Organizational response to employment under the ADA of workers with psychiatric disabilities: Four case studies

Title 1 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires all employers, public and private, with more than fifteen employees to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities if the accommodation would, within limits, allow the individual to perform the essential functions of the job. Seven years after Congress enacted the law and five years after the initial provisions became effective, little information is available about the experience of organizations faced with requests for workplace accommodation.^ The question addressed in this study is: How are organizations responding to the ADA mandate to fit individuals with psychiatric disabilities in the workplace? The data sources are three organizations that allowed access to this sensitive information, and a fourth that had two disability discrimination charges filed against it.^ A brute-force case method approach applied to the four organizations yields the following information: Attorneys are hesitant to allow inquiry into company policy owing to fear of litigation; workers are not disclosing and requesting accommodation; tacit accommodation of long-standing employees appears to be a regular practice; knowledge of the intent of the ADA makes a difference in terms of equality of treatment; and insensitivity to employee privacy results in an adversarial situation.^ Implications are relevant to the need to improve lines of communication between human resource, EEO, supervisory, and legal staff; consequences of failure to address accommodations on an explicit level; need for better understanding of the availability and use of outside resources for achieving accommodation; and improvement of self-advocacy and disclosure by the employees with disabilities. ^

Internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers

I examine three issues related to internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers. Motivation for the three studies comes from the fact that Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) continues to be controversial, as evidenced by the permanent exemption from Section 404(b) of SOX granted to non-accelerated filers by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act also requires the SEC to study compliance costs associated with smaller accelerated filers. In the first part of my dissertation, I document that the audit fee premium for non-accelerated filers disclosing a material weakness in internal controls (a) is significantly lower than the corresponding premium for accelerated filers, and (b) declines significantly over time. I also find that in the case of accelerated filers remediating clients pay lower fees compared to clients continuing to report internal control problems; however, such differences are not observed in the case of non-accelerated filers. The second essay focuses on audit report lag. The results indicate that presence of material weaknesses are associated with increased audit report lags, for both accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results also indicate that the decline in report lag following remediation of problems is greater for accelerated filers than for non-accelerated filers. The third essay examines early warnings (pursuant to Section 302 disclosures) for firms that subsequently disclosed internal control problems in their 404 reports. The analyses indicate that non-accelerated firms with shorter CFO tenure, presence of accounting experts on the audit committee, and more frequent audit committee meetings are more likely to provide prior Section 302 warnings. Overall the results suggest that there are differences in internal control reporting between the accelerated and non-accelerated filers. The results provide empirical grounding for the ongoing debate about internal control reporting by non-accelerated filers.

Implications of FIN 46 for Accruals Quality and Investment Efficiency

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities – An Interpretation of ARB No. 51, in January 2003 and revised it in December 2003, with the objective to improve the transparency of financial information. Under FIN 46, companies are required to consolidate variable interest entities (VIEs) on financial statements if they are the primary beneficiaries of the VIEs. This dissertation empirically examines whether the implementation of this new financial reporting guidance affects firms’ accruals quality and investment efficiency. A manually collected sample comprised of firms affected by FIN 46 and firms disclosing no material impact from FIN 46 is used in the empirical analyses.The first part of the dissertation investigates the effects of FIN 46 on accruals quality. By using different accrual quality measures in prior studies, this study found that firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in accrual quality compared to firms reporting no material impact from FIN 46. Among the firms affected by FIN 46, firms consolidating VIEs were compared with firms terminating or restructuring VIEs. The accruals quality of firms consolidating VIEs was found to be lower than that of firms terminating or restructuring VIEs. These results are consistent in tests using alternative control samples.The second part of this dissertation examines the effects of FIN 46 on investment efficiency. Mixed results were found from using two different proxies used in prior literature. Using the investment-cash flow sensitivity to proxy for investment efficiency, firms affected by FIN 46 experienced a decrease in investment efficiency compared to firms reporting no material impact. It was also found that higher investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms consolidating VIEs during post-FIN 46 periods compared to both the no-impact firms and the matched pair control sample. Contrasting results were found when the deviation from expected investment is used as another proxy for investment efficiency. Empirical analyses show that FIN 46 firms experienced improved investment efficiency measured by the deviation from expected investment after their adoption of FIN 46. This study also provides explanations for the opposite results from the two different proxies.