Decreasing Law Enforcement Applicants and Racial Profiling – Reversing the Trends

Valuing Polyrhythmic Realities and Critical Theories, specifically Critical Race Theory, is facilitated by Interdisciplinary inquiry. Racial Profiling will be utilized to demonstrate how acknowledging the lived experiences of individuals and viewing situations from the oppressed viewpoint will positively impact the number of Blacks in law enforcement.

The Use of the Military for Law Enforcement Activities in Central America

Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

A phenomenological exploration of Black male law enforcement officers' perspectives of racial profiling and their law enforcement career exploration and commitment

This phenomenological study explored Black male law enforcement officers' perspectives of how racial profiling shaped their decisions to explore and commit to a law enforcement career. Criterion and snow ball sampling was used to obtain the 17 participants for this study. Super's (1990) archway model was used as the theoretical framework. The archway model "is designed to bring out the segmented but unified and developmental nature of career development, to highlight the segments, and to make their origin clear" (Super, 1990, p. 201). Interview data were analyzed using inductive, deductive, and comparative analyses. Three themes emerged from the inductive analysis of the data: (a) color and/or race does matter, (b) putting on the badge, and (c) too black to be blue and too blue to be black. The deductive analysis used a priori coding that was based on Super's (1990) archway model. The deductive analysis revealed the participants' career exploration was influenced by their knowledge of racial profiling and how others view them. The comparative analysis between the inductive themes and deductive findings found the theme "color and/or race does matter" was present in the relationships between and within all segments of Super's (1990) model. The comparative analysis also revealed an expanded notion of self-concept for Black males – marginalized and/or oppressed individuals. Self-concepts, "such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, and role self-concepts, being combinations of traits ascribed to oneself" (Super, 1990, p. 202) do not completely address the self-concept of marginalized and/or oppressed individuals. The self-concept of marginalized and/or oppressed individuals is self-efficacy, self-esteem, traits ascribed to oneself expanded by their awareness of how others view them. (DuBois, 1995; Freire, 1970; Sheared, 1990; Super, 1990; Young, 1990). Ultimately, self-concept is utilized to make career and life decisions. Current human resource policies and practices do not take into consideration that negative police contact could be the result of racial profiling. Current human resource hiring guidelines penalize individuals who have had negative police contact. Therefore, racial profiling is a discriminatory act that can effectively circumvent U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission laws and serve as a boundary mechanism to employment (Rocco & Gallagher, 2004).

Assessing an automated, information -sharing technology in the post "9 -11" era: Do local law enforcement officers think it meets their needs?

In the wake of the “9-11” terrorists' attacks, the U.S. Government has turned to information technology (IT) to address a lack of information sharing among law enforcement agencies. This research determined if and how information-sharing technology helps law enforcement by examining the differences in perception of the value of IT between law enforcement officers who have access to automated regional information sharing and those who do not. It also examined the effect of potential intervening variables such as user characteristics, training, and experience, on the officers' evaluation of IT. The sample was limited to 588 officers from two sheriff's offices; one of them (the study group) uses information sharing technology, the other (the comparison group) does not. Triangulated methodologies included surveys, interviews, direct observation, and a review of agency records. Data analysis involved the following statistical methods: descriptive statistics, Chi-Square, factor analysis, principal component analysis, Cronbach's Alpha, Mann-Whitney tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and Scheffe' post hoc analysis. ^ Results indicated a significant difference between groups: the study group perceived information sharing technology as being a greater factor in solving crime and in increasing officer productivity. The study group was more satisfied with the data available to it. As to the number of arrests made, information sharing technology did not make a difference. Analysis of the potential intervening variables revealed several remarkable results. The presence of a strong performance management imperative (in the comparison sheriff's office) appeared to be a factor in case clearances and arrests, technology notwithstanding. As to the influence of user characteristics, level of education did not influence a user's satisfaction with technology, but user-satisfaction scores differed significantly among years of experience as a law enforcement officer and the amount of computer training, suggesting a significant but weak relationship. ^ Therefore, this study finds that information sharing technology assists law enforcement officers in doing their jobs. It also suggests that other variables such as computer training, experience, and management climate should be accounted for when assessing the impact of information technology. ^

Nutritional status of United States Coast Guard law enforcement detachment groups before and after a deployment

The purpose of this research was to study the nutritional status of United States Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (USCG/ LEDET) personnel before and after prolonged travel at sea. To date there is no information available regarding the nutritional status of Coast Guard personnel. Forty-seven subjects were studied in total, each served as their own control. Demographic and health history data was collected at baseline. Dietary and exercise data was collected before and during the deployment. Body composition was determined before and after a deployment. The results of this study revealed that the USCG/LEDET personnel had high cholesterol and decreased fiber intakes. Cholesterol intake during deployment (516.8±239.7 mg/day) was significantly higher (p= 0. 047) than pre-deployment (448.2 ± 144.3 mg/day). Fiber intake was significantly lower than recommended (p The results of this study indicate that LEDET personnel are put at higher nutritional risk while deployed and also have increased negative health behaviors associated with risk for Cardiovascular Disease (CVD) and other related diseases. This is crucial information for the USCG so that action can be taken to improve the physical well being of their personnel.

