Matching human resource and corporate strategies

Increasing use of the term, Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM), reflects the recognition of the interdependencies between corporate strategy, organization and human resource management in the functioning of the firm. Dyer and Holder (1988) proposed a comprehensive Human Resource Strategic Typology consisting of three strategic types--inducement, investment and involvement. This research attempted to empirically validate their typology and also test the performance implications of the match between corporate strategy and HR strategy. Hypotheses were tested to determine the relationships between internal consistency in HRM sub-systems, match between corporate strategy and HR strategy, and firm performance. Data were collected by a mail survey of 998 senior HR executives of whom 263 returned the completed questionnaire. Financial information on 909 firms was collected from secondary sources like 10-K reports and CD-Disclosure. Profitability ratios were indexed to industry averages. Confirmatory Factor Analysis using LISREL provided support in favor of the six-factor HR measurement model; the six factors were staffing, training, compensation, appraisal, job design and corporate involvement. Support was also found for the presence of a second-order factor labeled "HR Strategic Orientation" explaining the variations among the six factors. LISREL analysis also supported the congruence hypothesis that HR Strategic Orientation significantly affects firm performance. There was a significant associative relationship between HR Strategy and Corporate Strategy. However, the contingency effects of the match between HR and Corporate strategies were not supported. Several tests were conducted to show that the survey results are not affected by non-response bias nor by mono-method bias. Implications of these findings for both researchers and practitioners are discussed. ^

Three essays on the interrelationships among financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm's rate of return

The increase in the number of financial restatements in recent years has resulted in a significant decrease in the amount of market capitalization for restated companies. Prior literature did not differentiate between single and multiple restatements announcements. This research investigated the inter-relationships among multiple financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm’s rate of return in the form of three essays by differentiating between single and multiple restatement announcement companies. First essay examined the stock performance of companies announcing the financial restatement multiple times. The postulation is that prior research overestimates the abnormal return by not separating single restatement companies from multiple restatement companies. This study investigated how market penalizes the companies that announce restatement more than once. Differentiating the restatement announcement data based on number of restatement announcements, the results supported the non persistence hypothesis that the market has no memory and negative abnormal returns obtained after each of the restatement announcements are completely random. Second essay examined the multiple restatement announcements and its perceived resultant information asymmetry around the announcement day. This study examined the pattern of information asymmetry for these announcements in terms of whether the bid-ask spread widens around the announcement day. The empirical analysis supported the hypotheses that the spread does widen not only around the first restatement announcement day but around every subsequent announcement days as well. The third essay empirically examined the financial and corporate governance characteristics of single and multiple restatement announcements companies. The analysis showed that corporate governance variables influence the occurrence of multiple restatement announcements and can distinguish multiple restatements announcement companies from single restatement announcement companies.

Three Essays on the Interrelationships Among Financial Restatements, Corporate Governance, Market Microstructure and the Firm's Rate of Return

The increase in the number of financial restatements in recent years has resulted in a significant decrease in the amount of market capitalization for restated companies. Prior literature does not differentiate between single and multiple restatements announcements. This research investigates the inter-relationships among multiple financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm's rate of return in the form of three essays by differentiating between single and multiple restatement announcement companies. First essay examines the stock performance of companies announcing the financial restatement multiple times. The postulation is that prior research overestimates the abnormal return by not separating single restatement companies from multiple restatement companies. This study investigates how market penalizes the companies that announce restatement more than once. Differentiating the restatement announcement data based on number of restatement announcements, the results support for non persistence hypothesis that the market has no memory and negative abnormal returns obtained after each of the restatement announcements are completely random. Second essay examines the multiple restatement announcements and its perceived resultant information asymmetry around the announcement day. This study examines the pattern of information asymmetry for these announcements in terms of whether the bid-ask spread widens around the announcement day. The empirical analysis supports the hypotheses that the spread does widen not only around the first restatement announcement day but around every subsequent announcement days as well. The third essay empirically examines the financial and corporate governance characteristics of single and multiple restatement announcements companies. The analysis shows that corporate governance variables influence the occurrence of multiple restatement announcements and can distinguish multiple restatements announcement companies from single restatement announcement companies.