Displaced Comminuted Patellar Fracture Associated with Post Anterior Cruciate Ligament Reconstruction in a Male Collegiate Basketball Player

We present a unique case of a collegiate athlete who suffered an anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) injury leading to a displaced patellar stress fracture. We identified an unusual potential association between ACL reconstruction and patellar fractures in order to avoid potential complications in the rehabilitation and return to activity process.

No Free Lunch: Displaced Marsh Consumers Regulate a Prey Subsidy to an Estuarine Consumer

Pulse subsidies account for a substantial proportion of resource availability in many systems, having persistent and cascading effects on consumer population dynamics, and energy flow within and across ecosystem boundaries. Although the importance of pulsed resource subsidies is well-established, the mechanisms that regulate resource fluxes across ecosystem boundaries are not well understood. The aim of our study was to determine the extent that marsh consumers regulated a marsh prey subsidy to estuarine consumers in the oligohaline reaches of an Everglades estuary. We characterized a marsh pulsed subsidy of cyprinodontoid, invertebrate and sunfish prey that move into the upper estuary from adjacent drying marshes. In response to the prey pulse, we examined the numerical, fitness and dietary responses of three focal consumers in the upper estuary; two marsh species (largemouth bass and bowfin) that accompanied the subsidy as a result of marsh drying, and one estuarine consumer (snook). At the onset of marsh drying and the prey subsidy, estuarine consumers switched diets to consume the larger marsh prey (sunfishes), while bass and bowfin maintained similar diets (cyprinodontoids and invertebrates respectively) than pre and post subsidy. From the consumption of this subsidy, bass (marsh species) and snook (estuarine species) exhibited fitness gains while bowfin did not. Although both marsh and estuarine consumers benefitted from the subsidy, we found evidence that freshwater consumers shunted some of the subsidy away from snook. Of the prey sampled in consumer stomachs, 41% of marsh prey biomass was eaten by marsh consumers, while 59% was consumed by the estuarine consumer. We conclude that the amount of the marsh prey available to estuarine consumers may be greater in the absence of marsh consumers, thus the magnitude of the prey subsidy could depend on the dynamics of the marsh consumers from donor communities.

Law Enforcement Actions in Urban Spaces Governed by Violent Non-State Entities: Lessons from Latin America

In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in the retaken territories to regular police officers, with the hope that the territories and their populations will remain under the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have adopted such policies since the mid-1990s. During such operations, governments need to pursue two interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in those areas toward the state and away from the non-State criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement, such operations entail several critical decisions and junctions, such as: Whether or not to announce the force insertion in advance. The decision trades off the element of surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the criminal organizations against the ability to minimize civilian casualties and force levels. The latter, however, may allow criminals to go to ground and escape capture. Governments thus must decide whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups to other areas or maximize their decapitation capacity. Intelligence flows rarely come from the population. Often, rival criminal groups are the best source of intelligence. However, cooperation between the State and such groups that goes beyond using vetted intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate even public safety gains. Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is at times even more challenging than conducting the initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces, traditional police forces, especially if designed as community police, have the capacity to develop trust of the community and ultimately focus on crime prevention, developing such trust often takes a long time. To develop the community’s trust, regular police forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with intensive nonthreatening interactions with the population and minimize the use of force. Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at least over a year. Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint police-citizens’ boards, further facilities building trust in the police among the community. After disruption of the established criminal order, street crime often significantly rises and both the heavy-force and community-police units often struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime alienates the population of the retaken territory from the State. Thus developing a capacity to address street crime is critical. Moreover, the community police units tend to be vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any established trust and being able to recover it. Rather than operating on a priori determined handover schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength of regular police and criminal groups post-clearing operations is likely to be a better guide for timing the handover from heavy forces to regular police units. Cleared territories often experience not only a peace dividend, but also a peace deficit – in the rise new serious crime (in addition to street crime). Newly – valuable land and other previously-inaccessible resources can lead to land speculation and forced displacement; various other forms of new crime can also significantly rise. Community police forces often struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is frequently linked to legal business. Such new crime often receives little to no attention in the design of the operations to retake territories from criminal groups. But without developing an effective response to such new crime, the public safety gains of the clearing operations can be altogether lost.

