Relative roles of dispersal dynamics and competition in determining the isotopic niche breadth of a wetland fish

1. The niche variation hypothesis predicts that among-individual variation in niche use will increase in the presence of intraspecific competition and decrease in the presence of interspecific competition. We sought to determine whether the local isotopic niche breadth of fish inhabiting a wetland was best explained by competition for resources and the niche variation hypothesis, by dispersal of individuals from locations with different prey resources or by a combination of the two. We analysed stable isotopes of carbon and nitrogen as indices of feeding niche and compared metrics of within-site spread to characterise site-level isotopic niche breadth. We then evaluated the explanatory power of competing models of the direct and indirect effects of several environmental variables spanning gradients of disturbance, competition strength and food availability on among-individual variation of the eastern mosquitofish (Gambusia holbrooki). 2. The Dispersal model posits that only the direct effect of disturbance (i.e. changes in water level known to induce fish movement) influences among-individual variation in isotopic niche. The Partitioning model allows for only direct effects of local food availability on among-individual variation. The Combined model allows for both hypotheses by including the direct effects of disturbance and food availability. 3. A linear regression of the Combined model described more variance than models limited to the variables of either the Dispersal or Partitioning models. Of the independent variables considered, the food availability variable (per cent edible periphyton) explained the most variation in isotopic niche breadth, followed closely by the disturbance variable (days since last drying event). 4. Structural equation modelling provided further evidence that the Combined model was best supported by the data, with the Partitioning and the Dispersal models only modestly less informative. Again, the per cent edible periphyton was the variable with the largest direct effect on niche variability, with other food availability variables and the disturbance variable only slightly less important. Indirect effects of heterospecific and conspecific competitor densities were also important, through their effects on prey density. 5. Our results support the Combined hypotheses, although partitioning mechanisms appear to explain the most diet variation among individuals in the eastern mosquitofish. The results also support some predictions of the niche variation hypothesis, although both conspecific and interspecific competition appeared to increase isotopic niche breadth in contrast to predictions that interspecific competition would decrease it. We think this resulted from high diet overlap of co-occurring species, most of which consume similar macroinvertebrates.

Essays on Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.

Essays on competition in the pharmaceutical industry

Chapter 1: Patents and Entry Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Marketing Exclusivity. Effective patent length for innovation drugs is severely curtailed because of extensive efficacy and safety tests required for FDA approval, raising concern over adequacy of incentives for new drug development. The Hatch-Waxman Act extends patent length for new drugs by five years, but also promotes generic entry by simplifying approval procedures and granting 180-day marketing exclusivity to a first generic entrant before the patent expires. In this paper we present a dynamic model to examine the effect of marketing exclusivity. We find that marketing exclusivity may be redundant and its removal may increase generic firms' profits and social welfare. ^ Chapter 2: Why Authorized Generics?: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations Facing generic competition, the brand-name companies some-times launch generic versions themselves called authorized generics. This practice is puzzling. If it is cannibalization, it cannot be profitable. If it is divisionalization, it should be practiced always instead of sometimes. I explain this phenomenon in terms of switching costs in a model in which the incumbent first develops a customer base to ready itself against generic competition later. I show that only sufficiently low switching costs or large market size justifies launch of AGs. I then use prescription drug data to test those results and find support. ^ Chapter 3: The Merger Paradox and R&D Oligopoly theory says that merger is unprofitable, unless a majority of firms in industry merge. Here, we introduce R&D opportunities to resolve this so-called merger paradox. We have three results. First, when there is one R&D firm, that firm can profitably merge with any number of non-R&D firms. Second, with multiple R&D firms and multiple non-R&D firms, all R&D firms can profitably merge. Third, with two R&D firms and two non-R&D firms, each R&D firms prefer to merge with a non-R&D firm. With three or more than non-R&D firms, however, the R&D firms prefer to merge with each other.^