The impact of CEO compensation and CEO horizon on a firm's discretionary research and development expenditures

Agency costs are said to arise as a result of the separation of ownership from control inherent in the corporate form of ownership. One such agency problem concerns the potential variance between the time horizons of principal shareholders and agent managers. Agency theory suggests that these costs can be alleviated or controlled through performance-based Chief Executive Officer (CEO) contracting. However, components of a CEO's compensation contract can exacerbate or mitigate agency-related problems (Antle and Smith, 1985). According to the horizon hypothesis, a self-serving CEO reduces discretionary research and development (R&D) expenditures to increase earnings and earnings-based bonus compensation. Agency theorists contend that a CEO's market-based compensation component can mitigate horizon problems. This study seeks to determine whether there is a relationship between CEO earnings- and market-based compensation components and R&D expenditures in the largest United States industrial firms from 1987 to 1993.^ Consistent with the horizon hypothesis, results provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary and bonus) and the firm's R&D expenditures. Consistent with the expectations of agency theory, results provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between market-based CEO compensation and R&D.^ Further results of this study provide evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between CEO tenure and the firm's R&D expenditures. Although there is a negative relationship between CEO age and the firm's R&D, it was not statistically significant at the 0.5 level. ^

Earnings management using estimates and the timing of adoption of accounting standards: An empirical examination of pensions

This study investigates the relationship between adoption timing of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 87 and earnings management after adoption. Earnings management, defined consistent with Schipper (1989), is tested through hypotheses using (1) a portfolio approach and (2) pension rates. One Hypothesis uses a Modified Jones (1991) Model as a proxy for discretionary accruals and the other uses pension rate estimates.^ Statistically significant relationships are found between adoption timing and (1) discretionary accruals and (2) estimated rate-of-return (ROR) on pension plan assets. Early adopting firms tend to have lower discretionary accruals after adoption than on-time adopters. They also tend to use higher ROR estimates which are not supported by higher actual returns. Thus, while early adopters may be using ROR to manage income, this tends to not result in higher discretionary accruals. ^

Employee engagement: An examination of antecedent and outcome variables

This nonexperimental, correlational study (N = 283) examined the relation among job fit, affective commitment, psychological climate, discretionary effort, intention to turnover, and employee engagement. An internet-based self-report survey battery of six scales were administered to a heterogeneous sampling of organizations from the fields of service, technology, healthcare, retail, banking, nonprofit, and hospitality. Hypotheses were tested through correlational and hierarchical regression analytic procedures. Job fit, affective commitment, and psychological climate were all significantly related to employee engagement and employee engagement was significantly related to both discretionary effort and intention to turnover. For the discretionary effort model, the hierarchical regression analysis results suggested that the employees who reported experiencing a positive psychological climate were more likely to report higher levels of discretionary effort. As for the intention to turnover model, the hierarchical regression analysis results indicated that affective commitment and employee engagement predicted lower levels of an employee’s intention to turnover. The regression beta weights ranged from to .43 to .78, supporting the theoretical, empirical, and practical relevance of understanding the impact of employee engagement on organizational outcomes. Implications for HRD theory, research, and practice are highlighted as possible strategic leverage points for creating conditions that facilitate the development of employee engagement as a means for improving organizational performance.

An examination of accounting and auditing issues related to strategic environmental initiatives

Although corporate environmental accountability is receiving unprecedented attention in the United States from policy makers, the capital market, and the public at large, extant research is limited in its examination of the implications of strategic corporate environmental initiatives on accounting and auditing. The purpose of my dissertation is to address these implications by examining the association between firm environmental initiatives and audit fees, capital expenditures, and earnings quality using multivariate regression analysis. I find that firms engaged in more strategic environmental initiatives tend to have significantly higher audit fees and capital expenditures, and significantly lower levels of earnings manipulation measured using discretionary accruals. These results support the notion that auditors do recognize the importance of environmental initiatives when conducting the year-end financial statement audit, an idea that positively reflects upon the auditor’s monitoring role. The results also demonstrate the increased amount of capital resources required to participate in strategic environmental initiatives, an anecdotal notion that had yet to be empirically supported. This empirical support provides valuable insights on how environmental initiatives materially impact corporate financial statements. Finally, my results extend the extant literature by demonstrating that the superior financial performance reported by environmentally active firms is less likely driven by earnings manipulation by management, and by implication, more likely a result of real economic gains. Taken together, my dissertation establishes a strong and timely foundation for current and future research to explore corporate environmental initiatives in the United States and globally, a topic increasingly gaining momentum in today’s more eco-conscious world.^

Essays on audit report lag

Audit reporting lag continues to remain an issue of significant interest to regulators, financial statement users, public companies, and auditors. The SEC has recently acted to reduce the deadline for filing annual and quarterly financial statements. Such focus on audit reporting lag arises because, as noted by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, relevance and reliability are the two primary qualities of accounting information; and, to be relevant, information has to be timely. In my dissertation, I examine three issues related to the audit report lag. The first essay focuses on the association between audit report lag and the meeting or beating of earnings benchmarks. I do not find any association between audit report lag and just meeting or beating earnings benchmarks. However, I find that longer audit report lag is negatively associated with the probability of using discretionary accruals to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We can infer from these results that audit effort, for which audit report lag is a proxy, reduces earnings management. The second part of my dissertation examines the association between types of auditor changes and audit report lag. I find that the resignation of an auditor is associated longer audit report lag compared to the dismissal of an auditor. I also find a significant positive association between the disclosure of a reportable event and audit report lag. The third part of my dissertation investigates the association between senior executive changes and audit report lag. I find that audit report lag is longer when client firms have a new CEO or CFO. Further, I find that audit report lag is longer when the new executive is someone from outside the firm. These results provide empirical evidence about the importance of senior management in the financial reporting process.

A model of school managerial control : the systematic analysis of managerial behaviors, processes, and indicators

The theoretical construct of control has been defined as necessary (Etzioni, 1965), ubiquitous (Vickers, 1967), and on-going (E. Langer, 1983). Empirical measures, however, have not adequately given meaning to this potent construct, especially within complex organizations such as schools. Four stages of theory-development and empirical testing of school building managerial control using principals and teachers working within the nation's fourth largest district are presented in this dissertation as follows: (1) a review and synthesis of social science theories of control across the literatures of organizational theory, political science, sociology, psychology, and philosophy; (2) a systematic analysis of school managerial activities performed at the building level within the context of curricular and instructional tasks; (3) the development of a survey questionnaire to measure school building managerial control; and (4) initial tests of construct validity including inter-item reliability statistics, principal components analyses, and multivariate tests of significance. The social science synthesis provided support of four managerial control processes: standards, information, assessment, and incentives. The systematic analysis of school managerial activities led to further categorization between structural frequency of behaviors and discretionary qualities of behaviors across each of the control processes and the curricular and instructional tasks. Teacher survey responses (N=486) reported a significant difference between these two dimensions of control, structural frequency and discretionary qualities, for standards, information, and assessments, but not for incentives. The descriptive model of school managerial control suggests that (1) teachers perceive structural and discretionary managerial behaviors under information and incentives more clearly than activities representing standards or assessments, (2) standards are primarily structural while assessments are primarily qualitative, (3) teacher satisfaction is most closely related to the equitable distribution of incentives, (4) each of the structural managerial behaviors has a qualitative effect on teachers, and that (5) certain qualities of managerial behaviors are perceived by teachers as distinctly discretionary, apart from school structure. The variables of teacher tenure and school effectiveness reported significant effects on school managerial control processes, while instructional levels (elementary, junior, and senior) and individual school differences were not found to be significant for the construct of school managerial control.