Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony on mock-juror decision-making

In attempting to impeach eyewitnesses, attorneys often highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall. This study examined the differential impact of types of inconsistent testimony on mock-juror decisions. Each of 100 community members and 200 undergraduates viewed one of four versions of a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of the eyewitness. I manipulated the types of inconsistent statements given by the eyewitness in the four versions: (1) consistent testimony, (2) information given on-the-stand but not given during the pre-trial investigation, (3) contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial statements, and (4) contradictions made on the witness stand. Subjects exposed to any form of inconsistent testimony were less likely to convict and found the defendant less culpable and the eyewitness less effective. These effects were larger for contradictions than for information given on the stand but not during pre-trial investigations. ^

Effects of inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony on mock-juror decisionmaking

In attempting to impeach eyewitnesses, attorney's often highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall. This study examined the differential impact of types of inconsistent testimony on mock-juror decisions. Each of 100 community members and 200 undergraduates viewed one of four versions of a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence against the defendant was the testimony of the eyewitness. I manipulated the types of inconsistent statements given by the eyewitness in the four versions: (1) consistent testimony, (2) information given on-the-stand but not given during the pre-trial investigation, (3) contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial statements, and (4) contradictions made on the witness stand. Subjects exposed to any form of inconsistent testimony were less likely to convict and found the defendant less culpable and the eyewitness less effective. These effects were larger for contradictions than for information given on the stand but not during pre-trial investigations.

A theoretical analysis of eyewitness identification: Dual -process theory, signal detection theory and eyewitness confidence

Given the growing number of wrongful convictions involving faulty eyewitness evidence and the strong reliance by jurors on eyewitness testimony, researchers have sought to develop safeguards to decrease erroneous identifications. While decades of eyewitness research have led to numerous recommendations for the collection of eyewitness evidence, less is known regarding the psychological processes that govern identification responses. The purpose of the current research was to expand the theoretical knowledge of eyewitness identification decisions by exploring two separate memory theories: signal detection theory and dual-process theory. This was accomplished by examining both system and estimator variables in the context of a novel lineup recognition paradigm. Both theories were also examined in conjunction with confidence to determine whether it might add significantly to the understanding of eyewitness memory. ^ In two separate experiments, both an encoding and a retrieval-based manipulation were chosen to examine the application of theory to eyewitness identification decisions. Dual-process estimates were measured through the use of remember-know judgments (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). In Experiment 1, the effects of divided attention and lineup presentation format (simultaneous vs. sequential) were examined. In Experiment 2, perceptual distance and lineup response deadline were examined. Overall, the results indicated that discrimination and remember judgments (recollection) were generally affected by variations in encoding quality and response criterion and know judgments (familiarity) were generally affected by variations in retrieval options. Specifically, as encoding quality improved, discrimination ability and judgments of recollection increased; and as the retrieval task became more difficult there was a shift toward lenient choosing and more reliance on familiarity. ^ The application of signal detection theory and dual-process theory in the current experiments produced predictable results on both system and estimator variables. These theories were also compared to measures of general confidence, calibration, and diagnosticity. The application of the additional confidence measures in conjunction with signal detection theory and dual-process theory gave a more in-depth explanation than either theory alone. Therefore, the general conclusion is that eyewitness identifications can be understood in a more complete manor by applying theory and examining confidence. Future directions and policy implications are discussed. ^

Does expert psychological testimony improve juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness?

Previous research has examined the validity of behavioral assumptions underlying the presumed effectiveness of safeguards against erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness identification. In keeping with this agenda, this study examined juror sensitivity to lineup suggestiveness in the form of foil, instruction, and presentation biases and whether expert psychological testimony further sensitizes jurors to the factors that influence the likelihood of false identifications. One hundred and sixty jury eligible citizens watched versions of a videotaped trial that included information about the identification of the defendant by an eyewitness and that varied the suggestiveness of the eyewitness identification procedure. In addition, half of the mock-jurors heard the testimony of an expert psychologist regarding the factors that influence lineup suggestiveness. Mock-jurors rendered individual verdicts, rated the defendant's culpability and the suggestiveness and fairness of the identification procedure. Results indicated that jurors are somewhat sensitive to foil bias but are insensitive to instruction and presentation biases. No evidence was found to suggest that expert testimony leads to juror skepticism or juror sensitization. These results question the effectiveness of cross-examination and expert testimony as safeguards against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken identification. ^