A Phenomenological Exploration of Black Male Law Enforcement Officers' Perspectives of Racial Profiling and Their Law Enforcement Career Exploration and Commitment

This phenomenological study explored Black male law enforcement officers’ perspectives of how racial profiling shaped their decisions to explore and commit to a law enforcement career. Criterion and snow ball sampling was used to obtain the 17 participants for this study. Super’s (1990) archway model was used as the theoretical framework. The archway model “is designed to bring out the segmented but unified and developmental nature of career development, to highlight the segments, and to make their origin clear” (Super, 1990, p. 201). Interview data were analyzed using inductive, deductive, and comparative analyses. Three themes emerged from the inductive analysis of the data: (a) color and/or race does matter, (b) putting on the badge, and (c) too black to be blue and too blue to be black. The deductive analysis used a priori coding that was based on Super’s (1990) archway model. The deductive analysis revealed the participants’ career exploration was influenced by their knowledge of racial profiling and how others view them. The comparative analysis between the inductive themes and deductive findings found the theme “color and/or race does matter” was present in the relationships between and within all segments of Super’s (1990) model. The comparative analysis also revealed an expanded notion of self-concept for Black males – marginalized and/or oppressed individuals. Self-concepts, “such as self-efficacy, self-esteem, and role self-concepts, being combinations of traits ascribed to oneself” (Super, 1990, p. 202) do not completely address the self-concept of marginalized and/or oppressed individuals. The self-concept of marginalized and/or oppressed individuals is self-efficacy, self-esteem, traits ascribed to oneself expanded by their awareness of how others view them. (DuBois, 1995; Freire, 1970; Sheared, 1990; Super, 1990; Young, 1990). Ultimately, self-concept is utilized to make career and life decisions. Current human resource policies and practices do not take into consideration that negative police contact could be the result of racial profiling. Current human resource hiring guidelines penalize individuals who have had negative police contact. Therefore, racial profiling is a discriminatory act that can effectively circumvent U.S. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission laws and serve as a boundary mechanism to employment (Rocco & Gallagher, 2004).

Trading democracy for security? The effects of the international drug war on the quality of democracy in the Dominican Republic, 1996–2008

The purpose of the research is to study the relationship between international drug interdiction policies and domestic politics in fragile democracies, and to demonstrate how international drug control policies and the use of force fit the rhetoric of war, are legitimized by the principles of a just war, but may also cause collateral damage and negative unintended consequences. The method used is a case study of the Dominican Republic. The research has found that international drug control regimes, primarily led by the U.S. and narrowly focused on interdiction, have influenced an increasingly militarized approach to domestic law enforcement in the Dominican Republic. The collateral damage caused by militarized enforcement comes in the form of negative perceptions of citizen security, loss of respect for the rule of law and due process, and low levels of civil society development. The drug war has exposed the need for significant reform of the institutions charged with carrying out enforcement, the police force and the judicial system in particular. The dissertation concludes that the extent of drug trafficking in the Dominican Republic is beyond the scope of domestic reform efforts alone, but that the programs implemented do show some potential for future success. The dissertation also concludes that the framework of warfare is not the most appropriate for the international problems of drug traffic and abuse. A broader, multipronged approach should be considered by world policy makers in order to address all conditions that allow drugs to flourish without infringing upon democratic and civil rights in the process.

Trading Democracy for Security? The Effects of the International Drug War on the Quality of Democracy in the Dominican Republic, 1996 -2008

The purpose of the research is to study the relationship between international drug interdiction policies and domestic politics in fragile democracies, and to demonstrate how international drug control policies and the use of force fit the rhetoric of war, are legitimized by the principles of a just war, but may also cause collateral damage and negative unintended consequences. The method used is a case study of the Dominican Republic. The research has found that international drug control regimes, primarily led by the U.S. and narrowly focused on interdiction, have influenced an increasingly militarized approach to domestic law enforcement in the Dominican Republic. The collateral damage caused by militarized enforcement comes in the form of negative perceptions of citizen security, loss of respect for the rule of law and due process, and low levels of civil society development. The drug war has exposed the need for significant reform of the institutions charged with carrying out enforcement, the police force and the judicial system in particular. The dissertation concludes that the extent of drug trafficking in the Dominican Republic is beyond the scope of domestic reform efforts alone, but that the programs implemented do show some potential for future success. The dissertation also concludes that the framework of warfare is not the most appropriate for the international problems of drug traffic and abuse. A broader, multipronged approach should be considered by world policy makers in order to address all conditions that allow drugs to flourish without infringing upon democratic and civil rights in the process.

