Eyewitness memory: Balancing the accuracy, precision, and quantity of information through metacognitive monitoring and control

Historically, memory has been evaluated by examining how much is remembered, however a more recent conception of memory focuses on the accuracy of memories. When using this accuracy-oriented conception of memory, unlike with the quantity-oriented approach, memory does not always deteriorate over time. A possible explanation for this seemingly surprising finding lies in the metacognitive processes of monitoring and control. Use of these processes allows people to withhold responses of which they are unsure, or to adjust the precision of responses to a level that is broad enough to be correct. The ability to accurately report memories has implications for investigators who interview witnesses to crimes, and those who evaluate witness testimony. ^ This research examined the amount of information provided, accuracy, and precision of responses provided during immediate and delayed interviews about a videotaped mock crime. The interview format was manipulated such that a single free narrative response was elicited, or a series of either yes/no or cued questions were asked. Instructions provided by the interviewer indicated to the participants that they should either stress being informative, or being accurate. The interviews were then transcribed and scored. ^ Results indicate that accuracy rates remained stable and high after a one week delay. Compared to those interviewed immediately, after a delay participants provided less information and responses that were less precise. Participants in the free narrative condition were the most accurate. Participants in the cued questions condition provided the most precise responses. Participants in the yes/no questions condition were most likely to say “I don’t know”. The results indicate that people are able to monitor their memories and modify their reports to maintain high accuracy. When control over precision was not possible, such as in the yes/no condition, people said “I don’t know” to maintain accuracy. However when withholding responses and adjusting precision were both possible, people utilized both methods. It seems that concerns that memories reported after a long retention interval might be inaccurate are unfounded. ^

Memory conformity: Actors and bystanders

This dissertation explored memory conformity effects on people who interacted with a confederate and of bystanders to that interaction. Two studies were carried out. Study 1 was conducted in the field. A male confederate approached a group of people at the beach and had a brief interaction. About a minute later a research assistant approached the group and administered a target-absent lineup to each person in the group. Analyses revealed that memory conformity occurred during the lineup task. Bystanders were twice as likely to conform as those who interacted with the confederate. Study 2 was carried out in a laboratory under controlled conditions. Participants were exposed to two events during their time in the laboratory. In one event, participants were shown a brief video with no determinate roles assigned. In the other event participants were randomly assigned to interact with a confederate (actor condition) or to witness that interaction (bystander condition). Participants were given memory tests on both events to understand the effects of participant role (actor vs. bystander) on memory conformity. Participants answered second to all questions, following a confederate acting as a participant, who disseminated misinformation on critical questions. Analyses revealed no significant differences in memory conformity between actors and bystanders during the movie memory task. However, differences were found for the interaction memory task such that bystanders conformed more than actors on two of four critical questions. Bystanders also conformed more than actors during a lineup identification task. The results of these studies suggest that the role a person plays in an interaction affects how susceptible they are to information from a co-witness. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed. First, the results are explained through the use of two models of memory. Second, recommendations are made for forensic investigators.

A theoretical analysis of eyewitness identification: Dual -process theory, signal detection theory and eyewitness confidence