The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

Eyewitness memory: Balancing the accuracy, precision, and quantity of information through metacognitive monitoring and control

Historically, memory has been evaluated by examining how much is remembered, however a more recent conception of memory focuses on the accuracy of memories. When using this accuracy-oriented conception of memory, unlike with the quantity-oriented approach, memory does not always deteriorate over time. A possible explanation for this seemingly surprising finding lies in the metacognitive processes of monitoring and control. Use of these processes allows people to withhold responses of which they are unsure, or to adjust the precision of responses to a level that is broad enough to be correct. The ability to accurately report memories has implications for investigators who interview witnesses to crimes, and those who evaluate witness testimony. ^ This research examined the amount of information provided, accuracy, and precision of responses provided during immediate and delayed interviews about a videotaped mock crime. The interview format was manipulated such that a single free narrative response was elicited, or a series of either yes/no or cued questions were asked. Instructions provided by the interviewer indicated to the participants that they should either stress being informative, or being accurate. The interviews were then transcribed and scored. ^ Results indicate that accuracy rates remained stable and high after a one week delay. Compared to those interviewed immediately, after a delay participants provided less information and responses that were less precise. Participants in the free narrative condition were the most accurate. Participants in the cued questions condition provided the most precise responses. Participants in the yes/no questions condition were most likely to say “I don’t know”. The results indicate that people are able to monitor their memories and modify their reports to maintain high accuracy. When control over precision was not possible, such as in the yes/no condition, people said “I don’t know” to maintain accuracy. However when withholding responses and adjusting precision were both possible, people utilized both methods. It seems that concerns that memories reported after a long retention interval might be inaccurate are unfounded. ^

Eyewitness Memory: Balancing the Accuracy, Precision, and Quantity of Information through Metacognitive Monitoring and Control

Historically, memory has been evaluated by examining how much is remembered, however a more recent conception of memory focuses on the accuracy of memories. When using this accuracy-oriented conception of memory, unlike with the quantity-oriented approach, memory does not always deteriorate over time. A possible explanation for this seemingly surprising finding lies in the metacognitive processes of monitoring and control. Use of these processes allows people to withhold responses of which they are unsure, or to adjust the precision of responses to a level that is broad enough to be correct. The ability to accurately report memories has implications for investigators who interview witnesses to crimes, and those who evaluate witness testimony. This research examined the amount of information provided, accuracy, and precision of responses provided during immediate and delayed interviews about a videotaped mock crime. The interview format was manipulated such that a single free narrative response was elicited, or a series of either yes/no or cued questions were asked. Instructions provided by the interviewer indicated to the participants that they should either stress being informative, or being accurate. The interviews were then transcribed and scored. Results indicate that accuracy rates remained stable and high after a one week delay. Compared to those interviewed immediately, after a delay participants provided less information and responses that were less precise. Participants in the free narrative condition were the most accurate. Participants in the cued questions condition provided the most precise responses. Participants in the yes/no questions condition were most likely to say “I don’t know”. The results indicate that people are able to monitor their memories and modify their reports to maintain high accuracy. When control over precision was not possible, such as in the yes/no condition, people said “I don’t know” to maintain accuracy. However when withholding responses and adjusting precision were both possible, people utilized both methods. It seems that concerns that memories reported after a long retention interval might be inaccurate are unfounded.

Eyewitness decision -making with showups: Probative or perilous?

Showups are a technique of eyewitness identification in which a single suspect is presented to a witness for identification. Showups are controversial. Defense attorneys argue that they are suggestive and place suspects at undue risk of false identification. Prosecutors and police officers argue that showups are an indispensable investigative tool and are no more suggestive than other identification techniques. Are showups probative or perilous? If so, what can be done to improve their accuracy? This investigation converged on this question by addressing three interrelated goals. The first was to examine the effect of two system variables, retention interval and suspect clothing, on showup accuracy. The second was to determine if showups are more suggestive than lineups. The third goal was to explore carryover effects from showups to subsequent lineup identifications. ^ Eyewitness performance was evaluated with the Eyewitness Identification Paradigm. Approximately 500 undergraduate students at FIU witnesses a staged event (i.e., a "crime") in their classrooms and subsequently participated in a showup and/or lineup identification test. Half of the identification tests contained the target (i.e., the "perpetrator") and half contained a target-substitute (i.e., an "innocent suspect"). ^ The results of this study indicated that, overall, showups are not unusually prejudicial and are no more suggestive than lineups. However this study identified two specific conditions under which showups are likely to lead to false identifications of an innocent suspect. First, false identification are likely to occur in showups that are conducted shortly after a crime when the suspect is wearing clothing similar to that worn by the perpetrator. Second, placing an innocent suspect in both a showup and then a lineup substantially increases the chances that the suspect will be falsely identified in the lineup. The implications of these findings for the conduct of eyewitness investigations are discussed. ^

