A model of mistaken alibis: How innocent alibi providers generate inaccurate alibis

This dissertation comprised two experiments, which addressed three main goals: (a) to test a new paradigm for measuring objectively the accuracy of alibis, (b) to explore the effectiveness of three retrieval cues (time only, location only, and time-and-location) in an alibi context, and (c) to explore the metacognitive strategies of innocent alibi providers who experience different financial incentives as well as different motivations for reporting (be informative vs. be convincing). ^ The novel paradigm appears promising: by surreptitiously controlling the whereabouts of future alibi providers during a critical time, objective accuracy measurements were in fact possible. Such accuracy measurements revealed that time-cued retrieval can be devastating to innocent alibi providers. Participants who attempted to recall their whereabouts via a time cue were significantly less accurate than participants who attempted recall via a location cue (Experiment 1). ^ Innocent alibi providers, when cued effectively, may not, however, report their memories differently from memory reporters in non-alibi contexts. When cued effectively, participants who experienced a goal of being convincing did not differ in accuracy from participants who experienced a goal of merely being informative (Experiment 2). Similarly, participants did not differ from one another in accuracy across different levels of financial incentive (Experiment 2). ^ Despite the indistinguishable accuracy rates of alibi providers and non-alibi memory reporters when retrieval was cued effectively, proffering mistaken alibis presents a real risk for innocent suspects. Future research needs to address methods by which that risk can be reduced. ^

Judging psychology experts: Can judges and attorneys distinguish between clinical and experimental psychologists?

A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts are critical to preventing "junk" science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must first evaluate experts' CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts' credentials. Theoretical models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.^ Legal professionals' (N = 150) and undergraduate students' (N = 468) expert witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed participants' decision making processes.^ Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to render decisions.^