Rio and the Reds: The Comando Vermelho, Organized Crime and Brazil’s Economic Ascent [Student’s Paper Series]

Brazil’s growing status as a potential world power cannot obscure the characteristics of its other reality: that of a country with vast inequalities and high crime rates. The Comando Vermelho, the most prominent organized crime syndicate in Rio de Janeiro, besieges the beauty and charm that attracts tourists to this city. The CV arose not only as a product of the political dictatorship of the seventies, but also of the disenfranchised urban poor crammed into Rio’s favela slums. Today, the CV presents a powerful challenge to the State’s control of parts of Rio territory. As Brazil’s soft power projection grows, it is seriously challenged by its capacity to eliminate organized crime. Economic growth is not sufficient to destroy a deeply embedded organization like the CV. In fact, Brazil’s success may yet further retrench the CV’s activities. Culpability for organized crime cannot be merely limited to the gangs, but must also be shared among the willing consumers, among whom can be found educated and elite members of society, as well as the impoverished and desperate. The Brazilian government needs a top-down response addressing the schism between rich and poor. However, Brazil’s citizens must also take responsibility and forge a bottom-up response to the drug- and corruption-riddled elements of its most respected members of society. Brazil must target reform across public health, housing, education and above all, law enforcement. Without such changes, Brazil will remain a two-track democracy. Rio’s wealthy will still be able to revel in the city’s beauty albeit from behind armored cars and fortified mansions, while the city’s poor will yield – either as victims or perpetrators – to the desperate measures of organized crime.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua

A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attachés in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Job Perceptions of Citizenship Behavior and Deviance: Musings from Behind the Bar

The purpose of this research was to examine bartender workplace behavior. This study begins with a review of the literature pertaining to the job of bartending, and positive work behavior (citizenship) and negative (deviant) workplace behavior. Data was collected by semi-structured interview. The bartenders expressed instances of both behaviors and showed support for a newly termed citizenship behavior, norm avoidance.

The Prison System and the Media: How “Orange Is The New Black” Engages with the Prison as a Normalizing Agent

The purpose of this project is to ascertain the ways in which Orange is the New Black uses its platform to either complicate or reify narratives about the prison system, prisoners and their relationship to the state. This research uses the works of Giorgio Agamben, Colin Dayan, Michelle Alexander and Lisa Guenther to situate the ways the state uses the prison and social narratives about the prison to extend its control on certain populations beyond prison walls through police presence, parole, the war on drugs and prison fees. From that basis, this work argues that while Orange does challenge some narratives about race and sexuality, because of its reliance on “bad choices” as a humanizing trope and its reliance on certain racialized stereotypes for entertainment, the show ultimately does more to reify existing narratives that support state interests.

Natural Disasters and Comparative State-Formation and Nation-Building: Earthquakes in Argentina and Chile (1822-1939)

Natural disasters in Argentina and Chile played a significant role in the state-formation and nation-building process (1822-1939). This dissertation explores state and society responses to earthquakes by studying public and private relief efforts reconstruction plans, crime and disorder, religious interpretations of catastrophes, national and transnational cultures of disaster, science and technology, and popular politics. Although Argentina and Chile share a political border and geological boundary, the two countries provide contrasting examples of state formation. Most disaster relief and reconstruction efforts emanated from the centralized Chilean state in Santiago. In Argentina, provincial officials made the majority of decisions in a catastrophe’s aftermath. Patriotic citizens raised money and collected clothing for survivors that helped to weave divergent regions together into a nation. The shared experience of earthquakes in all regions of Chile created a national disaster culture. Similarly, common disaster experiences, reciprocal relief efforts, and aid commissions linked Chileans with Western Argentine societies and generated a transnational disaster culture. Political leaders viewed reconstruction as opportunities to implement their visions for the nation on the urban landscape. These rebuilding projects threatened existing social hierarchies and often failed to come to fruition. Rebuilding brought new technologies from Europe to the Southern Cone. New building materials and systems, however, had to be adapted to the South American economic and natural environment. In a catastrophe’s aftermath, newspapers projected images of disorder and the authorities feared lawlessness and social unrest. Judicial and criminal records, however, show that crime often decreased after a disaster. Finally, nineteenth-century earthquakes heightened antagonism and conflict between the Catholic Church and the state. Conservative clergy asserted that disasters were divine punishments for the state’s anti-clerical measures and later railed against scientific explanations of earthquakes.