Implicit eyewitness memory

After a crime has occurred, one of the most pressing objectives for investigators is to identify and interview any eyewitness that can provide information about the crime. Depending on his or her training, the investigative interviewer will use (to varying degrees) mostly yes/no questions, some cued and multiple-choice questions, with few open-ended questions. When the witness cannot generate any more details about the crime, one assumes the eyewitness' memory for the critical event has been exhausted. However, given what we know about memory, is this a safe assumption? In line with the extant literature on human cognition, if one assumes (a) an eyewitness has more available memories of the crime than he or she has accessible and (b) only explicit probes have been used to elicit information, then one can argue this eyewitness may still be able to provide additional information via implicit memory tests. In accordance with these notions, the present study had two goals: demonstrate that (1) eyewitnesses can reveal memory implicitly for a detail-rich event and (2) particularly for brief crimes, eyewitnesses can reveal memory for event details implicitly that were inaccessible when probed for explicitly. Undergraduates (N = 227) participated in a psychological experiment in exchange for research credit. Participants were presented with one of three stimulus videos (brief crime vs. long crime vs. irrelevant video). Then, participants either completed a series of implicit memory tasks or worked on a puzzle for 5 minutes. Lastly, participants were interviewed explicitly about the previous video via free recall and recognition tasks. Findings indicated that participants who viewed the brief crime provided significantly more crime-related details implicitly than those who viewed the long crime. The data also showed participants who viewed the long crime provided marginally more accurate details during free recall than participants who viewed the brief crime. Furthermore, participants who completed the implicit memory tasks provided significantly less accurate information during the explicit interview than participants who were not given implicit memory tasks. This study was the first to investigate implicit memory for eyewitnesses of a crime. To determine its applied value, additional empirical work is required.

Effects of alcohol intoxication and encoding conditions on eyewitness memory

Several researchers have investigated the effects of alcohol on memory. Few researchers have studied the effects of alcohol on an eyewitness's recall and recognition of crime events. This study proposed to examine the effects of alcohol and viewing conditions on subjects' ability to recall information regarding a videotaped bank robbery. Thirty male and 22 female subjects participated in a 2 (consumption: alcohol v. no alcohol) x 2 (lighting: good v. poor) factorial experiment with Average Accuracy and Total Amount of Information recalled as the primary dependent measures. There was no significant difference between the Intoxicated and Sober subjects regarding the amount of information recalled or their average accuracy. The main effect for lighting conditions and gender differences were also not significant.

Implicit Eyewitness Memory

After a crime has occurred, one of the most pressing objectives for investigators is to identify and interview any eyewitness that can provide information about the crime. Depending on his or her training, the investigative interviewer will use (to varying degrees) mostly yes/no questions, some cued and multiple-choice questions, with few open-ended questions. When the witness cannot generate any more details about the crime, one assumes the eyewitness’ memory for the critical event has been exhausted. However, given what we know about memory, is this a safe assumption? In line with the extant literature on human cognition, if one assumes (a) an eyewitness has more available memories of the crime than he or she has accessible and (b) only explicit probes have been used to elicit information, then one can argue this eyewitness may still be able to provide additional information via implicit memory tests. In accordance with these notions, the present study had two goals: demonstrate that (1) eyewitnesses can reveal memory implicitly for a detail-rich event and (2) particularly for brief crimes, eyewitnesses can reveal memory for event details implicitly that were inaccessible when probed for explicitly. Undergraduates (N = 227) participated in a psychological experiment in exchange for research credit. Participants were presented with one of three stimulus videos (brief crime vs. long crime vs. irrelevant video). Then, participants either completed a series of implicit memory tasks or worked on a puzzle for 5 minutes. Lastly, participants were interviewed explicitly about the previous video via free recall and recognition tasks. Findings indicated that participants who viewed the brief crime provided significantly more crime-related details implicitly than those who viewed the long crime. The data also showed participants who viewed the long crime provided marginally more accurate details during free recall than participants who viewed the brief crime. Furthermore, participants who completed the implicit memory tasks provided significantly less accurate information during the explicit interview than participants who were not given implicit memory tasks. This study was the first to investigate implicit memory for eyewitnesses of a crime. To determine its applied value, additional empirical work is required.