Given the growing number of wrongful convictions involving faulty eyewitness evidence and the strong reliance by jurors on eyewitness testimony, researchers have sought to develop safeguards to decrease erroneous identifications. While decades of eyewitness research have led to numerous recommendations for the collection of eyewitness evidence, less is known regarding the psychological processes that govern identification responses. The purpose of the current research was to expand the theoretical knowledge of eyewitness identification decisions by exploring two separate memory theories: signal detection theory and dual-process theory. This was accomplished by examining both system and estimator variables in the context of a novel lineup recognition paradigm. Both theories were also examined in conjunction with confidence to determine whether it might add significantly to the understanding of eyewitness memory. ^ In two separate experiments, both an encoding and a retrieval-based manipulation were chosen to examine the application of theory to eyewitness identification decisions. Dual-process estimates were measured through the use of remember-know judgments (Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). In Experiment 1, the effects of divided attention and lineup presentation format (simultaneous vs. sequential) were examined. In Experiment 2, perceptual distance and lineup response deadline were examined. Overall, the results indicated that discrimination and remember judgments (recollection) were generally affected by variations in encoding quality and response criterion and know judgments (familiarity) were generally affected by variations in retrieval options. Specifically, as encoding quality improved, discrimination ability and judgments of recollection increased; and as the retrieval task became more difficult there was a shift toward lenient choosing and more reliance on familiarity. ^ The application of signal detection theory and dual-process theory in the current experiments produced predictable results on both system and estimator variables. These theories were also compared to measures of general confidence, calibration, and diagnosticity. The application of the additional confidence measures in conjunction with signal detection theory and dual-process theory gave a more in-depth explanation than either theory alone. Therefore, the general conclusion is that eyewitness identifications can be understood in a more complete manor by applying theory and examining confidence. Future directions and policy implications are discussed. ^

The influence of the cross -race effect on lineup construction and fairness

Lineup procedures have recently garnered extensive empirical attention, in an effort to reduce the number of mistaken identifications that plague the criminal justice system. Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the influence of the lineup constructor or the lineup construction technique on the quality of the lineup. This study examined whether the cross-race effect has an influence on the quality of lineups constructed using a match-to-suspect or match-to-description technique in a series of three phases. Participants generated descriptions of same- and other-race targets in Phase 1, which were used in Phase 2. In Phase 2, participants were asked to create lineups for own-race targets and other-race targets using one of two techniques. The lineups created in this phase were examined for lineup quality in Phase 3 by calculating lineup fairness assessments through the use of a mock witness paradigm. ^ Overall, the results of these experiment phases suggest that the race of those involved in the lineup construction process influences lineups. There was no difference in witness description accuracy in Phase 1, which ran counter to predictions based on the cross-race effect. The cross-race effect was observed, however, in Phases 2 and 3. The lineup construction technique used also influenced several of the process measures, selection estimates, and fairness judgments in Phase 2. Interestingly, the presence of the cross-race effect was in the opposite direction as predicted for some measures in both phases. In Phase 2, the cross-race effect was as predicted for number of foils viewed, but in the opposite direction for average time spent viewing each foil. In Phase 3, the cross-race effect was in the opposite direction than predicted, with higher levels of lineup fairness in other-race lineups. The practical implications of these findings are discussed in relation to lineup fairness within the legal system. ^

Examining moderators of the hindsight bias in the context of civil legal decision -making: Counterfactuals, causal proximity, and self -referencing

The current research sought to clarify the diverging relationships between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias observed in the literature thus far. In a non-legal context, Roese and Olson (1996) found a positive relationship between counterfactuals and hindsight bias, such that counterfactual mutations that undid the outcome also increased participants’ ratings of the outcome’s a priori likelihood. Further, they determined that this relationship is mediated by causal attributions about the counterfactually mutated antecedent event. Conversely, in the context of a civil lawsuit, Robbennolt and Sobus (1997) found that the relationship between counterfactual thinking and hindsight bias is negative. The current research sought to resolve the conflicting findings in the literature within a legal context. ^ In Experiment One, the manipulation of the normality of the defendant’s target behavior, designed to manipulate participants’ counterfactual thoughts about said behavior, did moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge on mock jurors’ judgments of the foreseeability of that outcome as well as their negligence verdicts. Although I predicted that counterfactual thinking would increase, or exacerbate, the hindsight bias, as found by Roese and Olson (1996), my results provided some support for Robbenolt and Sobus’s (1997) finding that counterfactual thinking decreases the hindsight bias. Behavior normality did not moderate the hindsight effect of outcome knowledge in Experiment Two, nor did causal proximity in Experiment Three. ^ Additionally, my hypothesis that self-referencing may be an effective hindsight debiasing technique received little support across the three experiments. Although both the self-referencing instructions and self-report measure consistently decreased mock jurors’ likelihood of finding the defendant negligent, and self-referencing instructions decreased their foreseeability ratings in studies two and three, the self-referencing manipulation did not interact with outcome knowledge to moderate a hindsight bias effect on either foreseeability or negligence judgments. The consistent pattern of results across the three experiments, however, suggests that self-referencing may be an effective technique in reducing the likelihood of negligence verdicts.^

Confirmation bias in witness interviewing: Can interviewers ignore their preconceptions?

