Lower Aptian Comparative Stratigraphy of the Basco-Cantabrian Region (Spain) and Eastern Cordillera (Colombia): implications for local factors in the depositional record of Oceanic Anoxic Event 1a (OAE-1a)

An important episode of carbon sequestration, Oceanic Anoxic Event 1a (OAE-1a), characterizes the Lower Aptian worldwide, and is mostly known from deeper-water settings. The present work of two Lower Aptian deposits, Madotz (N Spain) and Curití Quarry (Colombia), is a multiproxy study that includes fossil assemblages, microfacies, X-ray diffraction bulk and clay mineralogy, elemental analyses (major, minor, trace elements), Rock-Eval pyrolysis, biomarkers, inorganic and organic carbon content, and stable carbon isotopes. The results provide baseline evidence of the local and global controlling environmental factors influencing OAE-1a in shallow-water settings. The data also improve our general understanding of the conditions under which organic-carbon-rich deposits accumulate. The sequence at Madotz includes four intervals (Unit 1; Subunits 2a, 2b and 2c) that overlap the times prior to, during and after the occurrence of OAE-1a. The Lower Unit 1(3m thick) is essentially siliciclastic, and Subunit 2a (20m) contains Urgonian carbonate facies that document abruptly changing platform conditions prior to OAE-1a. Subunit 2b (24.4 m) is a mixed carbonate-siliciclastic facies with orbitolinid-rich levels that coincides with OAE-1a δ13C stages C4-C6, and is coeval with the upper part of the Deshayesites forbesi ammonite zone. Levels with pyrite and the highest TOC values (0.4-0.97%), interpreted as accumulating under suboxic conditions, and are restricted to δ13C stages C4 and C5. The best development of the suboxic facies is at the level representing the peak of the transgression. Subunit 2c, within δ13C stage C7, shows a return of the Urgonian facies. The 23.35-m section at Curití includes a 6.3-m interval at the base of the Paja Formation dominated by organic-rich marlstones and shales lacking benthic fossils and bioturbation, with TOC values as high as 8.84%. The interval overlies a level containing reworked and phosphatized assemblages of middle Barremian to lowest Aptian ammonites. The range of values and the overall pattern of the δ13Corg (-22.05‰ to -20.47‰) in the 6.3m-interval is comparable with Lower Aptian δ13C stage C7. Thus, conditions of oxygen depletion at this site also occurred after Oceanic Anoxic Event-1a, which developed between carbon isotope stages C3 and C6. Both sites, Madotz and Curití, attest to the importance of terrigenous and nutrient fluxes in increasing OM productivity that led to episodic oxygen deficiency.

Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia

Since El Salvador’s civil war formally ended in 1992 the small Central American nation has undergone profound social changes and significant reforms. However, few changes have been as important or as devastating as the nation’s emergence as a central hub in the transnational criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to traffic in drugs, money weapons, human being, endangered animals and other products. The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and dangerous characteristic of El Salvador’s transnational criminal evolution. Trained, elite cadres from both sides, with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing protection services to transnational criminal organizations to becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. The demand for specialized military and transportation services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy of embedded corruption within the nation’s political structure. Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime – with gangs vying for control off specific geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products – and transnational groups that need to use that space to successfully move their products. These symbiotic relationships are both complex and generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

Water for the Wayuu: Procurement and maximization of a limited resource among indigenous pastoralists on the Guajira Peninsula of northern Colombia

For the Wayuu of the Guajira Peninsula of northern Colombia, water procurement has historically been challenging. The ancestral territory of this indigenous pastoral society is windy and arid, with low rainfall, high temperatures and an absence of perennial rivers or streams. In the past, the Wayuu adapted to these environmental conditions by practicing transhumance during the prolonged dry seasons, digging spring wells and artificial ponds and by following guiding principles for water usage. Since the 1930s, the government has made efforts to build additional wind-powered wells and ponds for a growing native population. Notwithstanding, these water solutions have only partly met the necessities; public water sources are limited or unreliable and few attempts are made to generate safe drinking water. Furthermore, the ubiquitous practice of animal husbandry places added pressure on existing sources; livestock consume more water than the human populations in the areas visited. Rapid assessments in four Wayuu areas on the peninsula were conducted by the author and an interdisciplinary team working for the Cerrejón Foundation for Water in La Guajira from 2010 to 2013. The assessments were part of a larger pilot project to design and implement a sustainability plan for reservoir-based water supply systems in the region. This study brings cultural practices and local knowledge to the forefront as key elements for the success of water works and other development projects carried out in Wayuu territory.

Blessed are the Peacemakers: Transnational Alliance, Protective Accompaniment and the Presbyterian Church of Colombia

The purpose of this thesis was to explore how Christian networks enable strategies of transnational alliance, whereby groups in different nations strive to strengthen one another’s leverage and credibility in order to resolve conflicts and elaborate new possibilities. This research does so by analyzing the case of the Presbyterian Church of Colombia (IPC). The project examines the historical development of the IPC from the initial missionary period of the 1850s until the present. Specifically, the purpose of the study was to consider how the historical struggle to articulate autonomy and equality vis-à-vis the U.S. Presbyterians (PCUSA) and paternalist models of ecclesial relations has affected recent political strategies pursued by the IPC. Despite the paternalism of the early missionary model, changing conceptions of social transformation during the 60s contributed to a shift in relations. Over time the IPC and PCUSA negotiated relationships in which groups both acknowledge a problematic history and insist upon an ethnic of partnership and respect. Today, PCUSA groups, in concert with the IPC, collaborate on a range of transnational political strategies aimed at strengthening the IPC’s leverage in local struggles for justice and peace. A review of this case suggests that long-established Christian networks may have an advantage over other civil society groups such as NGOs in facilitating strategies of transnational alliance. Although civil society organizations often have better access to important resources needed for international advocacy initiatives, Christian networks, such as the one established between the IPC and U.S. Presbyterian communities, rely on a history of negotiating power-disparity in order to elaborate relationships based on listening and partnership. Such findings prove important not only to how we conceptualize transnational alliance but also to the ways that we think about the history and future of Christian networks.