The development of optimized high performance liquid chromatography systems for the analysis of improvised explosives

Existing instrumental techniques must be adaptable to the analysis of novel explosives if science is to keep up with the practices of terrorists and criminals. The focus of this work has been the development of analytical techniques for the analysis of two types of novel explosives: ascorbic acid-based propellants, and improvised mixtures of concentrated hydrogen peroxide/fuel. In recent years, the use of these explosives in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has increased. It is therefore important to develop methods which permit the identification of the nature of the original explosive from post-blast residues. Ascorbic acid-based propellants are low explosives which employ an ascorbic acid fuel source with a nitrate/perchlorate oxidizer. A method which utilized ion chromatography with indirect photometric detection was optimized for the analysis of intact propellants. Post-burn and post-blast residues if these propellants were analyzed. It was determined that the ascorbic acid fuel and nitrate oxidizer could be detected in intact propellants, as well as in the post-burn and post-blast residues. Degradation products of the nitrate and perchlorate oxidizers were also detected. With a quadrupole time-of-flight mass spectrometer (QToFMS), exact mass measurements are possible. When an HPLC instrument is coupled to a QToFMS, the combination of retention time with accurate mass measurements, mass spectral fragmentation information, and isotopic abundance patterns allows for the unequivocal identification of a target analyte. An optimized HPLC-ESI-QToFMS method was applied to the analysis of ascorbic acid-based propellants. Exact mass measurements were collected for the fuel and oxidizer anions, and their degradation products. Ascorbic acid was detected in the intact samples and half of the propellants subjected to open burning; the intact fuel molecule was not detected in any of the post-blast residue. Two methods were optimized for the analysis of trace levels of hydrogen peroxide: HPLC with fluorescence detection (HPLC-FD), and HPLC with electrochemical detection (HPLC-ED). Both techniques were extremely selective for hydrogen peroxide. Both methods were applied to the analysis of post-blast debris from improvised mixtures of concentrated hydrogen peroxide/fuel; hydrogen peroxide was detected on variety of substrates. Hydrogen peroxide was detected in the post-blast residues of the improvised explosives TATP and HMTD.

The Security Challenges for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games

Brazilians greeted the long-awaited decision of making Rio de Janeiro the host of the 2016 Olympic Games with tremendous exhilaration. Although Rio’s fantastic natural beauty certainly added to its attraction in hosting the games, its alarming rates of urban crime and violence largely associated with drug trafficking immediately triggered worldwide criticism, and put at issue its ability to guarantee the security for the games. Brazilians have been vying for a position as an emerging global economy and understand the importance of the Games for international prestige. This makes the stakes very high when hosting the Olympic Games in the wake of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, which will also be held in Brazil. This paper explores these criticisms and assesses Rio’s ability to prepare for this important event. The paper further explores the consensus that Brazilians will be more equipped to address actions taken by organized crime capable of affecting the Olympic Games than to face a terrorist attack. Brazil – and Rio – does not figure in the “terrorism map” as a region particularly linked to terrorism. Aside from uncorroborated suspicions of activities by terrorist organizations on the Tri-Border region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Brazil does not elicit many concerns regarding terrorism.1 Yet, there is no way to guarantee that terrorist organizations will not try to make use of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to advance their agenda. This being in mind, Rio and Brazil in general face a long road ahead to prepare, prevent, protect and respond to a possible terrorist attack during the 2016 Olympics. It is clear that prevention and preparation towards potential threats to the Games must necessarily include cooperation and exchange of best practices with other countries. 1 U.S. Department of State has confirmed that this area may have been used to transport weapons and conduct financial affairs in the past. This type of activity has been made more difficult with the fortification of border controls in more recent times.

The Use of the Military for Law Enforcement Activities in Central America

Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

Building Regional Security: Cooperation in the 21st Century: The Case of the Caribbean Regional Security System [RSS]

Small states that lack capacity and act on their own may fall victim to international and domestic terrorism, transnational organized crime or criminal gangs. The critical issue is not whether small Caribbean states should cooperate in meeting security challenges, but it is rather in what manner, and by which mechanisms can they overcome obstacles in the way of cooperation. The remit of the Regional Security System (RSS) has expanded dramatically, but its capabilities have improved very slowly. The member governments of the RSS are reluctant to develop military capacity beyond current levels since they see economic and social development and disaster relief as priorities, requiring little investment in military hardware. The RSS depends on international donors such as the USA, Canada, Great Britain, and increasingly China to fund training programs, maintain equipment and acquire material. In the view of most analysts, an expanded regional arrangement based on an RSS nucleus is not likely in the foreseeable future. Regional political consensus remains elusive and the predominance of national interests over regional considerations continues to serve as an obstacle to any CARICOM wide regional defense mechanism. Countries in the Caribbean, including the members of the RSS, have to become more responsible for their own security from their own resources. While larger CARICOM economies can do this, it would be difficult for most OECS members of the RSS to do the same. The CARICOM region including the RSS member countries, have undertaken direct regional initiatives in security collaboration. Implementation of the recommendations of the Regional Task Force on Crime and Security (RTFCS) and the structure and mechanisms created for the staging of the Cricket World Cup (CWC 2007) resulted in unprecedented levels of cooperation and permanent legacy institutions for the regional security toolbox. The most important tier of security relationships for the region is the United States and particularly USSOUTHCOM. The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative [CBSI] in which the countries of the RSS participate is a useful U.S. sponsored tool to strengthen the capabilities of the Caribbean countries and promote regional ownership of security initiatives. Future developments under discussion by policy makers in the Caribbean security environment include the granting of law enforcement authority to the military, the formation of a single OECS Police Force, and the creation of a single judicial and law enforcement space. The RSS must continue to work with its CARICOM partners, as well as with the traditional “Atlantic Powers” particularly Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom to implement a general framework for regional security collaboration. Regional security cooperation should embrace wider traditional and non-traditional elements of security appropriate to the 21st century. Security cooperation must utilize to the maximum the best available institutions, mechanisms, techniques and procedures already available in the region. The objective should not be the creation of new agencies but rather the generation of new resources to take effective operations to higher cumulative levels. Security and non-security tools should be combined for both strategic and operational purposes. Regional, hemispheric, and global implications of tactical and operational actions must be understood and appreciated by the forces of the RSS member states. The structure and mechanisms, created for the staging of Cricket World Cup 2007 should remain as legacy institutions and a toolbox for improving regional security cooperation in the Caribbean. RSS collaboration should build on the process of operational level synergies with traditional military partners. In this context, the United States must be a true partner with shared interests, and with the ability to work unobtrusively in a nationalistic environment. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the RSS is not an option.