Basic research on expectancy effects suggests that investigative interviewers with pre-conceived notions about a crime may negatively influence the interview process in meaningful ways, yet many interviewing protocols recommend that interviewers review all available information prior to conducting their interviews. Previous research suggests that interviewers with no pre-interview knowledge elicit more detailed and accurate accounts than their informed counterparts (Cantlon, et al., 1996; Rivard et al., under review). The current study investigated whether (a) the benefit of blind versus informed interviewing is moderated by cautionary interviewer instructions to avoid suggestive questions and (b) whether any possible effects of pre-interview information extend beyond the immediate context of the forensic interview. ^ Paired participants (N = 584) were assigned randomly either to the role of interviewer or witness. Witnesses viewed a mock crime video and were interviewed one week later by an interviewer who received either correct, incorrect, or no information about the crime event. Half of the interviewers were assigned randomly to receive additional instructions to avoid suggestive questions. All participants returned 1 week after the interview to recall the crime video (for the witness) or the information recalled by the witness during the interview (for the interviewer). All interviews and delayed recall measures were scored for the quantity and accuracy of information reported. ^ Results replicate earlier findings that blind interviewers elicit more information from witnesses, without a decrease in accuracy rate. However instructions to avoid suggestive questions did not moderate the effect of blind versus informed interviewing on witness recall during the interview. Results further demonstrate that the effects of blind versus non-blind interviewing may extend beyond the immediate context of the interview to a later recall attempt. With instructions to avoid suggestive questions, witnesses of blind interviewers were more accurate than witnesses of incorrectly informed interviewers when recalling the event 1 week later. In addition, blind interviewers had more accurate memories for the witnesses' account of the event during the interview compared to non-blind interviewers.^

Judging psychology experts: Can judges and attorneys distinguish between clinical and experimental psychologists?

A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts are critical to preventing "junk" science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must first evaluate experts' CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts' credentials. Theoretical models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.^ Legal professionals' (N = 150) and undergraduate students' (N = 468) expert witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed participants' decision making processes.^ Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to render decisions.^

True and false confessions to an intentional act: A novel experimental paradigm

Due to the powerful nature of confession evidence, it is imperative that we investigate the factors that affect the likelihood of obtaining true and false confessions. Previous research has been conducted with a paradigm limited to the study of false confessions to an act of negligence, thereby limiting the generalizability of the findings. The first goal of the current study was to introduce a novel paradigm involving a more serious, intentional act that can be used in the study of both true and false confessions. The second goal was to explore the effects of two police interrogation tactics, minimization and an offer of leniency, on true and false confession rates. ^ Three hundred and thirty-four undergraduates at a large southeastern university were recruited to participate in a study on problem-solving and decision-making. During the course of the laboratory experiment, participants were induced to intentionally break or not break an experimental rule, an act that was characterized as “cheating.” All participants (i.e., both innocent and guilty) were later accused of the act and interrogated. For half of the participants, the interrogator used minimization tactics, which involved downplaying the seriousness of the offense, expressing sympathy, and providing face-saving excuses, in order to encourage the participant to confess. An offer of leniency was also manipulated in which half the participants were offered a “deal” that involved the option of confessing and accepting a known punishment or not confessing and facing the threat of harsher punishment. Results indicated that guilty persons were more likely to confess than innocent persons, and that the use of minimization and an explicit offer of leniency increased both the true and false confession rates. Furthermore, a cumulative effect of techniques was observed, such that the diagnosticity of the interrogation (the ratio of true confessions to false confessions) decreased as the number of techniques used increased. Taken together, the results suggest that caution should be used when implementing these techniques in the interrogation room. ^