The Basis of Support for Hugo Chávez: Measuring the Determinants of Presidential Job Approval in Venezuela

Since 1999, Venezuela has experienced a dramatic transformation of its political system with the coming to power of Hugo Chávez and his movement, known in Venezuela as Chavismo. Chávez has dismantled the previous political system and established neo-populist structures that rely on his personal appeal and the close collaboration of the armed forces. Chávez has relied heavily on significant support from the poor and those who felt economically and politically excluded by the “Punto Fijo system.” President Chávez has built an impressive record of electoral victories; winning every electoral contest except one since coming to power in 1999. He continues to receive relatively high levels of support among sectors of Venezuelan society. However, there is evidence of growing discontent with high crime rates, high levels of inflation, and significant corruption in the public administration. Using data from the AmericasBarometer surveys conducted in 2007, 2008 and 2010, this paper seeks to examine the basis of Chávez’s popular support. In general, the AmericasBarometer findings suggest that Venezuelans support for President Chávez is closely linked to the access to social programs and that as long as the government is able to fund these social programs or missions, particularly MERCAL and Barrio Adentro, it will possess an important tool to garner and sustain support for President Chávez. Our analysis, however, also indicates that evaluations of the national economic situation, more than crime or insecurity, are a key factor that could undermine support for the regime.

The United States Congress and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez

The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could also be committed to history. This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study finds that despite Chavez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chavez as a nuisance and not a threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chavez is seen by Congress largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat. The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches' reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910- 1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

Venezuela and Chile: Two Opposite Paths of Democratic Consolidation and Economic Development.

In the past 20 years, Chile and Venezuela have followed divergent paths of democratic and economic development. When the Cold War ended, Venezuela was one of the few Latin American countries where democracy had survived the authoritarian wave of the 1960 and 1970s. Heralded in the late 1980s as the most stable democracy and one of the most developed and globalized economies in the region, Venezuela has since experienced deterioration of democratic institutions, political polarization, economic stagnation, and instability. In contrast, Chile has experienced a democratic renaissance since 1990. Rapid economic growth, an increasingly efficient public sector, significant reductions in poverty, and improvements in social programs have all made Chile a regional leader in democratic consolidation and sustainable development. Chile emerges as a success story and Venezuela as a country lagging behind in terms of making progress in economic development and poverty reduction. While Chile has developed a democratic system based on institutions, Venezuela has seen its democracy evolve towards increasing concentration of power on the hands of President Hugo Chávez.

Islamist Cyber Networks in Spanish-Speaking Latin America

Despite significant concern among policy, law enforcement and intelligence communities in the United States (U.S.) over the possible spread of radical Islamist thought throughout the world as part of a global jihad movement, there has been little investigation into the growing cyber networks in Latin America that promote strong anti-Semitic and anti-U.S. messages. This paper offers an overview of that network, focusing on the structure of Shi’ite websites that promote not only religious conversion but are also supportive of Iran -- a designated State-sponsor of terrorism – its nuclear program. Hezbollah, and the “Bolivarian revolution” led by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and his allies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. There is also a smaller group of Sunni Muslim websites, mostly tied to the legacy organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many of the Shi’ite websites are linked to each other consistently portray Israel as a Nazi State, and the United States as an imperialist war monger. The Palestinian issue is frequently juxtaposed with the anti-imperialist struggle that those states supporting Chávez’ Bolivarian revolution claim to wage against the United States. Some of the Islamist websites claim thousands of new convert, but such claims are difficult to verify. Most of the websites visited touted the conversion of one or two individuals as significant victories and signs of progress, implying that there are few, if any, mass conversions. While conducting this research, no websites directly claiming to be linked to Hezbollah were found, although there numerous sites hosted by that group that were active until around 2006. Several of the inactive links are supportive of Hezbollah as a political party. No websites linked to al Qaeda were found. Yet a substantial Internet network remains operational. Much of the outreach for Shi’ite Muslims, closely tied to Iran, is sponsored on numerous websites across the region, including El Salvador, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico and Bolivia. Numerous Facebook forums for discussion are also hosted around Latin America. These links must be viewed in the context of the rapidly expanding diplomatic, intelligence, political and economic ties of Iran in recent years with the self-proclaimed Bolivarian states. Given the sparse literature available and the rich vein of un-mined information on the sites cited as well as others that one could find with additional research, the cyber network of Islamist groups remains one of the least understood or studied facets of their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. It merits significantly more investigation.

