Intuition and its component parts in the heuristic processing of deception detection: Hunch, *evidence, and reliance on intuitive efficacy

Rated trust in intuitive efficacy (measured as trust, belief, use, accuracy and weighting of intuition) was investigated as a predictor of self-designated use of intuitive (hunch and hunch plus evidential belief) vs. deliberative (evidential belief and evidential belief plus hunch) deception detection judgments and actual accuracy. Twenty-nine student participants were filmed as they made true and deceptive statements about their everyday activities on a given evening (last Friday night), and college students (N=238) judged 20 (10=true, 10=deceptive) of these filmed statements as truthful or deceptive. Participants provided ratings of reliance on hunches vs. evidential belief, confidence in film judgments, intuitive efficacy, accuracy in deception detection, reliance on cues to deception, and experiences with intuition. Generalized estimated equation modeling using binary logistics demonstrated accuracy in identifying true vs. deceptive statements was predicted by film number, hunch-evidence ratings, weighting of intuition, and total cues cited. Weighting of intuition was predictive of accuracy across participants, with higher weighting predictive of higher accuracy in general. Participants who cited evidential belief plus hunch and moderate to high weighting incorrectly reversed their true vs. deceptive judgments. Accuracy for true statements was higher for hunches and hunch plus evidential belief, whereas accuracy for deceptive statements was higher for evidential belief Accuracy for participants who relied on evidential belief plus hunch was at chance. Subjective experiences underlying judgments differed by participant and type of film viewed (true vs. deceptive) and were predicted by hunch-evidence ratings, trust, use, intuitive accuracy, and total cues cited. Trust predicted increases in judging films to be true, whereas use and accuracy predicted increases in judging films as deceptive; none were predictive of accuracy. Increased number of cues cited predicted judgments of deception, whereas decreased number of cues cited predicted truth. The study concluded that participants have the capacity to self-define their judgments as subjectively vs. deliberately based, provide subjective assessments of the influence of intuitive vs. objective information on their judgments, and can apply this self-knowledge, through effective weighting of intuition vs. other types of information, in making accurate judgments of true and deceptive everyday statements.