A state of war: Florida from 1939 to 1945

World War II profoundly impacted Florida. The military geography of the State is essential to an understanding the war. The geostrategic concerns of place and space determined that Florida would become a statewide military base. Florida's attributes of place such as climate and topography determined its use as a military academy hosting over two million soldiers, nearly 15 percent of the GI Army, the largest force the US ever raised. One-in-eight Floridians went into uniform. Equally, Florida's space on the planet made it central for both defensive and offensive strategies. The Second World War was a war of movement, and Florida was a major jump off point for US force projection world-wide, especially of air power. Florida's demography facilitated its use as a base camp for the assembly and engagement of this military power. In 1940, less than two percent of the US population lived in Florida, a quiet, barely populated backwater of the United States. But owing to its critical place and space, over the next few years it became a 65,000 square mile training ground, supply dump, and embarkation site vital to the US war effort. Because of its place astride some of the most important sea lanes in the Atlantic World, Florida was the scene of one of the few Western Hemisphere battles of the war. The militarization of Florida began long before Pearl Harbor. The pre-war buildup conformed to the US strategy of the war. The strategy of theUS was then (and remains today) one of forward defense: harden the frontier, then take the battle to the enemy, rather than fight them in North America. The policy of "Europe First," focused the main US war effort on the defeat of Hitler's Germany, evaluated to be the most dangerous enemy. In Florida were established the military forces requiring the longest time to develop, and most needed to defeat the Axis. Those were a naval aviation force for sea-borne hostilities, a heavy bombing force for reducing enemy industrial states, and an aerial logistics train for overseas supply of expeditionary campaigns. The unique Florida coastline made possible the seaborne invasion training demanded for US victory. The civilian population was employed assembling mass-produced first-generation container ships, while Floridahosted casualties, Prisoners-of-War, and transient personnel moving between the Atlantic and Pacific. By the end of hostilities and the lifting of Unlimited Emergency, officially on December 31, 1946, Floridahad become a transportation nexus. Florida accommodated a return of demobilized soldiers, a migration of displaced persons, and evolved into a modern veterans' colonia. It was instrumental in fashioning the modern US military, while remaining a center of the active National Defense establishment. Those are the themes of this work.

A State of War: Florida from 1939 to 1945

World War II profoundly impacted Florida. The military geography of the State is essential to an understanding the war. The geostrategic concerns of place and space determined that Florida would become a statewide military base. Florida’s attributes of place such as climate and topography determined its use as a military academy hosting over two million soldiers, nearly 15 percent of the GI Army, the largest force theUS ever raised. One-in-eight Floridians went into uniform. Equally,Florida’s space on the planet made it central for both defensive and offensive strategies. The Second World War was a war of movement, and Florida was a major jump off point forUSforce projection world-wide, especially of air power. Florida’s demography facilitated its use as a base camp for the assembly and engagement of this military power. In 1940, less than two percent of the US population lived in Florida, a quiet, barely populated backwater of the United States.[1] But owing to its critical place and space, over the next few years it became a 65,000 square mile training ground, supply dump, and embarkation site vital to the US war effort. Because of its place astride some of the most important sea lanes in the Atlantic World,Florida was the scene of one of the few Western Hemisphere battles of the war. The militarization ofFloridabegan long before Pearl Harbor. The pre-war buildup conformed to theUSstrategy of the war. The strategy of theUS was then (and remains today) one of forward defense: harden the frontier, then take the battle to the enemy, rather than fight them inNorth America. The policy of “Europe First,” focused the main US war effort on the defeat of Hitler’sGermany, evaluated to be the most dangerous enemy. In Florida were established the military forces requiring the longest time to develop, and most needed to defeat the Axis. Those were a naval aviation force for sea-borne hostilities, a heavy bombing force for reducing enemy industrial states, and an aerial logistics train for overseas supply of expeditionary campaigns. The unique Florida coastline made possible the seaborne invasion training demanded for USvictory. The civilian population was employed assembling mass-produced first-generation container ships, while Floridahosted casualties, Prisoners-of-War, and transient personnel moving between the Atlantic and Pacific. By the end of hostilities and the lifting of Unlimited Emergency, officially on December 31, 1946, Floridahad become a transportation nexus. Florida accommodated a return of demobilized soldiers, a migration of displaced persons, and evolved into a modern veterans’ colonia. It was instrumental in fashioning the modern US military, while remaining a center of the active National Defense establishment. Those are the themes of this work. [1] US Census of Florida 1940. Table 4 – Race, By Nativity and Sex, For the State. 14.

Emergency and Transitional Shelters [Literature Review]

Over the past two decades the number of recorded disasters has doubled from approximately 200 to over 400 disasters per year. Such an increase in the frequency of disasters has not been without consequence, producing ever-greater waves of population displacements throughout the developing world. The United Nation’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) responsible for the coordination of international humanitarian responses states unequivocally that populations displaced by disaster have a right to protection and the provision of basic necessities such as adequate food, water, clothing, sanitation, and essential health services (IASC, 2006 and The Sphere Project, 2011). Shelter responses are often a vital node around which many of these humanitarian concerns are addressed. This document is a review of 3 case studies, 6 field reports, 1 concept paper, 16 guidelines, 1 call for proposals, and 4 strategic framework documents prepared by organizations active in the humanitarian shelter sector on emergency and transitional shelters. While emergency shelter response is focused primarily on protection and relief during and immediately after a disaster has occurred, the transitional shelter approach emphasizes integrating disaster response into an immediate transition towards reconstruction, recovery, and sustainable development.