Theory of foreign portfolio investment

This dissertation examines one category of international capital flows, private portfolio investments (private refers to the source of capital). There is an overall lack of a coherent and consistent definition of foreign portfolio investment. We clarify these definitional issues.^ Two main questions that pertain to private foreign portfolio investments (FPI) are explored. The first problem is the phenomenon of home preference, often referred to as home bias. Related to this are the observed cross-investment flows between countries that seem to contradict the textbook rendition of private FPI. A description of the theories purporting to resolve the home preference puzzle (and the cross-investment one) are summarized and evaluated. Most of this literature considers investors from major developed countries. I consider--as well--whether investors in less developed countries have home preference.^ The dissertation shows that home preference is indeed pervasive and profound across countries, in both developed and emerging markets. For the U.S., I examine home bias in both equity and bond holdings as well. I find that home bias is greater when we look at equity and bond holdings than equity holdings solely.^ In this dissertation a model is developed to explain home bias. This model is original and fills a gap in the literature as there have been no satisfactory models that handle at the same time both home preference and cross-border holdings in the context of information asymmetries. This model reflects what we see in the data and permits us to reach certain results by the use of comparative statics methods. The model suggests, counter-intuitively, that as the rate of return in a country relative to the world rate of return increases, home preference decreases. In the context of our relatively simple model we ascribe this result to the higher variance of the now higher return for home assets. We also find, this time as intended, that as risk aversion increases, investors diversify further so that home preference decreases.^ The second question that the dissertation deals with is the volatility of private foreign portfolio investment. Countries that are recipients of these flows have been wary of such flows because of their perceived volatility. Often the contrast is made with the perceived absence of volatility in foreign direct investment flows. I analyze the validity of these concerns using first net flow data and then gross flow data. The results show that FPI is not, in relative terms, more volatile than other flows in our sample of eight countries (half were developed countries and the rest were emerging markets).^ The implication therefore is that restricting FPI flows may be harmful in the sense that private capital may not be allocated efficiently worldwide to the detriment of capital poor economies. More to the point, any such restrictions would in fact be misguided. ^

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

The role of overseas Chinese investment in the emerging countries of Southeast and East Asia: A Confucian model of the foreign direct investment decision-making process using factors unconsidered in the West

The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of the foreign direct investment location decision making process through the examination of non-Western investors and their investment strategies in non-traditional markets. This was accomplished through in-depth personal interviews with 50 Overseas Chinese business owners and executives in several different industries from Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand about 97 separate investment projects in Southeast and East Asia, including The Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, Taiwan, and Mainland China.^ Traditional factors utilized in Western models of the foreign direct investment decision making process are reviewed, as well as literature on Asian management systems and the current state of business practices in emerging countries of Southeast and East Asia. Because of the lack of institutionalization in these markets and the strong influences of Confucian and patriarchal value systems on the Overseas Chinese, it was suspected that while some aspects of Western rational economic models of foreign direct investment are utilized, these models are insufficient in this context, and thus are not fully generalizable to the unique conditions of the Overseas Chinese business network in the region without further modification.^ Thus, other factors based on a Confucian value system need to be integrated into these models. Results from the analysis of structured interviews suggest Overseas Chinese businesses rely more heavily on their network and traditional Confucian values than rational economic factors when making their foreign direct investment location decisions in emerging countries in Asia. This effect is moderated by the firm's industry and the age of the firm's owners. ^