On the fundamentals of research and development (R&D) spillovers in competitive markets

Rivals may voluntarily share Research and Development (R&D) results even in the absence of any binding agreements or collusion. In a model where rival firms engage in non-cooperative independent R&D process, we used optimization and game theory analysis to study the equilibrium strategy of the firms. Our work showed that, while minimal spillover is always equilibrium, there may be another equilibrium where firms may reciprocally choose high, sometimes perfect, spillover rates. The incentive for sharing R&D output is based on firms' expectations of learning from their rivals' R&D progress in the future. This leads to strategic complementarities between the firms' choices of spillover rates and thus policy implication follows. ^ Public research agencies can contribute more to social welfare by providing research as public goods. In a non-cooperative public-private research relationship where parallel R&D is conducted, by making its R&D results accessible, the public research agency can stimulate private spillovers, even if there exists rivalry among the private firms who can benefit from such spillovers. ^

Fluorescence-enhanced optical imaging on three-dimensional phantoms using a hand-held probe based frequency-domain intensified charge coupled device (ICCD) optical imager

Fluorescence-enhanced optical imaging is an emerging non-invasive and non-ionizing modality towards breast cancer diagnosis. Various optical imaging systems are currently available, although most of them are limited by bulky instrumentation, or their inability to flexibly image different tissue volumes and shapes. Hand-held based optical imaging systems are a recent development for its improved portability, but are currently limited only to surface mapping. Herein, a novel optical imager, consisting primarily of a hand-held probe and a gain-modulated intensified charge coupled device (ICCD) detector, is developed towards both surface and tomographic breast imaging. The unique features of this hand-held probe based optical imager are its ability to; (i) image large tissue areas (5×10 sq. cm) in a single scan, (ii) reduce overall imaging time using a unique measurement geometry, and (iii) perform tomographic imaging for tumor three-dimensional (3-D) localization. Frequency-domain based experimental phantom studies have been performed on slab geometries (650 ml) under different target depths (1-2.5 cm), target volumes (0.45, 0.23 and 0.10 cc), fluorescence absorption contrast ratios (1:0, 1000:1 to 5:1), and number of targets (up to 3), using Indocyanine Green (ICG) as fluorescence contrast agents. An approximate extended Kalman filter based inverse algorithm has been adapted towards 3-D tomographic reconstructions. Single fluorescence target(s) was reconstructed when located: (i) up to 2.5 cm deep (at 1:0 contrast ratio) and 1.5 cm deep (up to 10:1 contrast ratio) for 0.45 cc-target; and (ii) 1.5 cm deep for target as small as 0.10 cc at 1:0 contrast ratio. In the case of multiple targets, two targets as close as 0.7 cm were tomographically resolved when located 1.5 cm deep. It was observed that performing multi-projection (here dual) based tomographic imaging using a priori target information from surface images, improved the target depth recovery over using single projection based imaging. From a total of 98 experimental phantom studies, the sensitivity and specificity of the imager was estimated as 81-86% and 43-50%, respectively. With 3-D tomographic imaging successfully demonstrated for the first time using a hand-held based optical imager, the clinical translation of this technology is promising upon further experimental validation from in-vitro and in-vivo studies.

The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Essays on durable goods consumption and firm innovation

This dissertation comprises three individual chapters. Chapter Two examines how free riding across neighbors influenced the diffusion of color television sets in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors concerning its patent output. Chapter Four discusses how knowledge stocks influence a patenting firm’s later diversification. Chapter Two documents the existence of a type of network effects—free riding across neighbors—in the consumption of color television sets in rural China, which reduces the propensity of non-owners to purchase. I construct a model of the timing of the purchase of a durable good in the presence of free riding, and test its key implications using household survey data in rural China. Chapter Three tests for asymmetric information between a firm’s management and other investors about its patent output by examining insider trading patterns and stock price changes in R&D intensive firms. It demonstrates that management has considerable information about its patent output beyond what is known to investors. It also shows that the predictive power of insider trading patterns on patent output comes from purchases rather than sales. Chapter Four discusses two sequential channels through which knowledge stocks may influence a firm’s later diversification. One is that firms with more knowledge are more likely to enter a new industry. The other is that firms’ businesses have a better chance of surviving, conditional on being formed. By examining U.S. public patenting firms in manufacturing sectors for 1984-1996, I find that knowledge stocks predict the likelihood of new industry entry when controlling for firm size. However, this predictive power is weakened when diversification effects are included. On the other hand, a survival study of newly established segments shows that initial knowledge stocks have significant positive effects on segment survival, whereas diversification effects are insignificant.

An assessment of natural and human disturbance effects on Mexican ecosystems: current trends and research gaps

Mexico harbors more than 10% of the planet’s endemic species. However, the integrity and biodiversity of many ecosystems is experiencing rapid transformation under the influence of a wide array of human and natural disturbances. In order to disentangle the effects of human and natural disturbance regimes at different spatial and temporal scales, we selected six terrestrial (temperate montane forests, montane cloud forests, tropical rain forests, tropical semi-deciduous forests, tropical dry forests, and deserts) and four aquatic (coral reefs, mangrove forests, kelp forests and saline lakes) ecosystems. We used semiquantitative statistical methods to assess (1) the most important agents of disturbance affecting the ecosystems, (2) the vulnerability of each ecosystem to anthropogenic and natural disturbance, and (3) the differences in ecosystem disturbance regimes and their resilience. Our analysis indicates a significant variation in ecological responses, recovery capacity, and resilience among ecosystems. The constant and widespread presence of human impacts on both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems is reflected either in reduced area coverage for most systems, or reduced productivity and biodiversity, particularly in the case of fragile ecosystems (e.g., rain forests, coral reefs). In all cases, the interaction between historical human impacts and episodic high intensity natural disturbance (e.g., hurricanes, fires) has triggered a reduction in species diversity and induced significant changes in habitat distribution or species dominance. The lack of monitoring programs assessing before/after effects of major disturbances in Mexico is one of the major limitations to quantifying the commonalities and differences of disturbance effects on ecosystem properties.

Essays on Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.

Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. ^ Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. ^ Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.^