Foreign aid and the national interest : the cases of the United States and Japan

Developed countries give foreign assistance for many reasons, one of which is the protection of national interests. Foreign aid gives a donor country leverage in international relations and is used as a tool of foreign policy. The United States and Japan are the two largest aid donors in the world. Each of these countries exert influence over specific regions through foreign assistance. Although the national interests of each country are different, both use foreign aid to protect these interests. This thesis discusses the means by which the United States and Japan use foreign aid in foreign policy. It looks specifically at U.S. food aid to Central America and Japanese aid to Asia.

World coffee markets and national coffee parastatals since 1989: A comparative study of Colombia and Cote d'Ivoire

The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) involved the majority of nations producing and consuming coffee and provided relative economic stability to the coffee sectors of the exporting Third World countries. This study focuses on the serious impact of the 1989 collapse of the ICA on the domestic coffee sectors of Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, the dissertation examines the role of the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee parastatals, the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia and the Caisse de Stabilisation et Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, during the crisis and their transformation by it. ^ The theoretical framework employed in this study is borrowed from the literature on state-society relations. The methodology includes: in-depth analysis of the historical roles of the parastatal agencies in coffee production, state-society relations and economic development in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire; interviews with parastatal administrators, producers and other knowledgeable informants in both countries; and a comprehensive review of newspaper articles and official statements of coffee policy published in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire. prior to, during, and after the crisis. ^ The Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors and their producers faced serious economic and social problems following the drop in coffee prices. The coffee parastatals in Colombia and Côte d'lvoire first lost some of their responsibilities following the world coffee crisis. The Caisse was in the end eliminated while FEDECAFE struggled to remain in existence. Along the way, both entities faced protests from disgruntled coffee producers, who organized politically for the first time in their nations' histories. I argue that the outcome for the parastatals depended in part on the conditions of their formation, particularly the level of societal involvement in their creation. I also posit that the country's dependence on foreign aid played a key role in the fate of the parastatals. ^ This dissertation concludes that developments in the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors have significantly contributed to the creation of the difficult political and economic conditions of both countries today. ^

Soviet and Western bloc competition in the less developed world and the collapse of Détente

The purpose of my dissertation was to examine the competition between the U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet bloc in the less developed world during Détente. I assessed whether or not the Soviet bloc pushed for strategic gains in the less developed world in the middle-to-late 1970's and whether this contributed to the U.S. decision to abandon Détente in 1979. I made the attempt to test the international relations theory of balance of threat realism (Walt, 1992). I accomplished the test in two ways. First, I measured the foreign aid allocations (military and economic) made by each respective bloc towards the Third World by using a quantitative approach. Second, I examined U.S. archives using the process-tracing/historical method. The U.S. archives gave me the ability to evaluate how U.S. decision-makers and U.S. intelligence agencies interpreted the actions of the Soviet bloc. They also gave me the chance to examine the U.S. response as we evaluated the policies that were pushed by key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies. On the question of whether or not the Soviet bloc was aggressive, the quantitative evidence suggested that it was not. Instead, the evidence found the Western-bloc to have been more aggressive in the less developed world. The U.S. archives also showed Soviet actions to have been defensive. Key U.S. decision-makers and intelligence agencies attested to this. Finally, the archives show that U.S. officials pushed for aggressive actions against the Third World during the final years of Détente. Thus, balance of threat realism produced an incorrect assessment that U.S. aggression in the late 1970's was a response to Soviet aggression during Détente. The evidence suggests structural Marxism and domestic politics can better explain U.S./Western actions. The aggressive foreign aid allocations of the West, coupled with evidence of U.S. decision-makers/agencies vehemently concerned about the long-term prospects of the West, strengthened structural Marxism. Domestic politics can also claim to explain the actions of U.S. decision-makers. I found extensive archival evidence of bureaucratic inter-agency conflict between the State Department and other intelligence agencies in areas of strategic concern to the U.S.

World coffee markets and national coffee parastatals since 1989: a comparative study of Colombia and Cote D'ivoire

The International Coffee Agreements (ICA) involved the majority of nations producing and consuming coffee and provided relative economic stability to the coffee sectors of the exporting Third World countries. This study focuses on the serious impact of the 1989 collapse of the ICA on the domestic coffee sectors of Colombia and Cote d'Ivoire. In particular, the dissertation examines the role of the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee parastatals, the Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia and the Caisse de Stabilisation et Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles, during the crisis and their transformation by it. The theoretical framework employed in this study is borrowed from the literature on state-society relations. The methodology includes: in-depth analysis of the historical roles of the parastatal agencies in coffee production, state-society relations and economic development in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire; interviews with parastatal administrators, producers and other knowledgeable informants in both countries; and a comprehensive review of newspaper articles and official statements of coffee policy published in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire prior to, during, and after the crisis. The Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors and their producers faced serious economic and social problems following the drop in coffee prices. The coffee parastatals in Colombia and Côte d'Ivoire first lost some of their responsibilities following the world coffee crisis. The Caisse was in the end eliminated while FEDECAFE struggled to remain in existence. Along the way, both entities faced protests from disgruntled coffee producers, who organized politically for the first time in their nations' histories. I argue that the outcome for the parastatals depended in part on the conditions of their formation, particularly the level of societal involvement in their creation. I also posit that the country's dependence on foreign aid played a key role in the fate of the parastatals. This dissertation concludes that developments in the Colombian and Ivoirian coffee sectors have significantly contributed to the creation of the difficult political and economic conditions of both countries today.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.