The advantage of Spanish multinational enterprises in Latin America

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Spain made large foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Latin America between 1990 and 2002, making Spain the second largest direct investor in this region since 1998, behind the United States. This dissertation explains the reasons that led Spanish firms to make these FDIs, as well as their operations in Latin America. Seven Spanish MNEs were included in this study, BBVA and SCH (banking), Telefónica (telecommunications), Endesa, Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa (public utilities), and Repsol-YPF (oil and natural gas). Quantitative and qualitative data were used. Data were collected from the firms' annual reports, from their archives and from personal interviews with senior executives, as well as from academic and specialized publications. ^ Results indicate that the large Spanish FDIs in Latin America were highly concentrated in a few firms from five sectors. The FDIs of these firms alone accounted for 70 percent of total Spanish FDI in Latin America in this period. The reasons for these investments were firm-specific and sector specific. A series of institutional conditions existed in Spain between the 1970s and the 1990s that allowed the employees of the firms to develop the knowledge and devise strategies to adjust to that set of conditions. First, the policies of the Spanish state favored the creation of large firms in these sectors, operating under conditions of monopoly sometimes. Secondly, the consumers put pressure on the firms to provide better and cheaper products as the Spanish economy grew and modernized. Thirdly, the employees of the firms had to adjust their services and products to the demands of the consumers and to the constraints of the state and the market. They adjusted the internal organization of the firm to be able to produce the goods and services that the market demanded. Externally, they also adopted patterns of interaction with outside agents and institutions. This patterned behavior was the “corporate culture” of each firm and the “normative framework” in which their employees operated. When the managers of the firms perceived that there were similar conditions in Latin America, they decided to operate there as well by making FDIs. ^

The effects of intellectual property rights on knowledge spillovers and innovation: An empirical investigation

FDI is believed to be a conduit of new technologies between countries. The first chapter of this dissertation studies the advantages of outward FDI for the home country of multinationals conducting research and development abroad. We use patent citations as a proxy for technology spillovers and we bring empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that a U.S. subsidiary conducting research and development overseas facilitates the flow of knowledge between its host and home countries.^ The second chapter examines the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) reforms on the technology flows between the U.S. and host countries of U.S. affiliates. We again use patent citations to examine whether the diffusion of new technology between the host countries and the U.S. is accelerated by the reforms. Our results suggest that the reforms favor innovative efforts of domestic firms in the reforming countries rather than U.S. affiliates efforts. In other words, reforms mediate the technology flows from the U.S. to the reforming countries.^ The third chapter deals with another form of IPR, open source (OS) licenses. These differ in the conditions under which licensors and OS contributors are allowed to modify and redistribute the source code. We measure OS project quality by the speed with which programming bugs are fixed and test whether the license chosen by project leaders influences bug resolution rates. In initial regressions, we find a strong correlation between the hazard of bug resolution and the use of highly restrictive licenses. However, license choices are likely to be endogenous. We instrument license choice using (i) the human language in which contributors operate and (ii) the license choice of the project leaders for a previous project. We then find weak evidence that restrictive licenses adversely affect project success.^

Structure of international cooperation in trade, investment and environment

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.