Stackelberg leader, is allowed only two choices, total reform or status-quo. I show how a lobby reacts to an increase in its rival's or its own size. These reactions depend on the President's level of commitment to the reform. Finally, I discuss the effect of variations in the size of the lobbies on the President's choice. The model suitably explains real events that took place in the Dominican Republic in the mid-nineties.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986: Impact On Hospitality Industries

In her discussion - The Tax Reform Act Of 1986: Impact On Hospitality Industries - by Elisa S. Moncarz, Associate Professor, the School of Hospitality Management at Florida International University, Professor Moncarz initially states: “After nearly two years of considering the overhaul of the federal tax system, Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The impact of this legislation is expected to affect virtually all individuals and businesses associated with the hospitality industry. This article discusses some of the major provisions of the tax bill, emphasizing those relating to the hospitality service industries and contrasting relevant provisions with prior law on their positive and negative effects to the industry. “On October 22, 1986, President Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) with changes so pervasive that a recodification of the income tax laws became necessary…,” Professor Moncarz says in providing a basic history of the bill. Two, very important paragraphs underpin TRA 86, and this article. They should not be under-estimated. The author wants you to know: “With the passage of TRA 86, the Reagan administration achieved the most important single domestic initiative of Reagan's second term, a complete restructuring of the federal tax system in an attempt to re-establish fairness in the tax code…,” an informed view, indeed. “These changes will result in an estimated shift of over $100 billion of the tax burden from individuals to corporations over the next five years [as of this article],” Professor Moncarz enlightens. “…TRA 86 embraces a conversion to the view that lowering tax rates and eliminating or restricting tax preferences (i.e., loopholes) “would be more economically and socially productive.” Hence, economic decisions would be based on economic efficiency as opposed to tax effect,” the author asserts. “…both Congress and the administration recognized from its inception that the reform of the tax code must satisfy three basic goals,” and these goals are identified for you. Professor Moncarz outlines the positive impact TRA 86 will have on the U.S. economy in general, but also makes distinctions the ‘Act will have on specific segments of the business community, with a particular eye toward the hospitality industry and food-service in particular. Professor Moncarz also provides graphs to illustrate the comparative tax indexes of select companies, encompassing the years 1883-through-1985. Deductibility and its importance are discussed as well. The author foresees Limited Partnerships, employment, and even new hotel construction and/or rehabilitation being affected by TRA 86. The article, as one would assume from this type of discussion, is liberally peppered with facts and figures.