Assessing an automated, information -sharing technology in the post "9 -11" era: Do local law enforcement officers think it meets their needs?

In the wake of the “9-11” terrorists' attacks, the U.S. Government has turned to information technology (IT) to address a lack of information sharing among law enforcement agencies. This research determined if and how information-sharing technology helps law enforcement by examining the differences in perception of the value of IT between law enforcement officers who have access to automated regional information sharing and those who do not. It also examined the effect of potential intervening variables such as user characteristics, training, and experience, on the officers' evaluation of IT. The sample was limited to 588 officers from two sheriff's offices; one of them (the study group) uses information sharing technology, the other (the comparison group) does not. Triangulated methodologies included surveys, interviews, direct observation, and a review of agency records. Data analysis involved the following statistical methods: descriptive statistics, Chi-Square, factor analysis, principal component analysis, Cronbach's Alpha, Mann-Whitney tests, analysis of variance (ANOVA), and Scheffe' post hoc analysis. ^ Results indicated a significant difference between groups: the study group perceived information sharing technology as being a greater factor in solving crime and in increasing officer productivity. The study group was more satisfied with the data available to it. As to the number of arrests made, information sharing technology did not make a difference. Analysis of the potential intervening variables revealed several remarkable results. The presence of a strong performance management imperative (in the comparison sheriff's office) appeared to be a factor in case clearances and arrests, technology notwithstanding. As to the influence of user characteristics, level of education did not influence a user's satisfaction with technology, but user-satisfaction scores differed significantly among years of experience as a law enforcement officer and the amount of computer training, suggesting a significant but weak relationship. ^ Therefore, this study finds that information sharing technology assists law enforcement officers in doing their jobs. It also suggests that other variables such as computer training, experience, and management climate should be accounted for when assessing the impact of information technology. ^

The Development of High Performance Liquid Chromatography Systems for the Analysis of Improvised Explosives

Existing instrumental techniques must be adaptable to the analysis of novel explosives if science is to keep up with the practices of terrorists and criminals. The focus of this work has been the development of analytical techniques for the analysis of two types of novel explosives: ascorbic acid-based propellants, and improvised mixtures of concentrated hydrogen peroxide/fuel. In recent years, the use of these explosives in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has increased. It is therefore important to develop methods which permit the identification of the nature of the original explosive from post-blast residues. Ascorbic acid-based propellants are low explosives which employ an ascorbic acid fuel source with a nitrate/perchlorate oxidizer. A method which utilized ion chromatography with indirect photometric detection was optimized for the analysis of intact propellants. Post-burn and post-blast residues if these propellants were analyzed. It was determined that the ascorbic acid fuel and nitrate oxidizer could be detected in intact propellants, as well as in the post-burn and post-blast residues. Degradation products of the nitrate and perchlorate oxidizers were also detected. With a quadrupole time-of-flight mass spectrometer (QToFMS), exact mass measurements are possible. When an HPLC instrument is coupled to a QToFMS, the combination of retention time with accurate mass measurements, mass spectral fragmentation information, and isotopic abundance patterns allows for the unequivocal identification of a target analyte. An optimized HPLC-ESI-QToFMS method was applied to the analysis of ascorbic acid-based propellants. Exact mass measurements were collected for the fuel and oxidizer anions, and their degradation products. Ascorbic acid was detected in the intact samples and half of the propellants subjected to open burning; the intact fuel molecule was not detected in any of the post-blast residue. Two methods were optimized for the analysis of trace levels of hydrogen peroxide: HPLC with fluorescence detection (HPLC-FD), and HPLC with electrochemical detection (HPLC-ED). Both techniques were extremely selective for hydrogen peroxide. Both methods were applied to the analysis of post-blast debris from improvised mixtures of concentrated hydrogen peroxide/fuel; hydrogen peroxide was detected on variety of substrates. Hydrogen peroxide was detected in the post-blast residues of the improvised explosives TATP and HMTD.