The Re-Emergence of Suriname’s Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety

This study examines some concerns that derive from Suriname‘s May-July 2010 elections, which resulted in the re-emergence of erstwhile military ruler and convicted drug trafficker, Désiré (Desi) Bouterse, as President of the Republic. The victory reflects Bouterse‘s political acumen in aggregating disparate political interests and in establishing a viable coalition government. But because of his history and profile, this triumph has generated anxiety in some places internationally. In this respect, the study examines anxieties related to three matters: (a) relations with Guyana, where there is an existing territorial dispute and a recently resolved maritime dispute, (b) illegal drug trafficking operations, and (c) foreign policy engagement with Venezuela. There has been a flurry of bilateral activities—including several presidential summits—with Guyana since President Bouterse‘s inauguration, albeit seemingly more about symbolism than substance. Although the maritime dispute was settled by a Tribunal of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea in 2007, the 15,000 km2 New River Triangle is still unresolved. Indeed, in June 2011 President Bouterse reasserted Suriname‘s claim to the Triangle. Suriname has upped the ante in that dispute by portraying internationally the map of Suriname as inclusive of the disputed area. In all likelihood that self-redefinition slowly will become the country‘s cartographic definition in the eyes of the world if Guyana does not successfully rebuff that move or pursue the definitive settlement of the dispute. A geonarcotics assessment shows Suriname to be still heavily implicated in trafficking, because of geography, law enforcement limitations, corruption, and other factors. But despite Bouterse‘s drug-related history and that of former senior military officers, several reasons suggest the inexpediency of a narco-state being created by Bouterse. As well, as part of Suriname‘s pursuit of increased Caribbean and South American engagement, it has boosted relations with Venezuela, which has included it in PetroCaribe and provided housing and agricultural aid. However, the engagement appears to be driven more by pragmatism and less by any ideological affinity with Hugo Chavez.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

The New Transatlantic Bonanza: Cocaine on Highway 10.

The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade between the two continents. More recently, these routes have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine destined for the growing European market. The Parallel’s growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it known as cocaine “Highway 10” among law enforcement. Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route. West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing number of nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West African partner had already started developing his own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.

Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

The National Institute of Justice guide for eyewitness identification evidence: Can it improve juror decision-making?

Mistaken eyewitness identifications of innocent lead to more false convictions in the United States than any other cause. In response to concerns about the reliability of eyewitness evidence, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in 1999 published a Guide for the gathering and preservation of eyewitness evidence by law enforcement personnel. Previous research has shown that eyewitness identifications are more accurate when obtained using procedures recommended in the NIJ Guide. This experiment assessed whether informing jurors about the Guide can improve their ability to discriminate between eyewitness identifications likely to be accurate and those likely to be inaccurate and, if so, how to most effectively provide jurors with such information. ^ Seven hundred sixteen U.S. citizens who reported for criminal jury duty participated. Half of the participant jurors read a summary of an armed robbery trial in which the police followed the NIJ Guide when obtaining an eyewitness identification of the defendant. The other half read about an identical case in which the police did not follow the Guide. Jurors received information about the Guide from a court-appointed expert witness, one of the attorneys in the case, the trial judge, the judge in combination with one of the attorneys, or from no one (in the control groups). Jurors then rendered a verdict in the case and answered questions about the evidence in the case. ^ When an expert witness or the judge (either alone or in combination with one of the attorneys) informed jurors about the Guide, the jurors voted to convict defendants likely to be guilty and to acquit defendants likely to be innocent more often than did uninformed jurors assigned to a control group. These data suggest that informing jurors about the NIJ Guide using expert testimony or instructions from a judge will improve the quality and accuracy of jurors' verdict decisions in cases involving eyewitness identification evidence. However, more research is needed to determine whether the judge will remain an effective source of information about the Guide in a longer, more detailed trial scenario and to learn more about the underlying psychological processes governing the effects observed in this experiment. ^

Essays on financial crises

This dissertation analyzes recent financial crises in developed and developing countries. The research emphasizes the effects of institutional factors on the international banking and currency crises and their output losses. ^ Chapter two examines the roles of regulation, supervision, and countries' institutional environment in determining the probability of banking crises for a panel of fifteen developed countries from 1975 to 1998. The results from a multivariate logit model indicated that countries with greater government involvement, less capital standard requirements, and lower lending limits on a single borrower are associated with a higher probability of banking crises. ^ Chapter three studies whether output loss in banking crisis differs in market-based or bank-based financial systems. Using existing banking crisis data for sixty-nine countries during 1970–1999, we investigate whether the underlying financial system affects the output loss. The results show that output losses are more serious in market-based economies than those in bank-based economies. Longer crisis duration tends to increase the output losses in banking crises. Finally, countries with deposit insurance and strict law enforcement have less output losses. ^ Chapter four uses macroeconomic and institutional measures to explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and the decline in stock prices for emerging countries affected by the Mexican currency crisis of 1994–95. The results show that countries with more government budget deficits, and worse reserve adequacies tend to experience large exchange rate depreciation. The institutional measures do not explain much the extent of both the exchange rate depreciation and the decline in stock prices. ^