Fostering the development of identity and intimacy during late adolescence

This dissertation tested the effectiveness of a psychosocial intervention, the Personal Development in the Context of Relationships (PDCR) program. The aim of the PDCR seeks to foster the development (or enhancement) of a sense of identity and intimacy among adolescents who participate in the program. The PDCR is a psychosocial group intervention which utilizes interpersonal relationship issues as a context to foster personal development in identity formation and facilitate the development of an individual's capacity for intimacy. The PDCR uses intervention strategies which include skills and knowledge development, experiential group exercises, and exploration for insight. Participants consisted of 110 late adolescents. A mixed-subjects design (pre-post-follow up) was used to assess the effectiveness, efficacy and utility of the PDCR on the experimental condition relative to a content/social contact control group and a time control condition. Identity exploration and identity commitment were measured by the Ego Identity Process Questionnaire (EIPQ). Total intimacy and identity role satisfaction were measured by the Erikson Psychosocial Stage Inventory (EPSI). Relationship quality and closeness were measured by the Relationship Quality Scale (RQS) and the Relationship Closeness Inventory (RCI) in an effort to assess whether any potential impact on interpersonal relationships occurs. Mixed MANOVAs were used to analyze the data with results yielding significant values for increased total identity exploration from pre to post test and decreases in total identity commitment from pre to post to follow-up test in the experimental group relative to the control conditions on the EIPQ. Further results indicated increases in total intimacy from pre to post to follow-up test in the experimental group relative to the control conditions on the EPSI. No clear trends emerged from pre to post to follow-up test for the Relationship measures. Results are discussed in terms of both practical and theoretical implications. ^

A phenomenology of crack abuse

The aim of this dissertation is to identify, describe, and explain the common experiences defining the crack abuser's life-world. Its method is phenomenological. Using basic cybernetic premises, a neurophysiologically oriented phenomenological framework concerning the constitution of thoughts, memories, and perceptions is first written. The framework is designed to hypothetically represent the neuropathology of crack abuse within a perspective that prescinds and describes the constitution, flow, and interdependence of experience. After the framework is written, the dissertation outlines the neuro-psychopharmacology of crack abuse and delimits crack abusers as a specific group within the more general population of cocaine users. It then represents the neuropathology of crack abuse within its phenomenological framework and uses the first-person accounts of forty-two crack dependents to actualize a phenomenological sketch of the crack abuser's life-world. The ethnographies afford the possibility of writing a “thick” description of the crack abuser's daily life—one that communicates the substance, order, and subjective and cultural dimensions of the dependent's defining experiences. ^ The dissertation's goals are successfully realized. The framework written and the ethnographies recorded and transcribed, the dissertation is able to identify, describe, and to a certain extent explain some of the common experiences defining the crack abusers life-world. The dissertation concludes that the crack abuser's life-world is organized around three primary and four secondary experiences. His primary experiences include: (1) an almost complete, yet fleeting, satisfaction of the ego's innate insufficiency and sublime, erotic-like stimulation of its core, (2) a fundamental inclination and expansion of the uniquely oriented euphoria-dysphoria dynamic that vivifies and orients the flow of consciousness, and (3) a change in the ego's innate structure. His secondary experiences include: (a) a characteristic aiming of projects, actions, and conduct toward the procurement and consumption of crack, (b) a denigration in the hold of legitimations and institutionalizations on the thematic field, (c) a strict alignment and a contraction in the scope of logical types pointing to the salient experiences within the stock of knowledge, and (d) for some crack abusers, ontological insecurity, despair, and exhaustion. ^

Judging psychology experts: Can judges and attorneys distinguish between clinical and experimental psychologists?

A trial judge serves as gatekeeper in the courtroom to ensure that only reliable expert witness testimony is presented to the jury. Nevertheless, research shows that while judges take seriously their gatekeeper status, legal professionals in general are unable to identify well conducted research and are unable to define falsifiability, error rates, peer review status, and scientific validity (Gatkowski et al., 2001; Kovera & McAuliff, 2000). However, the abilities to identify quality scientific research and define scientific concepts are critical to preventing "junk" science from entering courtrooms. Research thus far has neglected to address that before selecting expert witnesses, judges and attorneys must first evaluate experts' CVs rather than their scientific testimony to determine whether legal standards of admissibility have been met. The quality of expert testimony, therefore, largely depends on the ability to evaluate properly experts' credentials. Theoretical models of decision making suggest that ability/knowledge and motivation are required to process information systematically. Legal professionals (judges and attorneys) were expected to process CVs heuristically when rendering expert witness decisions due to a lack of training in areas of psychology expertise.^ Legal professionals' (N = 150) and undergraduate students' (N = 468) expert witness decisions were examined and compared. Participants were presented with one of two versions of a criminal case calling for the testimony of either a clinical psychology expert or an experimental legal psychology expert. Participants then read one of eight curricula vitae that varied area of expertise (clinical vs. legal psychology), previous expert witness experience (previous experience vs. no previous experience), and scholarly publication record (30 publications vs. no publications) before deciding whether the expert was qualified to testify in the case. Follow-up measures assessed participants' decision making processes.^ Legal professionals were not better than college students at rendering quality psychology expert witness admissibility decisions yet they were significantly more confident in their decisions. Legal professionals rated themselves significantly higher than students in ability, knowledge, and motivation to choose an appropriate psychology expert although their expert witness decisions were equally inadequate. Findings suggest that participants relied on heuristics, such as previous expert witness experience, to render decisions.^