Modeling security and cooperation in wireless networks using game theory

This research involves the design, development, and theoretical demonstration of models resulting in integrated misbehavior resolution protocols for ad hoc networked devices. Game theory was used to analyze strategic interaction among independent devices with conflicting interests. Packet forwarding at the routing layer of autonomous ad hoc networks was investigated. Unlike existing reputation based or payment schemes, this model is based on repeated interactions. To enforce cooperation, a community enforcement mechanism was used, whereby selfish nodes that drop packets were punished not only by the victim, but also by all nodes in the network. Then, a stochastic packet forwarding game strategy was introduced. Our solution relaxed the uniform traffic demand that was pervasive in other works. To address the concerns of imperfect private monitoring in resource aware ad hoc networks, a belief-free equilibrium scheme was developed that reduces the impact of noise in cooperation. This scheme also eliminated the need to infer the private history of other nodes. Moreover, it simplified the computation of an optimal strategy. The belief-free approach reduced the node overhead and was easily tractable. Hence it made the system operation feasible. Motivated by the versatile nature of evolutionary game theory, the assumption of a rational node is relaxed, leading to the development of a framework for mitigating routing selfishness and misbehavior in Multi hop networks. This is accomplished by setting nodes to play a fixed strategy rather than independently choosing a rational strategy. A range of simulations was carried out that showed improved cooperation between selfish nodes when compared to older results. Cooperation among ad hoc nodes can also protect a network from malicious attacks. In the absence of a central trusted entity, many security mechanisms and privacy protections require cooperation among ad hoc nodes to protect a network from malicious attacks. Therefore, using game theory and evolutionary game theory, a mathematical framework has been developed that explores trust mechanisms to achieve security in the network. This framework is one of the first steps towards the synthesis of an integrated solution that demonstrates that security solely depends on the initial trust level that nodes have for each other.^

History and evolutionary trajectory of the Iranian nuclear program

What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what mechanisms have pushed Iran's nuclear program (INP) towards being designated as a proliferation threat (securitization)? What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what mechanisms have pushed Iran's nuclear program away from being designated as an existential threat (de-securitization)? What has been the overall balance of power and interaction dynamics of these opposing forces over the last half-century and what is their most likely future trajectory? ^ Iran's nuclear story can be told as the unfolding of constant interaction between state and non-state forces of "nuclear securitization" and "nuclear de-securitization." Tracking the crisscrossing interaction between these different securitizing and de-securitizing actors in a historical context constitutes the central task of this project. ^ A careful tracing of "security events" on different analytical levels reveals the broad contours of the evolutionary trajectory of INP and its possible future path(s). Out of this theoretically conscious historical narrative, one can make informed observations about the overall thrust of INP along the securitization - de-securitization continuum. ^ The main contributions of this work are three fold: First, it brings a fresh theoretical perspective on Iran's proliferation behavior by utilizing the "securitization" theory tracing the initial indications of the threat designation of INP all the way back to the mid 1970s. Second, it gives a solid and thematically grounded historical texture to INP by providing an intimate engagement with the persons, processes, and events of Tehran's nuclear pursuit over half a century. Third, it demonstrates how INP has interacted with and even at times transformed the NPT as the keystone of the non-proliferation regime, and how it has affected and injected urgency to the international discourse on nuclear proliferation specifically in the Middle East.^