State legislative term limits and the law of unintended consequences: An examination of member behavior, power structures, and legislative organization in Florida

The implementation of term limits on state legislators has provided a wealth of data for study. Florida, the second largest state in the Union with term limits, has not been comprehensively studied. This research examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, member composition, legislator career paths, legislative leadership, and intra- and inter-governmental influences on Florida's legislature. This study looks at the Florida legislature from 1992 when term limits were enacted through 2004, three electoral cycles in which term limits have been in effect. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative data where appropriate. Electoral data is used to assess electoral and demographic effects, as well as member career trajectories. Interview data with current and former legislators, lobbyists, and executive branch officials is used to analyze both changes in legislative organization and intra- and inter-governmental influences on the legislative process. Term limits has only created greater competition when a legislative seat opens and has actually created a greater advantage for incumbents. Women and minorities have only made minimal gains in winning seats post-term limits. Newly elected legislators are not political novices with a vast majority having previous elective experience. Leadership is more centralized under term limits and the Senate has gained an advantage over the more inexperienced House. Lastly, the influence of staff, lobbyists, and most importantly, the governor has greatly increased under term limits. This research finds that term limits have not produced the consequences that proponents had envisioned.^

Electoral rules and elite recruitment: A comparative analysis of the Bundestag and the U.S. House of Representatives

In this research, I analyze the effects of candidate nomination rules and campaign financing rules on elite recruitment into the national legislatures of Germany and the United States. This dissertation is both theory-driven and constitutes exploratory research, too. While the effects of electoral rules are frequently studied in political science, the emphasis is thereby on electoral rules that are set post-election. My focus, in contrast, is on electoral rules that have an effect prior to the election. Furthermore, my dissertation is comparative by design.^ The research question is twofold. Do electoral rules have an effect on elite recruitment, and does it matter? To answer these question, I create a large-N original data set, in which I code the behavior and recruitment paths and patterns of members of the American House of Representatives and the German Bundestag. Furthermore, I include interviews with members of the said two national legislatures. Both the statistical analyses and the interviews provide affirmative evidence for my working hypothesis that differences in electoral rules lead to a different type of elite recruitment. To that end, I use the active-politician concept, through which I dichotomously distinguish the economic behavior of politicians.^ Thanks to the exploratory nature of my research, I also discover the phenomenon of differential valence of local and state political office for entrance into national office in comparative perspective. By statistically identifying this hitherto unknown paradox, as well as evidencing the effects of electoral rules, I show that besides ideology and culture, institutional rules are key in shaping the ruling elite. The way institutional rules are set up, in particular electoral rules, does not only affect how the electorate will vote and how seats will be distributed, but it will also affect what type of people will end up in elected office.^