On the fundamentals of research and development (R&D) spillovers in competitive markets

Rivals may voluntarily share Research and Development (R&D) results even in the absence of any binding agreements or collusion. In a model where rival firms engage in non-cooperative independent R&D process, we used optimization and game theory analysis to study the equilibrium strategy of the firms. Our work showed that, while minimal spillover is always equilibrium, there may be another equilibrium where firms may reciprocally choose high, sometimes perfect, spillover rates. The incentive for sharing R&D output is based on firms' expectations of learning from their rivals' R&D progress in the future. This leads to strategic complementarities between the firms' choices of spillover rates and thus policy implication follows. ^ Public research agencies can contribute more to social welfare by providing research as public goods. In a non-cooperative public-private research relationship where parallel R&D is conducted, by making its R&D results accessible, the public research agency can stimulate private spillovers, even if there exists rivalry among the private firms who can benefit from such spillovers. ^

The Development of an Ethical Strategy for Managers of International Hotels in Third World Countries

This article discusses some of the dilemmas of conscience that greet the international hotel manager in the Third World. It offers realistic and ethical guidelines for decision-making and problem-solving. Some of these guidelines require only common sense and good will to implement; others require a great deal of creativity, sensitivity, effort, and care; and a few will demand the courage to stand up for what is right in the face of competitive pressure.