Jurors' use of social framework evidence

Monahan and Walker (1988) delineated three uses of social science evidence within the courts: social authority, social fact, and social framework. Social authority evidence is social science evidence used in making policy or law. Social fact evidence is social science evidence that describes research undertaken expressly for the case at hand. Social framework evidence involves providing conclusions from previously conducted social science research to assist jurors in evaluating the other evidence in the case. Although this type of evidence has traditionally been presented via expert testimony, Monahan and Walker (1988) have suggested that, because the social science research involved comes from the extant literature and is not the province of any particular expert, it would be more economical to have the judge present this information as part of the judicial instructions to the jury. This study tested the implicit assumption that the presentation of the social framework evidence by the judge will have the same impact on juror verdicts as presentation of this evidence by an expert. ^ Two hundred mock jurors watched a videotaped hostile work environment sexual harassment trial. The social framework evidence consisted of the discussion of factors that have been found to increase the likelihood of sex stereotyping of women by men. The trial included either no social framework evidence, social framework evidence presented by the expert, or social framework evidence presented in judicial instructions. ^ Results indicated that men who heard the social framework evidence from the judge were more likely to vote for the defendant than men who heard no social framework evidence. Men who heard the judicial instruction with the social framework evidence also rated the plaintiff as less credible than the other men and women in the study. Thus, it appears that, for men, social framework evidence presented by the judge harms the plaintiff's case by reducing ratings of her credibility, but the same evidence presented by an expert does not affect men's verdicts. For women, however, social framework evidence, irrespective of who presents it, enhances the plaintiff's case. ^

Juror need for cognition and sensitivity to methodological flaws in expert evidence

Two studies investigated the influence of juror need for cognition on the systematic and heuristic processing of expert evidence. U.S. citizens reporting for jury duty in South Florida read a 15-page summary of a hostile work environment case containing expert testimony. The expert described a study she had conducted on the effects of viewing sexualized materials on men's behavior toward women. Certain methodological features of the expert's research varied across experimental conditions. In Study 1 (N = 252), the expert's study was valid, contained a confound, or included the potential for experimenter bias (internal validity) and relied on a small or large sample (sample size) of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). When the expert's study included trucking employees, high need for cognition jurors in Study 1 rated the expert more credible and trustworthy than did low need for cognition jurors. Jurors were insensitive to variations in the study's internal validity or sample size. Juror ratings of plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. In Study 2 (N = 162), the expert's published or unpublished study (general acceptance) was either valid or lacked an appropriate control group (internal validity) and included a sample of college undergraduates or trucking employees (ecological validity). High need for cognition jurors in Study 2 found the defendant liable more often and evaluated the expert evidence more favorably when the expert's study was internally valid than when an appropriate control group was missing. Low need for cognition jurors did not differentiate between the internally valid and invalid study. Variations in the study's general acceptance and ecological validity did not affect juror judgments. Juror ratings of expert and plaintiff credibility, plaintiff trustworthiness, and study quality were positively correlated with verdict. The present research demonstrated that the need for cognition moderates juror sensitivity to expert evidence quality and that certain message-related heuristics influence juror judgments when ability or motivation to process systematically is low. ^

Evaluating and improving the opposing expert safeguard against junk science

In Daubert, the Supreme Court opined that opposing expert testimony is an effective safeguard against junk science in the courtroom. Although jurors maybe unable to identify flaws in scientific research without some assistance, social psychological research suggests that people can be trained to make more sophisticated judgments about scientific quality. Further, previous research demonstrated that an opposing expert who addresses the methodology of proffered expert testimony may not enable jurors to evaluate scientific validity. In three studies, I tested why this safeguard was ineffective using a variety of stimulus materials. In the first study, I examined the mediating effect of attitudes on juror decisions within the context of a sexual harassment trial. In the second study, I examined the moderating effect of the presentation of expert credentials on participant decisions regarding child suggestibility literature. In the third study, I tested several improvements to the safeguard using improvements designed to correct for the effects of attitudes and credential presentation on juror decisions within the context of a first-degree murder trial. I found that while opposing expert testimony may have potential as a safeguard, in its current form it is ineffective. That is, a traditional opposing expert caused jurors to be skeptical of all expert testimony rather than sensitizing them to the validity of the research presented at trial. Further, while the improvements tested in this study may have potential to assist jurors in making scientifically sound decisions, more research is needed to further test and refine these improvements. ^