Improved sampling, pre-concentration, and detection of hidden explosives and illicit drugs by a novel solid phase microextraction geometry coupled to ion mobility spectrometry

The 9/11 Act mandates the inspection of 100% of cargo shipments entering the U.S. by 2012 and 100% inspection of air cargo by March 2010. So far, only 5% of inbound shipping containers are inspected thoroughly while air cargo inspections have fared better at 50%. Government officials have admitted that these milestones cannot be met since the appropriate technology does not exist. This research presents a novel planar solid phase microextraction (PSPME) device with enhanced surface area and capacity for collection of the volatile chemical signatures in air that are emitted from illicit compounds for direct introduction into ion mobility spectrometers (IMS) for detection. These IMS detectors are widely used to detect particles of illicit substances and do not have to be adapted specifically to this technology. For static extractions, PDMS and sol-gel PDMS PSPME devices provide significant increases in sensitivity over conventional fiber SPME. Results show a 50–400 times increase in mass detected of piperonal and a 2–4 times increase for TNT. In a blind study of 6 cases suspected to contain varying amounts of MDMA, PSPME-IMS correctly detected 5 positive cases with no false positives or negatives. One of these cases had minimal amounts of MDMA resulting in a false negative response for fiber SPME-IMS. A La (dihed) phase chemistry has shown an increase in the extraction efficiency of TNT and 2,4-DNT and enhanced retention over time. An alternative PSPME device was also developed for the rapid (seconds) dynamic sampling and preconcentration of large volumes of air for direct thermal desorption into an IMS. This device affords high extraction efficiencies due to strong retention properties under ambient conditions resulting in ppt detection limits when 3.5 L of air are sampled over the course of 10 seconds. Dynamic PSPME was used to sample the headspace over the following: MDMA tablets (12–40 ng detected of piperonal), high explosives (Pentolite) (0.6 ng detected of TNT), and several smokeless powders (26–35 ng of 2,4-DNT and 11–74 ng DPA detected). PSPME-IMS technology is flexible to end-user needs, is low-cost, rapid, sensitive, easy to use, easy to implement, and effective. ^

Correlation of detector dog alerts to cocaine decomposition products found in illicit forensic specimens

The volatile chemicals which comprise the odor of the illicit drug cocaine have been analyzed by adsorption onto activated charcoal followed by solvent elution and GC/MS analysis. A series of field tests have been performed to determine the dominant odor compound to which dogs alert. All of our data to date indicate that the dominant odor is due to the presence of methyl benzoate which is associated with the cocaine, rather than the cocaine itself. When methyl benzoate and cocaine are spiked onto U.S. currency, the threshold level of methyl benzoate required for a canine to signal an alert is typically 1-10 $\mu$g. Humans have been shown to have a sensitivity similar to dogs for methyl benzoate but with poorer selectivity/reliability. The dominant decomposition pathway for cocaine has been evaluated at elevated temperatures (up to 280$\sp\circ$C). Benzoic acid, but no detectable methyl benzoate, is formed. Solvent extraction and SFE were used to study the recovery of cocaine from U.S. currency. The amount of cocaine which could be recovered was found to decrease with time. ^

Social factors influencing antiretroviral therapy (ART) adherence among Black men living with HIV who use illicit drugs

In the United States 1.2 million persons are HIV infected. Among men, HIV rates in Blacks are seven times higher than Whites. More Black men progress to AIDS because of treatment failure and adherence problems. Antiretroviral therapy (ART), the only treatment effective for long term HIV suppression, requires near perfect adherence. Illicit drug use and homelessness pose further challenges. Suboptimal ART adherence leads to HIV mutations that can render entire classes of medication ineffective and transmission of mutated HIV to others in the community. The purpose of this study was to investigate ART adherence behaviors of Black men living with HIV who use illicit drugs. A sample of 160 Black men living with HIV who use illicit drugs was recruited using flyers and snowball sampling. These men completed study questionnaires that included: demographics, the K-10, PSOM and Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire, among others. One-way ANOVAs, multiple regression, and path analysis were used to address the study's research questions. Most of the Black men in this sample were high school graduates and single, with high rates of being marginally housed and homeless. Unemployment and disability were common, and personal and household income was low. The men reported high numbers of sexual partners both over the past year and during their lifetimes, suggesting continued engagement in high risk behaviors. The majority of the men attributed their HIV to heterosexual sex, with sexual commoditization being common. About half of the 105 men currently taking ART reported the current regimen was their first. Patient-provider relationship was positively associated with tolerability of ART. ART adherence was greater with less psychological distress, lower frequency of current illicit drug use, and greater tolerability of ART. Partner status negatively influenced ART adherence. This study of Black men's ART adherence behaviors has implications for public health. It identified social context factors that influence ART adherence among the men and provides evidence to refine existing, or develop new, ART adherence interventions.

Illicit interest groups: The political impact of the Medellin drug trafficking organizations in Colombia

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the "Medellin Cartel." In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study's findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government's push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.