Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua

A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attachés in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Secure routing and trust computation in multihop infrastructureless networks

Today's wireless networks rely mostly on infrastructural support for their operation. With the concept of ubiquitous computing growing more popular, research on infrastructureless networks have been rapidly growing. However, such types of networks face serious security challenges when deployed. This dissertation focuses on designing a secure routing solution and trust modeling for these infrastructureless networks. ^ The dissertation presents a trusted routing protocol that is capable of finding a secure end-to-end route in the presence of malicious nodes acting either independently or in collusion, The solution protects the network from active internal attacks, known to be the most severe types of attacks in an ad hoc application. Route discovery is based on trust levels of the nodes, which need to be dynamically computed to reflect the malicious behavior in the network. As such, we have developed a trust computational model in conjunction with the secure routing protocol that analyzes the different malicious behavior and quantifies them in the model itself. Our work is the first step towards protecting an ad hoc network from colluding internal attack. To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, extensive simulation has been carried out to evaluate the protocol efficiency and scalability with both network size and mobility. ^ This research has laid the foundation for developing a variety of techniques that will permit people to justifiably trust the use of ad hoc networks to perform critical functions, as well as to process sensitive information without depending on any infrastructural support and hence will enhance the use of ad hoc applications in both military and civilian domains. ^

Soviet and Western bloc competition in the less developed world and the collapse of Détente

The purpose of my dissertation was to examine the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during Détente. I assessed whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the less developed world in the middle-to-late 1970's and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Détente in 1979. I made the attempt to test the international relations theory of balance of threat realism (Walt, 1992). I accomplished the test in two ways. First, I measured the foreign aid allocations (military and economic) made by each respective bloc towards the Third World by using a quantitative approach. Second, I examined U.S. archives using the process-tracing/historical method. The U.S. archives gave me the ability to evaluate how U.S. decision-makers and U.S. intelligence agencies interpreted the actions of the Soviet bloc. They also gave me the chance to examine the U.S. response as we evaluated the policies that were pushed by key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies. On the question of whether or not the Soviet bloc was aggressive, the quantitative evidence suggested that it was not. Instead, the evidence found the Western-bloc to have been more aggressive in the less developed world. The U.S. archives also showed Soviet actions to have been defensive. Key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies attested to this. Finally, the archives show that U.S. officials pushed for aggressive actions against the Third World during the final years of Détente. Thus, balance of threat realism produced an incorrect assessment that U.S. aggression in the late 1970's was a response to Soviet aggression during Détente. The evidence suggests structural Marxism and domestic politics can better explain U.S./Western actions. The aggressive foreign aid allocations of the West, coupled with evidence of U.S. decision-makers/agencies vehemently concerned about the long-term prospects of the West, strengthened structural Marxism. Domestic politics can also claim to explain the actions of U.S. decision-makers. I found extensive archival evidence of bureaucratic inter-agency conflict between the State Department and other intelligence agencies in areas of strategic concern to the U.S.

European integration and democratic consolidation: Spain, Poland and Turkey in comparative perspective

The study explored when, under what conditions, and to what extent did European integration, particularly the European Union’s requirement for democratic conditionality, contribute to democratic consolidation in Spain, Poland, and Turkey? On the basis of a four-part definition, the dissertation examined the democratizing impact of European integration process on each of the following four components of consolidation: (i) holding of fair, free and competitive elections, (ii) protection of fundamental rights, including human and minority rights, (iii) high prospects of regime survival and civilian control of the military, and (iv) legitimacy, elite consensus, and stateness. To assess the relative significance of EU’s democratizing leverage, the thesis also examined domestic and non-EU international dynamics of democratic consolidation in the three countries. By employing two qualitative methods (case study and process-tracing), the study focused on three specific time frames: 1977–1986 for Spain, 1994–2004 for Poland, and 1999–present for Turkey. In addition to official documents, newspapers, and secondary sources, face-to-face interviews made with politicians, academics, experts, bureaucrats, and journalists in the three countries were utilized. The thesis generated several conclusions. First of all, the EU’s democratizing impact is not uniform across different components of democratic consolidation. Moreover, the EU’s democratizing leverage in Spain, Poland, and Turkey involved variations over time for three major reasons: (i) the changing nature of EU’s democratic conditionality over time (ii) varying levels of the EU’s credible commitment to the candidate country’s prospect for membership, and (iii) domestic dynamics in the candidate countries. Furthermore, the European integration process favors democratic consolidation but its magnitude is shaped by the candidate country’s prospect for EU membership and domestic factors in the candidate country. Finally, the study involves a major policy implication for the European Union: unless the EU provides a clear prospect for membership, its democratizing leverage will be limited in the candidate countries.