Latin America: Nuclear Capabilities, Intentions and Threat Perceptions

Three key states are relevant in considering future nuclear proliferation in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. Argentina and Brazil are critical because of their relatively advanced nuclear capabilities. For historical and geopolitical reasons, neither Argentina nor Brazil is likely to reactive nuclear weapons programs. Venezuela’s President, Hugo Chávez, has repeatedly demonstrated interest in developing a nuclear program, yet Venezuela lacks any serious nuclear expertise. Even if it had the managerial and technological capacity, the lead-time to develop an indigenous nuclear program would be measured in decades. Acquisition of nuclear technology from international sources would be difficult because members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would insist on safeguards, and potential non-Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) suppliers are highly surveilled, risking the exposure of such a program before Venezuela could put a deterrent into place. While South American states have historically opposed nuclear weapons, their acquisition by Brazil and Argentina would lead to little more than diplomatic condemnation. Brazil and Argentina are both geopolitically satisfied powers that are deeply embedded in a regional security community. On the other hand, Venezuela under President Chávez is perceived as a revisionist power seeking a transformation of the international system. Venezuelan acquisition of nuclear weapons would be met with alarm by the United States and Colombia, and it would prompt nuclear weapons development by Brazil and possibly Argentina, more for reasons of preserving regional leadership and prestige than for fear of a Venezuelan threat.

Race Relations & Politics in Venezuela during Punto Fijo (1958 – 1998)

In 1998, Hugo Chávez Frías’ presidential candidacy brought race to national discussion in Venezuela for first time since 1945. For long, the country’s politics had abided by the myth of racial harmony and racial democracy. This approach pointed to institutional separation in the United States and Africa as examples of true racism. Latin America was largely void of such atrocities. Nonetheless, Chávez claimed the present political parties (Acción Democrática, Copei and Unión Republicana Democrática) disenfranchised the common, colored Venezuelan. He continued to assert the opposition’s racism during his presidency. And his political fanbase agrees. A variety of scholars have studied the break from Punto Fijo politics to the Bolivarian Revolution. Yet, few have linked the obvious class struggle to race. Here, I seek to explain how racial identity has shaped class identity in Venezuela by closely examining the Punto Fijo era (1958-1998). The essay begins with an overview of historical race relations, moving to the period in focus. Then, I examine systematic and institutional exclusion under Punto Fijo politics. The object is to understand the merit of Chávez’s racial claims since 1998. Hence, the study also sees democracy in action and the consequences of racial exclusion. The study will be accomplished through secondary research, considering the limitations brought by working abroad. In the end, this study serves as first step in analyzing the fall of what was once considered Latin America’s most durable democracy.

Race Relations & Politics in Venezuela during Punto Fijo (1958 – 1998)

In 1998, Hugo Chávez Frías’ presidential candidacy brought race to national discussion in Venezuela for first time since 1945. For long, the country’s politics had abided by the myth of racial harmony and racial democracy. This approach pointed to institutional separation in the United States and Africa as examples of true racism. Latin America was largely void of such atrocities. Nonetheless, Chávez claimed the present political parties (Acción Democrática, Copei and Unión Republicana Democrática) disenfranchised the common, colored Venezuelan. He continued to assert the opposition’s racism during his presidency. And his political fanbase agrees. A variety of scholars have studied the break from Punto Fijo politics to the Bolivarian Revolution. Yet, few have linked the obvious class struggle to race. Here, I seek to explain how racial identity has shaped class identity in Venezuela by closely examining the Punto Fijo era (1958-1998). The essay begins with an overview of historical race relations, moving to the period in focus. Then, I examine systematic and institutional exclusion under Punto Fijo politics. The object is to understand the merit of Chávez’s racial claims since 1998. Hence, the study also sees democracy in action and the consequences of racial exclusion. The study will be accomplished through secondary research, considering the limitations brought by working abroad. In the end, this study serves as first step in analyzing the fall of what was once considered Latin America’s most durable democracy.

The United States Congress and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez

The Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991 marks the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the United States' main rival for global political-economic leadership. For decades U.S. foreign policymakers had formulated policies aimed at containing the spread of Soviet communism and Moscow's interventionist policies in the Americas. They now assumed that Latin American leftist revolutionary upheavals could also be committed to history. This study explores how Congress takes an active role in U.S. foreign policymaking when dealing with revolutionary changes in Latin America. This study finds that despite Chávez's vitriolic statements and U.S. economic vulnerability due to its dependence on foreign oil sources, Congress today sees Chávez as a nuisance and not a threat to U.S. vital interests. Devoid of an extra-hemispheric, anti-American patron intent on challenging the United States for regional leadership, Chávez is seen by Congress largely as a threat to the stability of Venezuela's institutions and political-economic stability. Today both the U.S. executive and the legislative branches largely see Bolivarianism a distraction and not an existential threat. The research is based on an examination of Bolivarian Venezuela compared to revolutionary upheaval and governance in Nicaragua over the course of the twentieth century. This project is largely descriptive, qualitative in approach, but quantitative data are used when appropriate. To analyze both the U.S. executive and legislative branches' reaction to revolutionary change, Cole Blasier's theoretical propositions as developed in the Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America 1910-1985 are utilized. The present study highlights the fact that Blasier's propositions remain a relevant means for analyzing U.S. foreign policymaking.