Peru’s Shining Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects

Although soundly defeated in the early to mid-1990s, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) did not disappear. Over the past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially different form, with both a military and a political component. The organization, once again coordinated by jailed leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, has eschewed shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term strategy of slowly rebuilding popular support and establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In so doing, it has also moved from extreme Maoist ideological rigidity to a more pragmatic, though perhaps only tactical, approach. Financial support is derived once again from cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Although there may be some individual exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization. At the same time, Sendero is still very small, in no way a threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based political organization and the military wing in the UHV continue to follow Guzmán‟s leadership, while the Apurímac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to the armed struggle. The Government of Peru (GOP) response to date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate. VRAE military operations are hampered by poor leadership, ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE development resources have been cut, and the long-promised paved road remains in the planning stage. Without significant GOP adjustments, Shining Path is likely to continue to grow.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Pirates, exiles, and empire: English seamen, Atlantic expansion, and Jamaican settlement, 1558–1658

A life of piracy offered marginal men a profession with a degree of autonomy, despite the brand of "outlaw" and the fear of prosecution. At various times throughout history, governments and crowned heads suspended much of their piracy prosecution, licensing men to work as "privateers" for the state, supplementing naval forces. This practice has a long history, but in sixteenth-century England, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) significantly altered this tradition. Recognizing her own weakness in effectively prosecuting these men and the profit they could contribute to the government, Elizabeth began incorporating pirates into the English naval corps in peacetime—not just in war. This practice increased English naval resources, income, and presence in the emerging Atlantic World, but also increased conflict with the powerful Spanish empire. By 1605, making peace with Spain, James VI/I (1603-1625) retracted Elizabeth's privateering promotion, prompting an emigration of English seamen to the American outposts they had developed in the previous century. Now exiles, no longer beholden to the Crown, seamen reverted back to piracy. The Carolinas and Jamaica served as bases for these rover communities. In 1650, the revolutionary leader Oliver Cromwell (1649-1658) once again recognized the merits of such policies. Determined to demonstrate his authority and solidify his rule, Cromwell offered citizenship and state support to Caribbean exiles in exchange for their aiding of his navy in the taking of Spanish Jamaica. Official chartering of Port Royal, Jamaica served as reward for these men's efforts and as the culmination of a century-long cycle of piracy legislation, creating one of England's most lucrative colonies in the middle of a traditionally Spanish Caribbean empire. Through legal and diplomatic records, correspondence, and naval and demographic records from England and Spain, this dissertation explores early modern piracy/privateering policy and its impact on the development of the Atlantic World. European disputes and imperial competition converged in these piracy debates with significant consequences for the definitions of criminality and citizenship and for the development of Atlantic empire.

Pirates, Exiles, and Empire: English Seamen, Atlantic Expansion, and Jamaican Settlement, 1558-1658

A life of piracy offered marginal men a profession with a degree of autonomy, despite the brand of “outlaw” and the fear of prosecution. At various times throughout history, governments and crowned heads suspended much of their piracy prosecution, licensing men to work as “privateers” for the state, supplementing naval forces. This practice has a long history, but in sixteenth-century England, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) significantly altered this tradition. Recognizing her own weakness in effectively prosecuting these men and the profit they could contribute to the government, Elizabeth began incorporating pirates into the English naval corps in peacetime—not just in war. This practice increased English naval resources, income, and presence in the emerging Atlantic World, but also increased conflict with the powerful Spanish empire. By 1605, making peace with Spain, James VI/I (1603-1625) retracted Elizabeth’s privateering promotion, prompting an emigration of English seamen to the American outposts they had developed in the previous century. Now exiles, no longer beholden to the Crown, seamen reverted back to piracy. The Carolinas and Jamaica served as bases for these rover communities. In 1650, the revolutionary leader Oliver Cromwell (1649-1658) once again recognized the merits of such policies. Determined to demonstrate his authority and solidify his rule, Cromwell offered citizenship and state support to Caribbean exiles in exchange for their aiding of his navy in the taking of Spanish Jamaica. Official chartering of Port Royal, Jamaica served as reward for these men’s efforts and as the culmination of a century-long cycle of piracy legislation, creating one of England’s most lucrative colonies in the middle of a traditionally Spanish Caribbean empire. Through legal and diplomatic records, correspondence, and naval and demographic records from England and Spain, this dissertation explores early modern piracy/privateering policy and its impact on the development of the Atlantic World. European disputes and imperial competition converged in these piracy debates with significant consequences for the definitions of criminality and citizenship and for the development of Atlantic empire.